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Steganography is the process of hiding information in plain sight, it is a technology
that can be used to hide data and facilitate secret communications. Steganography
is commonly seen in the digital domain where the pervasive nature of media con-
tent (image, audio, video) provides an ideal avenue for hiding secret information.
In recent years, video steganography has shown to be a highly suitable alternative
to image and audio steganography due to its potential advantages (capacity, flexi-
bility, popularity). An increased interest towards research in video steganography
has led to the development of video stego-systems that are now available to the
public. Many of these stego-systems have not yet been subjected to analysis or
evaluation, and their capabilities for performing secure, practical, and effective
video steganography are unknown.
This thesis presents a comprehensive analysis of the state-of-the-art in practical
video steganography. Video-based stego-systems are identified and examined using
steganalytic techniques (system steganalysis) to determine the security practices
of relevant stego-systems. The research in this thesis is conducted through a series
of case studies that aim to provide novel insights in the field of steganalysis and
its capabilities towards practical video steganography.
The results of this work demonstrate the impact of system attacks over the
practical state-of-the-art in video steganography. Through this research, it is evi-
dent that video-based stego-systems are highly vulnerable and fail to follow many
of the well-understood security practices in the field. Consequently, it is possible
to confidently detect each stego-system with a high rate of accuracy. As a result of
this research, it is clear that current work in practical video steganography demon-
strates a failure to address key principles and best practices in the field. Continued
efforts to address this will provide safe and secure steganographic technologies.
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Traditional approaches to cyber-security and data protection have a heavy reliance
on encryption. Cryptographic protocols and systems are implemented worldwide
to keep information and communications secure. This is a result of the digital era
and the consumption of digital content.
In many cases, cryptography provides the ideal solution when a user is mainly
concerned about privacy and the confidentiality of their information. However,
cryptography still faces challenges. Secured communications can still be at risk of
attracting unwarranted intervention. An encrypted message, although indecipher-
able, may be tampered if it has been intercepted. In some cases, the messages
can be analysed to attempt decryption, or the communication channel may be
blocked to cause disruption between parties. Finally, the message can be modi-
fied or destroyed through a sanitization process. These concerns demonstrate a
need for an alternative method of communication, a subliminal channel in which
communicating parties would be safe from intrusion and intervention. This was
originally conceptualised and formulated by Gustavus Simmons in the well known
Prisoner’s Problem [138]. The aim was to emphasise the need to explore alternative
subliminal channels for secret communication.
In this formulation, Alice and Bob are locked in separate cells. The two pris-
oners plan to escape confinement even as their communication is monitored and
controlled by the prison’s warden Eve. If Eve suspects that Alice and Bob are
exchanging messages secretly, any communication is blocked and the plan will fail.
1
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Three scenarios can be described to demonstrate approaches towards creating and
using a subliminal channel.
Scenario 1 can be called “The plaintext problem” (Figure 1). Alice and Bob use
a typical method of communication where information is being exchanged between
the two prisoners in clear, plain-text. Eve, who has access to the communication
channel can easily observe the messages and see that unauthorised information is
being exchanged. With control of the channel, Eve can block, modify or sanitise
the messages, causing any plan formulated between Bob and Alice to fail.
Figure 1: Scenario 1 - The plaintext problem
Scenario 2 can be named “The cryptographic addition” (Figure 2). In this
scenario, Alice and Bob attempt the use of cryptography over plaintext. The two
prisoners encrypt a message to make it indecipherable so that the warden Eve
cannot read the contents of any exchanged messages. This method of communica-
tion although potentially secure in terms of confidentiality, draws attention to the
unreadable content of each message. Eve believes this to be suspicious and she
will again block the prisoner’s channel of communication.
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Figure 2: Scenario 2 - The cryptographic extension
Scenario 3 is the “steganographic solution” (Figure 3). Alice and Bob create a
subliminal method for exchanging messages, one that is hidden within the original
channel of communication. Through this, the two prisoners can hide their messages
in plain sight and keep any plans to escape hidden from the warden Eve. Without
knowledge of this subliminal channel, communications are allowed through.
Figure 3: Scenario 3 - The steganographic solution
Formally this is defined as steganography. It is the process of hiding information
in plain sight while concealing any evidence of itself. Steganography has become
particularly popular in the digital domain due to the diverse nature of digital
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content, and the widespread usage of the Internet. Messages can be hidden through
a variety of file formats and easily exchanged. Detection of steganography is left to
the field of steganalysis. This is the pursuit of identifying and proving the existence
of steganography. Typically, a steganalytic attack is based upon one of two main
approaches. The first falls under the traditional paradigm for steganography, where
the approach is modelled as a data hiding and detection problem. Through this,
the attack is interested in how an embedding algorithm impacts a digital signal.
The second approach extends this paradigm to consider steganography as a coding
challenge. This is described as a system attack and through this, a diverse range
of steganalytic attacks can be constructed throughout an entire given object. In
this case, the attack may not be related exclusively to the embedding algorithm.
Statistical steganalysis can at times reliably detect the presence of steganog-
raphy. However, these techniques face multiple challenges in a practical setting.
Statistical methods are sophisticated and typically incorporate machine learning
and feature extraction techniques. When applicable, system attacks can markedly
simplify the process of steganalysis. Implementation vulnerabilities can be far
easier to identify as they are often predictable and consistent. This is because
high-level features used for extraction will usually be an unintentional by-product
of the implementation. In some cases, it could be that a stego-system has not
considered its impact on a stego-object outside of the digital signal. This effec-
tively creates a new avenue for steganalysis. These vulnerabilities quickly degrade
a stego-system into a cryptographic application and defeat the fundamental pur-
pose of steganography.
Steganography can be used either for malicious or legitimate purposes. Typ-
ically, stego-systems are created and intended for those who are unable to com-
municate safely. This could include journalists or those who are under oppressive,
non-democratic regimes or whistle-blowers. These are the target audience for many
modern steganography tools such as Pixelknot [120]. However, the unintended use
of steganography by criminals often motivates the need for advancements in ste-
ganalysis.
Terrorists have long been suspected of using steganography to conceal all evi-
dence of their communications. A report by the United Nations recognises the use
of steganography tools such as Camouflage to hide information [110] for terrorist
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purposes. The report also identifies the FARC organisation and showcases their
use of steganography and similar anti-forensic techniques. Many other known cases
give support to this concern. In May 2011, an al-Qaeda operative, Masqood Lodin,
was detained by German police and found to be in possession of a concealed mem-
ory stick containing a video. Embedded within this video using steganographic
techniques were 141 documents including reports on past al-Qaeda operations and
plans for future attacks [60]. Another high-profile case involved a Russian spy
ring based in the USA. This group used steganography to embed messages within
image files and upload them to websites to avoid detection from the U.S. govern-
ment [146]. It has also been reported that ISIS supporters are using the Telegram
channel to share steganography tools [111].
The use of steganography by cyber-criminals to distribute malware and con-
trol compromised machines is another concerning use of the technology. A case
presented by researchers from Proofpoint had highlighted the use of malvertis-
ing campaigns. In October 2015 criminal groups used malicious code embedded
within advertising banners to target and infect users [121]. Due to the secretive
nature of steganography, data hiding techniques provides an ideal method for data
exfiltration. Sensitive information can be leaked from secure locations if reliable
detection systems are not in place [100]. Finally, steganography has been used to
support the distribution of illicit images, where it has been employed to exchange
and store such content over seemingly innocuous media [153].
Steganography has shown a decreasing interest over the past decade, as shown
in Figure 4. Trends in user searches for “Steganography” appear to be more or
less consistent in recent years. In contrast to this, interest and searches for its
counterpart “Steganalysis” show significantly less interest.
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Figure 4: Trends in searches for “steganography” and “steganalysis” according to Google
Trends as of 27/05/2018 - Trends are relative to the highest point
Regional trends show an interesting variability. As shown in Figure 5, interest
in steganography is far from consistent globally, and once again, regional results
show far more interest in steganography as opposed to steganalysis.
Figure 5: Regional interest in steganography relative to the highest point (Google Trends
as of 27/05/2018)
As evidenced by these figures, and by cases of real-world criminal use for
steganography, more attention is needed in steganalysis. Steganalytic techniques
require continuous development to keep up with the advancements in steganogra-
phy.
1.1 Research Problem
From a practical standpoint, there are many challenges with the current state of
steganalysis. Many experts agree that state-of-the-art steganalysis cannot be used
effectively in the real-world [88]. This problem comes from the difficulty of mod-
elling statistical solutions into a practical environment, where the parameters of
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theoretical implementations would struggle with the highly variable aspects of the
real-world. This is especially relevant when considering the practical applications
of a steganalytic method, where time allocation, resources, and expert-knowledge
become a major constraint for forensic practitioners. In addition to this, many of
the attacks presented in the academic literature often assume the steganalyst will
have a vast pre-existing knowledge of the embedding algorithm used to hide secret
information. In a practical case, without access to a stego-system, this is unlikely
and other methods must be considered for successful steganalysis.
System-attacks provide an avenue for practical steganalysis, especially as a
method to combat the emergence of modern video stego-systems targeted to crim-
inal or terrorist use. System steganalysis is a particularly useful method to exam-
ine the broader impact of the stego-system over a stego-object, to quickly identify
the method of embedding and construct a targeted attack. These techniques can
provide an ideal approach for forensic analysts and investigators. However, even
though these attacks can simplify the process of steganalysis, this avenue of re-
search still remains largely unexplored with too many unanswered questions. The
scope of system steganalysis has not yet been extensively evaluated, and the ap-
plications for system attacks are not fully understood. This is especially true with
regards to video steganography, a field that is rapidly advancing in recent years.
A global methodology for system attacks does not exist, and little research has
been conducted to explore why these techniques can be so effective. Because of
this, system attacks are at risk of being overlooked in favour of other well-known
approaches, even in cases where this approach might provide better results.
Academic research in steganalysis has a significant weighting towards the statis-
tical methodology. These attacks provide an interesting mathematical solution to
the complex problems brought forward by modern advancements in steganography.
However, this can lead to the development of stego-systems that lack consideration
towards their implementation vulnerabilities, as little effort is directed towards ex-
amining robust security coding. This was evident with the implementation of the
JPEG compressor for the F5 algorithm [46]. As a result, system attacks are a
highly viable method of steganalysis, but their capabilities and limitations over
new and emerging steganographic technologies are not fully understood. Given
these problems, this thesis considers the following research questions.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
1. How are system attacks best used within the scope of steganalysis?
2. Can system attacks be successfully applied to achieve practical re-
sults over video steganography?
Research in system steganalysis presents several challenges. Firstly, the focus
of this research is to examine the practical applications for system steganalysis.
Because of this, the methodology must be heavily focused towards a series of case
studies that examine existing stego-systems. The range of embedding algorithms
across all stego-systems must have unique embedding properties to suitably ad-
dress the different applications of system steganalysis (Weak encoding/implemen-
tation, poor practice for pre- and post-processing, and secret key/cryptographic
key vulnerabilities). In addition, the primary focus of this research surrounds the
application of system attacks to video steganography stego-systems. Therefore, it
is important that a diverse range of video steganography tools are identified to
address the primary focus of the thesis.
1.2 Research Approach
The work presented in this thesis proposes a methodology for system steganalysis.
This is achieved by examining the state-of-the-art in practical video steganography
to demonstrate the applications for system attacks. Furthermore, by using prac-
tical case studies, this approach highlights the motivation for system steganalysis
and emphasises why this method of steganography can be successful in realistic
settings.
The primary scope of this research surrounds the practicality of steganalysis
with regards to implementation vulnerabilities of a stego-system. To evaluate this
work, system attacks are constructed and tested over existing stego-systems. The
research on this thesis is conducted primarily through a series of case studies to ex-
amine and evaluate the practical scope of system attacks over video steganography.
The approach to this research consists of several stages.
First, system attacks are used to attack pre- and post-processing requirements
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of a stego-system (double compression). This approach demonstrates that stego-
systems constructed to target subtle, temporal features of a given object can unin-
tentionally modify auxiliary components. This leaves the stego-system vulnerable
to steganalysis.
Second, system steganalysis is used to detect implementation vulnerabilities
surrounding the weak encoding and encryption features of a stego-system. This
approach shows practical examples of poor practice in steganographic security that
allow highly accurate methods of detection.
Third, weak embedding algorithms for stego-systems are subjected to system
steganalysis. This research demonstrates that even in cases where coding problems
are considered, the impact is compromised at the expense of a strong embedding
algorithm. From this, it is possible to use system attacks to detect the presence
of steganography.
Finally, these approaches are implemented into a framework for automated
blind system steganalysis. This method is capable of detecting steganography for
each case study presented throughout this thesis and can be applied as a practical
steganalytic attack to new stego-systems.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The main aim of this thesis is to determine whether system attacks can be used
to detect video steganography systems and whether these attacks can achieve
practical results. From this, there are several contributions, which are outlined in
the following.
1. A series of novel system attacks are presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. These
steganalytic attacks are not only new but also valuable from a practical point
of view.
2. This work examines the possible applications of system steganalysis on video
stego-systems. The aim of this contribution is to determine if practical results
can be achieved and if they simplify the process of steganalysis.
3. A framework is presented for the autonomous detection of stego-systems.
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Although the focus of this is the detection of practical video steganography,
it is also applicable to many other types of digital steganography (image,
audio, documents).
4. The gap between theoretical and practical models for video steganography
is examined. This contribution aims to explore and identify the association
between modern stego-systems and system attacks.
1.4 Structure of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature
review that outlines the scope of the current state of steganography and the outly-
ing research problem. The literature review discusses the topics of steganography,
steganalysis and video steganography. The literature review outlines academic re-
search and well-known methods for steganography over digital media. This section
provides a discussion of the state-of-the-art in image and video steganography and
steganalysis.
Chapter 3 presents the experimental and research methodology carried out in
this thesis. This chapter discusses the experimental decisions made throughout
this work and aims to justify and explain why components of the experimental
procedure had been chosen. In addition, this chapter discusses the formal outputs
from this thesis and examines the research impact of the work.
Chapter 4 examines the association between stego-systems and system at-
tacks with regards to implementation vulnerabilities across several different stego-
system. The research in this chapter focuses on the impact of poor encoding,
encryption, embedding, and pre- and post processing to evaluate the scope of
system attacks.
Chapter 5 examines a stego-system that itself has demonstrated consideration
towards some of the challenges of practical steganography. This is performed as a
means to reduce its risk of vulnerability. However, this is achieved by compromising
the embedding algorithm and using a method that is vulnerable to steganalysis.
The research in this chapter is evaluated through a case study, presenting a novel
detection scheme to identify the method of steganography and the stego-system.
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Chapter 6 presents a blind autonomous framework using a trained classifier
to extract signatures through system steganalytic methods. This framework is
applied to state-of-the-art steganography tools across multiple formats to demon-
strate the capability of system steganalysis and the scope of system vulnerabilities.
Chapter 7 evaluates the work of this thesis. This chapter examines the initial
research questions of the thesis and discusses whether they have been suitably
addressed by the research conducted throughout the thesis. Furthermore, this
chapter examines the experimental results of previous chapters to identify formal
outputs and determine their success.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by evaluating the research that has been con-





Data hiding is an anti-forensic technique that is particularly suitable to the digi-
tal domain. Sensitive information can be susceptible to a wide variety of internal
and external attacks that target intellectual property, critical resources, or per-
sonal data. In typical cases, these attacks are quickly detected [12] and resulting
damage can be mitigated by patching vulnerabilities and informing those affected.
However, subtle attacks can cause significant damage by remaining undetected
over longer periods of time [174]. An emerging trend is seeing anti-forensic and
specifically data hiding techniques being employed to secretly exfiltrate sensitive
information or hide unlawful data or communications. The art and science of
hiding information in such a way is called steganography.
Steganography is a field within the domain of information hiding. This is an
area of research that exists to support data protection and information security.
The goal of steganography is to hide information in plain sight, often by creating
a covert channel within a digital medium that can be recovered at a convenient
time. This is achieved through embedding techniques that modify components of
digital data. Figure 6 illustrates the broader scope of information hiding and some
of its active fields of research.
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Figure 6: Classification of information hiding concepts based on [118]
Steganography is often seen as a two-sided or dual-use technology. On one side,
the steganographic approach exists to support those who may be in an environment
unaccommodating of free speech. States where censorship is heavily enforced, or
where channels of communication are actively monitored are common cases where
steganography can be legitimately used. This is particularly relevant to journalists
and whistle-blowers. Under such circumstances, classic models of communication
would likely fail, as monitored channels can detect interesting or uncommon com-
munications. This would include cryptographically secure exchanges, as even the
suspicion of undesirable communication would be enough to warrant intervention
in many scenarios. However, when given access to a secure steganographic scheme,
a user can communicate safely without any concern of detection.
The other side to steganography shows potential for malicious use. Data hiding
techniques are used to facilitate and exchange illicit content, spread malware, steal
sensitive data [114], or communicate terrorist activities [60, 110]. The challenges
brought forward by this use of steganography have led to the need of new and
accurate detection methods.
Steganalysis is the counterpart to steganography. This is an area of research in
which its pursuit is to identify and detect steganography. Similarly, steganalysis
has a familiar two-sided use. On one side, it can be used to identify the pres-
ence of secret terrorist communications and possibly extract any hidden criminal
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messages. However, malicious use of steganalysis may result in identifying and
capturing those who communicate secretly to avoid intervention from dangerous
third parties under censorship or in oppressive states. This could lead to journal-
ists or whistleblowers being placed in unnecessarily dangerous situations that can
be avoided. These challenges have resulted in a technological arms race between
steganography and steganalysis, where the former is in pursuit of the ideal stegano-
graphic scheme and similarly, the latter endeavours to develop novel steganalytic
approaches. Consequently, this technological arms race has become an important
part of cyber-warfare in the 21st century [150].
Steganography has attracted attention over recent years from both academic
and industrial sectors, especially within the larger domain of information hiding.
Watermarking techniques are used prominently for data protection and copyright
enforcement. The role of steganography and information hiding techniques is par-
ticularly important at a time where cryptography is facing uncertainty regarding
the implementation of backdoor exploits. This is particularly relevant in states
where governments may have a direct involvement over their countries encryption
standards [132]. Such activity undermines the fundamental objectives of crypto-
graphic schemes, and points to a need for alternative secure solutions.
The use of steganography can provide an ideal solution in these circumstances.
The exchange of sensitive information can avoid suspicion by concealing the chan-
nel of communication. However, various controls need to exist to maintain assur-
ances against the abuse of steganographic systems. These can range from adminis-
trative procedures (security policies and protocols) to technical solutions (e.g., file
sanitizers, detection systems). In a digital environment, it is crucial to understand
that there is no clear end to this arms race as it will be a continuously evolving
pursuit. For as long as there is a need to keep information and communication
secret, new tools and techniques will be created to hide and detect secret data.
The research in this thesis focuses on steganalysis by presenting a methodology
and framework for system steganalysis. Specifically, the goal is to evaluate an ap-
proach towards system steganalysis by using system attacks to provide insights into
practical, usable approaches for steganalysis. This research supports analysts and
investigators to handle the steganographic challenges they may often encounter.
The research in this thesis has a particular focus towards video steganography
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and video-based stego-systems. One challenge of modern steganalysis with re-
gards to a steganalytic investigation surrounds time and resources available, as
well as the practicality of any proposed steganalytic solution. The diversity in
which digital signals can be modified means that a steganographic system can
consider many separate digital features to perform steganography. This makes
steganalysis particularly important in media files such as video. Video formats
are a pervasive media type that offer multiple possibilities for embedding (e.g.,
frames, audio, metadata). In steganalysis, the attacker must have a well-rounded
understanding of the embedding algorithm before a secure steganalytic method
can be constructed. System attacks in steganalysis provide an ideal solution to
not only determine the embedding techniques used, but also detect the presence of
steganography where traditional statistical methods assume a pre-existing knowl-
edge of the steganographic scheme.
In this chapter, an extended literature review explores the topics of steganog-
raphy and steganalysis. It is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a core
overview of steganography. Common embedding techniques and models within
academia and industry are reviewed alongside emerging techniques and stegano-
graphic concepts that are of particular interest within the field. Section 2.3 dis-
cusses the steganalytic counterpart to the field, and the techniques used for identi-
fying the presence of steganography, and how this has affected both fields. Section
2.4 provides an overview of the current state of the art for video steganography
which, is of significance throughout this thesis. This section will review how em-
bedding algorithms and steganographic solutions have evolved and where they
fit in, academically and practically. Section 2.5 covers video steganalysis and re-
views the detection techniques used to attack video based stego-systems. Lastly,
in Section 2.6, a summary of the literature review is provided.
2.2 Steganography
Steganography is the process of hiding information in plain sight. By doing so, se-
cret communications are concealed in such a way that third party intruders would
be unaware of such practices [76]. This method facilitates secret communication
by creating a secure channel in which two parties can exchange information safely.
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Digital communication is now a fundamental component of the modern world and
everyday life. From this technological advancement, privacy is an important fea-
ture that is expected from its users, and for many this is possible, but is not
always the case. For some, unwarranted or unknown intervention could be in ac-
tion. In many cases, steganography mitigates potential consequences that might
arise from the use of open or insecure communication channels. Figure 7 demon-
strates steganography in use over the JPEG format. The image on the left is clear
of any form of steganography, while the image on the right has been modified by
the OpenPuff steganography tool, with a 6KB of pseudo-random data embedded.
Figure 7: Steganography in use (left is clean, right is modified)
Digital steganography has a single goal, that is, to conceal any evidence of hid-
den data or its transmission. Imperceptibility is the primary feature of steganogra-
phy in which a modified file (stego-object) must be indistinguishable from the orig-
inal unmodified file (cover-object). The challenge is to create a steganographic sys-
tem that can accommodate a desired capacity while maintaining security against
steganalysis. The development of a secure steganographic system is a continually
evolving process. Over time, traditional concepts and practices in the field adapt
and what may once have been a highly secure scheme, will sometimes be easily
detectable by advancements in steganalysis. In light of this, it is important for any
user of steganography to consider how a stego-system will be influenced by four
key steganography principals: The cover-object, the selection rule, the embedding
operation, and the embedding efficiency [54].
The cover-object is the object used to hide secret information. The selection
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of a cover-object and its properties will have a significant impact on the devel-
opment of a steganography scheme and the overall steganographic security. A
poor choice of cover-object will likely produce suboptimal results, specifically, this
could lead to a low rate of embedding efficiency and produce a highly detectable
stego-object. Regarding digital steganography, the choice of cover-object is di-
verse. Typically, a cover-object can be any form of digital representation that
contains redundancy to hide secret information [124]. In the context of steganog-
raphy, redundancy can be defined as any component of a signal that maintains
minimal visual and statistical deviation between cover-object and stego-object. A
highly diverse range of files and formats can be used for steganography. The most
popular being media files such as image, audio, and video.
The selection rule is the principle used to identify components of the cover-
object that will be modified during the embedding process. The steganography
algorithm must consider the importance of each component in a cover-object to
minimize the impact of the embedding process. The selection rule will determine
the potential for capacity based on how it identifies digital redundancy within a
cover-object.
The embedding operation determines how the signal component of a cover-
object will be modified to incorporate the secret information. This is different
from the selection rule, which identifies the component of the cover-object to be
modified. Specifically, the embedding operation determines how the selection rule
affects the cover-object. For example, this could be a randomized or sequential
process.
Embedding efficiency calculates the average number of message-bits intro-
duced into the cover-object for each embedding change made. The purpose of
this is to determine the amount of information embedded within a file against the
number of changes required to successfully embed the message [171]. A higher
embedding efficiency increases steganographic security as it reduces the likelihood
of detection. Ideally, a secure steganographic scheme will offer higher embedding
efficiency, where a stego-object can accommodate a high capacity while maintain-
ing the statistical properties of the cover-object. Modern steganographic schemes
are capable of achieving this by implementing cover-codes to improve embedding
efficiency [169].
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In addition to these four principles, the design of a good steganographic system
should demonstrate consideration towards steganalysis. A secure steganographic
scheme should aim to satisfy the criteria of imperceptibility, embedding capacity,
robustness, and tamper-resistance with regards to steganalytic methods [124]. The
first three are often considered to be the pillars of steganography, as shown in
Figure 8.
Figure 8: The three characteristics of steganography
Imperceptibility is the potential for a stego-object to appear indistinguishable
from the cover-object. In any case an observable deviation is identified, the pres-
ence of a hidden message can be proven and the application of steganography fails.
This is the main feature of good steganographic systems, and frequently one has
to compromise the others to maximise this.
Embedding capacity relates to the amount of data that can be embedded within
a file. This has a direct trade-off with imperceptibility. It is ideal for a stegano-
graphic system to hide a large amount of information; however, if embedding
capacity exceeds the threshold for imperceptibility, identifiable artifacts will be
introduced.
Robustness is the ability for an embedded message to accommodate uninten-
tional third-party changes to the stego-object. A common example of this could
be compression of a file. File hosting sites often compress a file to their particular
standard for storage purposes. This can effectively be a sanitization process for
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many steganography schemes, where the hidden message is removed upon com-
pression. Again, this can also be a trade-off with the other two properties.
Tamper-resistance relates to an attackers’ ability to modify a message once it
has been embedded within a carrier. Similarly to file sanitization, steganographic
schemes are not often developed with robustness in mind and can be fragile to small
changes. This principle is often given the least consideration when developing a
steganographic scheme. The security of a stego-system relies fundamentally on
imperceptibility. With regards to this, an attacker should not be aware of the
presence of steganography to warrant targeted tamper-resistance.
2.2.1 The Process of Steganography
Embedding schemes differ greatly due to the diverse range of steganographic re-
dundancy across digital content. Typically, the functionality of an embedding algo-
rithm will be determined by the selection of the cover-object. This can vary based
on different cover-objects and the form of redundancy identified. In some cases,
an embedding scheme can be applied across different cover-object types. This has
been demonstrated by Luo et al. [102], who proposed an edge-adaptive scheme
for image that can be extended to video. Alternative methods of steganography,
however, may be limited to a specific cover-object. This is often seen when the
embedding algorithm modifies features that are specific or unique to the cover-
object (e.g., metadata components, compression features, etc). Considering the
diverse range of potential for steganography, the embedding operation follows a
typical process across most stego-systems, outlined in Figure 9.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 20
Figure 9: The process of steganography
Four components are required to carry out steganography: the steganographic
scheme, a cover-object, secret data, and a secret key to encrypt hidden contents.
The inclusion of encryption is seen as a best practice for steganography and an
added layer of security. This key is usually agreed upon by all parties involved in
the communication and would be shared privately beforehand.
The embedding scheme follows a predetermined operation, outlined by the
stego-system. The selection process will identify components within a cover-object
that contain steganographic redundancy (cover-bits). The cover-bits are replaced
by the secret message and any additional padding that may be necessary as deter-
mined by the embedding operation. The final result is a stego-object containing a
secret message that should be indistinguishable from the cover-object prior to the
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steganographic process.
Traditional embedding methods use one of two main selection criteria for
steganography. These are sequential and random embedding. The former was
popular in early steganography schemes, where embedding locations are selected
sequentially (e.g., one after another in a particular order). This embedding princi-
ple had fundamental vulnerabilities, as it was simple to trace a selection path and
find a hidden message [26]. The latter method randomizes the bits through a seem-
ingly arbitrary permutation. This offers a more secure solution, as the embedded
bits are challenging to detect and the embedding path will appear inconsistent.
2.2.2 The Warden
In steganography and steganalysis, it is often considered that there are three sepa-
rate entities. The first two are Alice and Bob, who are attempting to communicate
secretly and securely. The third is Eve, the warden who acts as an eavesdropper in
the communication channel. The role that Eve plays in the process of steganogra-
phy and steganalysis varies depending on each scenario, which can be summarised
as follows:
• Active Warden - In this role, Eve has an active role in steganalysis with a goal
to prevent hidden communication, or at least impede it. It can be assumed
that Eve has total control over the communication channel and can choose
to block it at any point. Furthermore, Eve is allowed to modify the message
that is being sent. This introduces additional challenges to the process of
steganography. Notably that any new steganography method constructed
must be capable of surviving an active modification.
• Passive Warden - In this role, Eve will not interfere with any messages sent.
A passive warden has a read-only presence, in which their goal is to correctly
identify the use of steganography.
These scenarios are constructed as adversary models. This is similarly seen in
cryptography and is used to create a set of definitions that illustrate the goals and
limitations of a steganalyst. This is an important feature of both steganography
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and steganalysis, as it is impossible to achieve meaningful security goals when the
warden is omnipotent [18].
2.2.3 Spatial Domain Steganography
Steganography is commonly performed in digital media, where it can be applied to
a diverse range of applications. Spatial domain steganography remains a popular
method, whereby images are represented as a matrix of intensity values. It is
the individual values of the spatial domain that are commonly modified. This
is because small changes to intensity values generally cause hardly recognisable
visual differences to the stego-object as a whole. The early basis for this type of
steganography was to exploit the limitations of the human visual system (HVS).
2.2.3.1 LSB Substitution
LSB (Least Significant Bit) substitution is considered the most well-known method
of embedding in digital steganography. It relies on the principle that the least sig-
nificant bit of any byte is frequently indistinguishable from random noise and can
therefore be replaced by bits from a secret message. For example, Figure 10 shows
the full representation of a greyscale image (on the left) paired with its repre-
sentation in the LSB bit-plane. The LSB bit-plane appears random and should
therefore accommodate bit replacement with an encrypted message. Advance-
ments in steganalysis, however, revealed this naive assumption to be completely
untrue, leading to steganography methods exploiting this false concept [15].
Figure 10: Comparison of greyscale image and LSB bit plane, image from [29]
The early work on image steganography was by Bender et al. [16], Adelson
[2], and those working in spread-spectrum steganography [38], [139], [31]. Initially,
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these researchers based their schemes on exploiting the limitations of the Human
Visual System (HVS) and its sensitivity to contrast versus spatial frequency.
In the naive applications of LSB steganography, there was one qualifying char-
acteristic, that the change of the LSB of a byte would result in a stego-object being
visually indistinguishable from the cover-object. The concept of LSB is still widely
applied in modern steganography schemes [35, 41, 106], However, these methods
are typically supported by complex operations and cover codes to produce a secure
scheme with improved embedding efficiency, that is significantly harder to detect
[45].
One of the first known implementations for digital steganography was a spatial
domain technique proposed by Kurak and Mchugh [92]. This method embedded
secret data within 4-LSB components and was the first case of steganography
exploiting detailed knowledge of the HVS. Typically, spatial techniques modify
bits within an image’s pixel values, replacing them directly with the secret message
bits [19]. The concept of bit replacement would be that, for each pixel in an image,
it can be assigned a corresponding integer value, based on the intensity of a colour
that is displayed by the pixel. Once converted into a binary stream, individual bits
can be extrapolated to determine whether they are suitable for substitution [129].
For example, functions can be included to prevent even values from being decreased
and odd values from being increased. Figure 11 demonstrates the process for LSB
bit substitution steganography.
Figure 11: Breakdown of bit-planes in an image
This concept formed the initial works in LSB steganography. However, naive
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LSB schemes are highly susceptible to Chi-square tests and statistical steganalysis
[144].
LSB encoding within 24-bit colour images was the most popular form of early
spatial domain steganography. The embedding technique was used across many
software products [76, 77]. Capacity became the focus of these techniques, as 24-
bit images allowed the user to store up to 3-bits for each modified pixel. The early
work in spatial domain steganography for colour based images was broken by the
efforts of Fridrich et al. [55]. To detect LSB steganography, Fridrich and her team
considered a calculation of the ratio between close colour pairs and all colour pairs
in an image.
Their idea was that for an image with no secret messages, the number of close
pairs of colours relative to the number of all possible pairs of colours will be smaller
than for an image that has a message already embedded in it. To determine the
ratio threshold, their team observed that further modifying a stego-object with a
new secret message will not modify the ratio in any significant manner. Whereas
if the image does not contain a secret message, then embedding will drastically
change the ratio. This knowledge can be used to determine the presence of LSB
colour encoded steganography and develop a detection algorithm. A test was used
where a message was randomly distributed throughout the LSB of selected pixels.
The calculation is given to the new stego-object and if the two ratios are almost
identical, LSB steganography is suspected.
2.2.3.2 LSB Matching (+1 Method)
LSB matching is a method of LSB steganography first proposed by Sharp [136].
The concept was that instead of sequentially and predictably substituting bits of
target LSBs within an image, an adaptive scheme would be constructed to be
selective of the features present in any particular cover-object. If the message
bit fails to match the LSB of the cover-image, then a ‘1’ value is either added or
subtracted from the value of the target pixel. To ensure that the scheme for AoSo
(Add or Subtract One) would be invertible, an algorithm would be implemented
to stop pixel values from being modified outside of a predetermined range. While
simple to implement, it is surprisingly and significantly more challenging to detect
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than basic LSB substitution. A similar method was proposed by Mielikainen [105]
who proposed that instead of using a random function to determine the use of the
+1 or −1 principle, a selection feature can be introduced to set a binary function
of two cover pixels to the desired value. A sample of this is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Sample algorithm for improved LSB matching by [105]
Input: Pixel pair from cover image xi, xi+1 & two secret message bits mi,mi+1
Output: Corresponding stego-image pixel pair yi, yi+1
if mi = LSB (xi)







if mi+1 = f(xi − 1, xi+1)
yi = xi − 1
else




This improved method of LSB matching maintained the same embedding ef-
ficiency as the original but provided greater resistance to known attacks, such as
the one proposed by Westfeld [156]. Westfeld’s attack relied upon a count of arbi-
trary neighbour colours introduced by the embedding algorithm for LSB matching.
However, this means that the detection method was only applicable to colour im-
ages and would not work for a grayscale representation [84]. A stronger method
for greyscale images was presented by Andrew Ker [85].
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2.2.3.3 Prediction Error
Prediction error was another method of spatial domain steganography that gained
popularity. The scheme assumed a fairly intuitive principle within images in that;
for a stego-object to maintain visual quality and be indistinguishable from the
cover-object, secret data should be hidden within complex areas of an image. To
determine local complexity, pixel prediction error can be used where the larger the
prediction error, the more obvious the local fluctuation.
Using this method, data can be hidden within prediction errors. These are pairs
of pixels isolated where each corresponding neighbour pixel is used to predict the
current pixel value. This calculation is assumed to be the prediction error where
data can be hidden within the difference values. Suppose the following of two-
group neighbour pixels from a partitioned image where pi and pi+1 are the pixels
used. Their difference value would be.
di = pi+1 − pi (1)
Where 0≤| di |≤255 [95]. The size of di denotes the complexity of the data and
determines its suitability for steganography. This allows for any embedding dis-
tortion to be distributed evenly and to maintain the features of the cover-object.
The selection process has a fundamental role in any steganography scheme.
A robust criteria for selection defines the security offered by the embedding algo-
rithm. Many of the discussed embedding schemes are based upon Pseudo-Random-
Number-Generation (PRNG) to make the embedding path less predictable. This
often means that any embedded message, given enough length will be spread across
the entire stego-object. Typically, consideration towards embedding location of-
ten reduces visual distortion and increases imperceptibility. This concept was
presented by Hemalatha [69] who proposed a technique called Hiding Behind Cor-
ners (HBC) to target specific regions for LSB embedding. The effect of this is
demonstrated in Figure 12. The presence of black pixels in (b-g) describe where
corresponding pixel values have been modified by steganography. This demon-
strates the selection process for HBC.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 27
Figure 12: Impact of HBC steganography vs traditional LSB, from [102]
Many of the early methods for spatial domain steganography were quickly out-
performed by academic advancements in transform domain steganography. How-
ever, avenues of LSB steganography are still actively pursued and recent advance-
ments led to complex spatial domain systems. Particularly of note are those using
content adaptive steganography such as HUGO (Highly Undetectable SteGO).
2.2.3.4 Content Adaptive Steganography
Traditional schemes for steganography, particularly with LSB, are often consistent
in their selection process. Even when using a pseudo-random scheme, features of
the embedding process can be predictable. Content adaptive techniques instead
alter the selection process based on the content of the cover-object. For this,
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embedding locations are often made in complex regions where content noise masks
any steganographic noise being introduced.
2.2.3.5 Highly Undetectable SteGO (HUGO)
Advancements in steganography and steganalysis have also been motivated by
competitions. The “Break Our Steganographic System” (BOSS) competition
launched in 2010 proposed one of the most advanced image steganography tools
to date and challenged researchers to break it [13]. This competition was inspired
by similar watermarking competitions in 2005 and 2007 titled BOWS and BOWS-
2 [119]. Contestants of BOSS were provided datasets, a 9074 pair of clean and
modified image files, with the embedding algorithm for training. The goal was
to use steganalytic techniques over a sample of 1000 images and determine which
contained steganography featuring the “Highly Undetectable SteGO” (HUGO)
system. The competition featured an international pool of competitors, each with
varying degrees of success. The most noteworthy contributions were achieved by
Fridrich et al., with an accuracy of 80.3%, Gul & Kurugollu (76.8%) and A. West-
feld (67%) [44].
HuGO Steganography worked in the spatial domain via LSB in grayscale im-
ages. The primary feature of the embedding operation was the application of the
minimum-embedding-impact principle; where for any given message that is to be
embedded, the distortion between cover-object and stego-object is minimal. The
function of the scheme can be isolated into two parts, the image model and the
coder. The image model is tasked with generating a space in which the distance be-
tween two points leads to a suitable distortion function, this is in accordance with
the minimum-embedding-principle. The distortion function is then applied by the
encoding, using content-adaptive functionality. This will determine which features
of the cover-object can be modified during embedding [13]. The advanced security
behind the HUGO system is based on its ability to preserve a high-dimensional
representation of cover-objects [57]. The content-adaptive scheme used by HUGO
provides excellent statistical resistance by limiting modifications to cover-regions
that are complex to model. The edge adaptive embedding operation is shown in
Figure 13, where +1 embedding changes are shown through white pixels and -1
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embedding is shown through black pixels.
Figure 13: Cover-object (left) and encoded image (right) shows +1 embedding changes
on white pixels and -1 embedding on black pixels
2.2.4 Transform Domain Steganography
Transform domain techniques provide a solution to many of the challenges in spa-
tial domain steganography. By transitioning an image into the frequency/trans-
form domain, embedding methods demonstrate increased capacity and robustness
to signal processing attacks [150]. This happens because the embedding techniques
in transform domain steganography would spread changes across the entire image.
Well-known methods for image-based transform domain steganography, include
DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform), and DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform).
2.2.4.1 DCT Steganography
For each colour component in the JPEG image, the compression scheme uses a
discrete cosine transform to convert an image block of 8 x 8 blocks through a matrix
into 64 DCT spectral sub-bands using a quantization process. The processed result
provides a sum of varying magnitudes and frequencies that scale according to the
image’s visual quality. The significance of this is that for a typical image, most
of the visually significant information will be stored in a small number of the
coefficients resulting from the DCT operation. To perform this operation, the
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DCT coefficients F (u, v) of each 8 x 8 block (where u and v are the frequency
coordinates) are calculated as follows based on the algorithm by Provos [124].
















Afterwards, the DCT operation quantizes coefficients in a 64-element quantization







From this, the least significant bits of quantized DCT coefficients are used as
steganographic redundancy for message embedding. The resulting change for each
coefficient is shown in Figure 14.
Figure 14: DCT quantization process, from [145]
For image steganography, particularly over the JPEG format, a common tech-
nique is to identify the least significant bit components of the quantized DCT
coefficients as redundant data within the image, to be used to embed a secret
message, using similar bit-replacement techniques to LSB steganography. One of
the first publicly available schemes to carry out steganography in the transform
domain was JSteg, developed by Derek Upham [149]. This used a sequential em-
bedding operation to replace the least significant bit of DCT coefficients with the
secret message. However, it has several notable security issues. Firstly, there was
no secret shared key, this means that any user with access to the steganographic
scheme could extract the hidden message. The second vulnerability was first pre-
sented by Andreas Westfeld and Andreas Pfitzmann. They found that sequential
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operations used for embedding caused distortions that are detectable by steganal-
ysis [158]. They observed that the embedding of high entropy data would cause
deviations to a histogram that could be easily predicted, for example, in that uni-
form embedding to distribute message bits throughout would reduce frequency
differences between adjacent images.
An improvement for the predictability problem of sequential embedding was
proposed by Niels Provos in a system called OutGuess 0.1 [122]. This stego-system
used a pseudo-random number generator to select the DCT coefficients at random
for embedding. This method provided resistance to the statistical chi-squared
attack. However, it was eventually broken by Fridrich et al [58]. Fridrich had
shown that macroscopic features of the steganographic file predictably change with
the length of the embedded message. At this point, they were able to successfully
determine the parameters of any quantity by calculating an approximation to the
cover image.
Andreas Westfeld carried out research on DCT schemes and proposed three
separate systems F3, F4 and F5 [155]. The function of F3 was to decrease the
coefficient’s absolute values in case the LSB did not match. This improvement
over Jsteg means that zero coefficients would not be selected by the embedding
operation, except when matching the corresponding bits from the secret message.
This provided resistance to the standard Chi-square test, but was statistically
predictable due to the exclusive reduction of zeros. F4 advanced this by fixing
the vulnerabilities of F3. This was achieved by mapping negative coefficients to
the inverted steganographic value. F4 however, used a technique called Continu-
ous Embedding where the process of embedding a secret message would result in
changes at the start and end of the file. This made the scheme easily detectable
and hence susceptible to steganalysis.
The final release, F5 attempted to maximise embedding efficiency through
matrix encoding and adapting the mechanism from F4 to shuﬄe all coefficients
through a permutation. This would provide a simpler estimation for expected
file capacity. F5 was seen as the first implementation of matrix encoding using
a technique conceptualised by Ron Crandall [32]. These methods for using cover
codes to maximise embedding efficiency are still pursued in modern research [98,
104, 108]
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Matrix encoding relies on the assumption that for a standard stego-object
where message bits are uniformly distributed, approximately half of the embedded
message will cause changes to the carrier file. This provides a base-line embedding
efficiency of 2-bits-per-change. However, with many early schemes this could be
lower when accounting for shrinkage. This would occur when the changes made
during embedding would not account specifically for the hidden message itself.
These changes could consist of parity information or compression components. F4
is an example of this where the embedding efficiency was 1.5 bits per change, due
to the problem of continuous embedding.
2.2.4.2 DWT Steganography
DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform) steganography is an alternative method of
embedding within images the transform domain. A well-known method for this is
the Haar transform [1]. For any given image, there are two stages to this method
of steganography. Firstly, image pixels are scanned horizontally. Neighbouring
pixels are calculated through addition and subtraction operations and the sum
(S) is stored on the left while the difference (D) is stored on the right. This
is repeated for every row of pixels, where the sum values on the left are the low
frequency band, and the difference values on the right are the high frequency band.
This stage is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: First stage of DWT transformation
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Pixels are then scanned vertically and the same operation is performed on
neighbouring pixels. In this step, the sum of the values for each column is stored
at the top, and the difference is stored at the bottom. From this, 4 sub-bands
are created, each called LL,HL,LH, and HH (as shown in Figure 16) where LL
represents the low frequency band.
Figure 16: Second stage of DWT transformation
The low frequency sub-band contains the most significant features of the image
file. Therefore, embedding is recommended in this region to preserve the secret
message from signal processing modifications.
2.2.5 Social Relevance and Impact of Steganography
The practical applications of steganography have made it a useful technology for
security and privacy. This can, however, support a small minority of its users
to avoid detection while planning or committing crime or terrorist activities. It
should be highlighted that the vast majority of steganography users will have
legitimate reasons (i.e. journalists, civil rights and democracy activists under
threat of imprisonment, etc.) to employ it. However, it is the criminal use of
steganography which often gains widespread exposure through the media. Recent
cases in point are the use of image steganography by a network of Russian spies
in the US [134], video steganography usage by an Al-Qaeda operative in Germany
[60], or recent strands of malware employing steganography for communication
using command and control servers [165].
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In recent years, video steganography has become an increasingly popular tech-
nique for data exfiltration. One example is the case of an undisclosed Fortune 500
company that was hit by this type of attack [114]. The use of video steganography
allowed for large amounts of sensitive data to be exfiltrated from the company net-
work after the breach, bypassing all the Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) tools and
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) put in place. The impact that steganography
has on DLP systems has been subjected to some academic research [4], but still
remains largely unexplored.
The use of steganography in the real-world has often been a subject of discus-
sion, especially surrounding the distribution of steganographic content throughout
the internet as a means to support terrorist communications. Shortly after the
9/11 attacks in 2001, US media discussed the prospect of this, and it wasn’t un-
til an article published in USA Today that academics became involved [83]. The
article claimed that Al-Qaeda used websites such as eBay to distribute messages
through bid images. An investigation of this claim was carried out by Niels Provos
and Peter Honeyman [124]. They attempted to not only approach these allega-
tions, but also question how steganalytic methods, particularly statistical attacks,
can be used in a real-world setting. A detection framework was created to down-
load JPEG images from the Internet and use their proposed attacks to identify
the presence of steganography. It utilised StegDetect to detect content hidden in
JPEG images across popular tools (JSteg, JPHide, and Outguess 0.13b). This was
paired with a dictionary attack against suspect images in an attempt to extract
steganographic content.
Throughout the course of the investigation, over two million images were down-
loaded from eBay auctions, to which StegDetect indicated 17,000 could potentially
have steganographic content. However, the dictionary attacks gave no positive re-
sults, for which, the authors offered four possible explanations.
1. Steganography users chose passwords not susceptible to dictionary attacks.
2. Steganographic content may be hidden within other sources.
3. Steganographic systems examined throughout the investigation are not used
by actual users.
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4. Messages are too small for detection.
Although Provos and Honeyman’s work did not identify evidence of steganog-
raphy, recent studies reveal how modern steganography is being used maliciously.
A study conducted by McAfee in 2017 [133] has shown a significant rise in the use
of steganography for the purposes of spreading malware. The impact of malicious
steganography demonstrates a need for further research in steganalysis, and the
development of reliable detection methods.
2.3 Steganalysis
The field of steganography has established a wide variety of methods for hiding
secret messages. By embedding data in digital content, communicating parties
can securely exchange messages through a stego-object that is for all purposes
indistinguishable from the cover-object. However, the process of steganography is
invasive and can leave detectable traces within a stego-object. Techniques used
to detect the presence of steganography fall under the scope of steganalysis. This
is the pursuit of identifying and proving the existence of steganography. This is
different from cryptanalysis, where the goal is to identify the key and read the
contents of an encrypted message.
Steganalysis is considered a decision problem in that a steganalyst must decide
between one of two statements with confidence for any given object. Firstly, the
steganalyst can assert that “the given-object contains content hidden by steganog-
raphy”. Secondly, the steganalyst can assert that “the given object contains no
hidden data”. This statement is considered successful only when the confidence of
a steganalytic assertion is significantly higher than that of a random guess. How-
ever, the result is still prone to two types of error. The first is the likelihood that
a clean object is misclassified as a stego-object. This is known as the probability
for false positives. The second is the likelihood that steganalytic scheme fails to
correctly classify a stego-object. This is called false negatives. Every steganalytic
scheme should aim to minimise the rate of false positives while maintaining a high
rate of detection accuracy.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 36
Steganography and steganalysis are continually evolving fields. A diverse selec-
tion of cover material brings considerable challenges to the efforts of steganalysis.
Many formats of natural media offer low embedding distortion to make stego-
objects appear indistinguishable from the original cover [164]. For this reason,
digital steganography provides an ideal means to facilitate secret communication.
Despite these challenges, steganalysis is an actively pursued field of research. Meth-
ods used for steganalysis are highly varied with each often being tailored to fulfil
the particular needs for a steganalytic investigation. It is often considered that in
steganalysis, there are two approaches to the detection of steganography.
• Blind Steganalysis: The goal of blind steganalysis is to detect any stegano-
graphic technique regardless of the scheme used. The steganalyst has no pre-
existing knowledge of how an embedding algorithm functions. A blind at-
tack can be approached by constructing a trained classifier to extract feature
sets between cover-object and stego-object [65]. Blind attacks cannot deal
with the full representation of a stego-object, but instead will focus on low-
dimensional feature space. Although feature extraction is considered a well
suited approached for blind steganalysis, it is often that methods only man-
age a small number of features or a single domain of the stego-object. This
can provide low detection accuracy. However, methods do exist that man-
age blind steganalysis across a wider variety of features and multi-domain
instances [116]
• Targeted Steganalysis: It is assumed that the steganalyst will have pre-
existing knowledge of a steganographic scheme before any attack is carried
out. A steganalytic method is constructed against that particular scheme to
detect the presence of steganography [58]. Typically the scheme used will
not be applicable to other stego-systems. The pre-existing knowledge of the
stego-system simplifies the challenge of steganalysis, but can only be used
when this information is available, which is not always practical. Similar
to blind steganalysis, these attacks cannot work over the full representation
of a stego-object. However, a targeted attack should require fewer features
to be extracted, as they are constructed from pre-existing knowledge of the
embedding mechanism.
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Although the single goal of steganalysis is to detect the presence of steganog-
raphy, different attacks can be constructed to achieve this. Applications for ste-
ganalysis are defined by the approach used. System and statistical attacks are
considered to be two of the major types of steganalytic attack [46].
2.3.1 Steganalytic Attacks
The success of any steganalytic intervention relies on the information that is avail-
able to an attacker. For any scenario, different approaches can be used based on
any pre-existing knowledge of the cover-object, stego-object, stego-system, secret
message, or secret key. Attempts have been made to classify many of the at-
tacks that exist within steganalysis [112, 46]. These attacks and methods can be
described as follows:
2.3.1.1 System Attacks
System attacks are one of two major types of steganalytic attack. Steganalysis in
this instance has a particular focus on the stego-system to identify implementation
vulnerabilities or obtain side-channel information. This information is used to
construct detection methods for that particular stego-system. System attacks
may target third-party features of the stego-system or exploit the presence of weak
cryptographic features and encoders. Typical approaches for system steganalysis
can include the following:
1. Secret Key Attacks: A secret key used to hide a message with steganography
should be sufficiently strong so that it cannot be attacked. A PRNG imple-
mentation should be strong enough to mitigate attacks that could break the
stego-system and even provide the attacker with readable information.
2. Magic-prefix - This can be a common issue with steganographic schemes
that embed extra information unrelated to the message itself. Compression
artifacts are a typical example of this, as they are common practice in the
construction of a steganography scheme. These artifacts may introduce pre-
dictable changes that can be detected by observing known prefix locations,
such as the header or footer of a file.
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3. Signature steganalysis: Steganographic systems that feature implementation
vulnerabilities are often the result of a weak encoder. This can result in the
presence of consistent signatures that are used to detect steganography. The
advantage of this, is that signatures like this, are often simple to use as the
basis for a classifier while offering a very high rate of accuracy (in many
cases 100% due to the length of these signatures). This approach relies on
the existence of signatures that are often introduced unintentionally, and
do not exist in every stego-system; however, the occurrence of this can be
seen across a wide number of stego-systems [141]. In cases where signatures
exist but the strings are not consistent or long enough, feature extraction
can be used to predict a deviation from the cover-object to obtain a pseudo-
signature.
4. Reverse engineering: This can often be a valuable method in a system ap-
proach where an attacker wants to identify vulnerabilities directly within the
steganographic system as opposed to a stego-object. This can lead to ex-
posing cryptographic vulnerabilities, embedding flaws or system-based weak-
nesses that might leave consistent artifacts within a stego-object.
Implementation vulnerabilities are often an unintentional by-product of the encod-
ing process by a stego-system. As a result, the developer may be unaware of such
problems, or little effort may be given to correct them. If these vulnerabilities can
be directly associated with the steganographic process, they provide an ideal av-
enue for steganalysis. These methods not only markedly simplify an investigation,
but make it a highly practical choice over alternative methods of steganalysis.
System attacks use techniques that can be highly efficient when compared to
alternative methods of steganalysis. For example, statistical attacks are often
interested in a particular signal component of the stego-object and how it is modi-
fied by the embedding algorithm. This requires or assumes pre-existing knowledge
of the embedding operation and is not practical in every case. The techniques
used by system steganalysis often incorporate the entire stego-object. This extra
information can provide valuable early insights into the presence of steganography.
Once the functionality of a steganography scheme has been determined and im-
plementation vulnerabilities have been detected, a steganalytic approach can be
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constructed. From a practical standpoint, system attacks are ideal. Many of the
techniques have a low demand for computational resources and detection meth-
ods constructed from signatures are simple to implement. Accuracy for signature
attacks are often high, particularly in cases when long, consistent fingerprints are
present. This is favourable in cases where a significantly large number of datasets
exist for analysis.
The advantages of system steganalysis have been discussed by Fridrich with re-
gards to the steganalysis of the F5 algorithm, developed by Westfeld [155]. Shortly
after the development of F5, many researchers focused their efforts towards sta-
tistical methods to detect the F5 scheme. These attacks were met with varying
degrees of accuracy, some as low as 75% [51]). Niels Provos, however, pointed out
that the compression component of the F5’s embedding algorithm left a consistent
signature within the headers of modified JPEG files that read “JPEG Encoder
Copyright 1998, James R. Weeks and BioElectroMech”. A signature of this length
can be used to detect the presence of F5 steganography with a significantly higher
rate of success. Within academic literature, system attacks have little surrounding
literature.
2.3.1.2 Statistical Attacks
Statistical Steganalysis is recognised as the second major steganalytic attack. Sta-
tistical attacks observe deviations between the statistical properties of a stego-
object and a cover-object by training a classifier to extract features in low dimen-
sional space. When used against specific stego-systems, these attacks can be highly
accurate. However, this can be resource intensive as feature space increases and
statistical methods will not trace the presence of steganography to a particular
stego-system.
A wide variety of attacks exist within the field of statistical steganalysis to
analyse stego-objects for the presence of steganography. Regarding images and
video, commonly used methods can include, image processing, first order statistics
(histogram), or second order statistics (pixel or feature extraction and correlation)
[27].
Working in low dimensional space is a major feature of statistical steganalysis.
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A full representation of any digital media is vastly complex and will provide an
overwhelming number of redundant features to a steganalyst. To overcome this,
one can assume that it is best to work in a low dimensional feature space that is
appropriate to the embedding algorithm, for example, in JPEG images, a statistical
attack should work with the analysis of DCT coefficients in the transform domain
as opposed to any spatial representation of the stego-object [75].
It is a general rule of thumb in steganalysis, that to successfully break a stego-
system, an attacker must be able to predict the presence of steganography at a
percentage higher than that of a random guess (50%). This has lead to steganalyic
schemes being proposed that offer average detection rates accommodating for a
high number of false positives. In a practical setting where storage devices can
host thousands or even millions of files, examining a large number of suspicious
files that may in fact be false positives may be too time consuming to successfully
and practically implement.
2.3.1.3 Peak Signal to Noise Ratio
Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) is often used as a feature of evaluation in
steganography. It is a technique used to compute a peak-signal-to-noise ratio in
decibels between two images and is used as a test for quality measurement. It
is often used by authors developing steganographic schemes to demonstrate the
quality degradation of their scheme between a stego-object and cover-object. A
common scenario for this test is one where an attacker realises the existence of
steganography within a file. In any case where a high PSNR is presented, it
should be challenging for that attacker to identify the hidden information. A high
PSNR ratio makes the difference between stego-object and cover-object almost






Where MAX21 is the maximum possible pixel value of the image. Typically value
ranges for PSNR within compressed video and images will be between 30 and 50
dB for 8-bit representations and between 60 and 80 dB for 16-bit representations
[154].
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2.3.1.4 Chi-Square Attack
One early assumption in LSB steganography was that the values corresponding
to LSB pixels would be completely random. This led to the belief that these bits
could be replaced as they have minimal impact over the stego-object. This idea
led to the development of tools for LSB steganography [103, 67]. Although the
distribution of bits in the LSB plane appear random (as can be seen in Figure 17),
these bits do in fact correlate to the full representation of the image. Through a
series of visual attacks, Westfeld and Pfitzmann proved this to be true [158].
Figure 17: Representation of images in different bit planes (LSB to MSB)
One of the first statistical attacks to be successful against embedding in the
transform domain was the Chi-square attack. The Chi-square attack works as
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follows: For any transform domain scheme that equally distributes message bits
throughout an image, a pair of values are created that have equal frequencies. The
Chi-square attack compares the expected frequency distribution with that of the
observed stego-object. This could be observed through a histogram as shown in
Figure 18.
Figure 18: DCT coefficients of before (left) and after (right) embedded by EZStego [91]
The Chi-square method has shown to be effective in the transform domain
against tools such as EZStego, JSteg and Steganos. This is because the Chi-
square attack is based on analysing the higher-order statistics of the stego-object.
However, it cannot detect steganographic methods that work in low dimensional
feature space (OutGuess, F5).
2.3.1.5 RS-Analysis
RS-Analysis is a steganalytic method developed by Fridrich et al. to detect LSB
and provide accurate message estimation [49]. At the time, this method was con-
sidered state-of-the-art in spatial domain steganalysis. This technique divides the
processed image into small equally sized blocks and applies two mapping functions.
The first, F1 for 0 ↔ 1, 2 ↔ 3, and 254 ↔ 255 corresponds to the flipping of the
LSB of a pixel. The second function maps pixel changes in the opposite direction
to F1, i.e., F−1 : −1 ↔ 0, 1 ↔ 2, ..., 255 ↔ 256. The mapping function F1 is
applied to each part of a block to track the ratio of blocks in which the magnitude
of fluctuations increases (Rm) and the ratio of blocks with a decreasing fluctuation
of magnitudes (Sm). Typically Rm +Sm ≤ 1. Similarly, F−1 is applied to a part of
each block to generate the parameters R−m and S−m. If the tested image contains
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no secret data, then F1 and F−1 should equally increase the magnitudes of fluc-
tuation. In any case where LSB steganography is carried out Rm and Sm become
more linear whereas a wider deviation appears for R−m and S−m as a result of the
LSB operation and the mapping functions counteracting one another.
2.3.2 Forensic Steganalysis
Suspicion of the existence of steganography can arise in many ways. This could be
from the presence of a steganography tool on a computer, or the transfer of files
in a suspicious manner (Internet or storage). One objective will be to identify files
that could be considered suspicious, in that a steganalyst suspects the presence of
steganography within. The second objective will be to examine and understand
the embedding algorithm that is used to hide secret messages. If an investigator
is capable of doing this, then a steganalytic scheme can be developed to detect
the presence of steganography and the stego-system is considered broken. This is
the classic model for steganalysis and once the presence of hidden information is
proven, little more is required. However, this approach can be extended to incorpo-
rate further steganalytic tasks such as identifying the stego-key and extracting any
hidden contents to a readable state. This falls within the sub-domain of forensic
steganalysis [56]. Many of the techniques within this field of steganalysis belong
to digital forensic analysis and can feature many other investigative tasks. These
can be summarised as follows:
1. Use of forensic tools and techniques to detect the presence of steganographic
systems: This can involve the use of specially configured forensic tools that
monitor filesystems for specific contents. These tools can be adapted to
look for well known stego-systems. This however relies on the pre-existing
knowledge of a certain tool.
2. Identification and examination of steganographic hosts - This will typically
involve searching for suspicious systems that may be harbouring stegano-
graphic tools or contents, such as computers, storage devices, or servers/web-
pages.
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3. Development of automated tools for the detection of steganography: One
particular challenge facing forensic steganalytic investigations, will be time
constraints. Providing automated and highly accurate solutions to this can
significantly benefit these investigations in identifying steganographic sys-
tems and the presence of steganography. This is often facilitated by the use
of system steganalysis.
4. Profiling of steganographic and steganalytic software: A significant foun-
dation of pre-existing knowledge regarding steganography and steganalytic
tools will be a critical component of forensic steganalysis investigations. It is
particularly useful in any case where examination time can be significantly
reduced through access to necessary pre-existing resources and documenta-
tion regarding known steganographic schemes.
5. Observation of steganographic networking: The pervasive nature of media
files throughout the Internet make them ideal candidates for steganography.
It can be important to observe how steganography is applied to these files and
transferred throughout the Internet by networks of individuals. One subsec-
tion of this is the restriction of steganographic networking by file sanitization.
Primarily to remove any potential for steganography to occur through file
compression, thereby removing sensitive hidden contents.
6. Identification of steganographic key: One underlying principle of stegano-
graphic security is that the key should always be kept hidden. Once found,
the scheme is no longer secure. This can be a task of forensic steganalysis
to obtain or predict the key through various methods such as brute force
attacks.
7. Extraction of hidden content: This often relies on a precursor of identifying a
secret key for a stego-system. However, particularly vulnerable schemes can
be broken without the presence of a key. Embedded content is often hidden
in an encrypted state, so this task will require the efforts of cryptanalysis.
Under this model for forensic steganalysis, a scope is defined that allows forensic
analysis tasks to be applicable towards steganalysis for a broader investigation.
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This domain can also allow researchers to present a broader range of stegana-
lytic approaches. Research carried out by Trivedi and Chandramouli presented a
forensic steganalysis technique to estimate a secret key within sequential steganog-
raphy [148]. The authors’ goal was to propose a technique applicable to any type
of sequential message embedding, however the primary focus of their work was
carried out across spread spectrum embedding. This assumed that the key could
be determined through the beginning and the end of the subsequence modulated
during embedding of the secret message. Similarly, Fridrich et al built on the work
of Trivedi and Chandramouli [56] to be applicable to JPEG schemes particularly
using LSB and +1 embedding within the spatial domain.
Early work in spatial domain steganography led to the conceptualisation of
these steganalytic techniques that would expand the single goal of steganalysis.
Schemes were presented to perform forensic techniques that could be applied to
steganalysis. This included estimating the length of secret messages and determin-
ing the existence of a stego-key. These techniques were both presented by Fridrich
[56, 48]. In the former case, this scheme offered a competing approach to simi-
lar (at the time) state-of-the-art techniques, outperforming Sample Pair-Analysis
(SPA) and giving comparable results to RS-analysis (RSA).
Work carried out by Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman looked into the de-
velopment of a tool (StegDetect/Break) paired with a webcrawler to detect the
presence of steganography throughout the internet [123]. Although much of their
work is primarily focused towards purely statistical steganalysis, many aspects of
their investigation fall under a forensic theme. Firstly, there being a target host
site the authors wanted to investigate for the presence of steganography. Secondly,
brute force attacks were used in an attempt to gain access to embedded contents
upon finding suspicious files. Ultimately, they developed automated tools for the
detection of steganography. However, no content was found throughout their in-
vestigation.
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2.3.3 Information Adaptive Approaches to Steganalysis
As a detection problem, steganalysis can be approached through a variety of
hypothesis-testing scenarios. The information available to an attacker during an in-
vestigation can markedly impact the steganalytic process (time, resources, method
of attack required). These scenarios consider the information that is available to
an attacker or warden during an investigation [37].
• Known-carrier attack: This attack relies on the existence of a pair of objects,
the stego-object and the cover-object. It is assumed that there is no access
to the steganographic scheme to train a classifier. If only a single object
pair are given, this limits the potential for statistical steganalysis. In this
situation, system attacks are favourable, as they can provide quick insights
into the functionality of a particular scheme.
• Known-message attack: This is an unusual scenario where only the hidden
message is known. If a stego-system is following recommended practices and
is encrypting data before embedding, then the significance of knowing the
message can be greatly diminished.
• Chosen-message attack: Both the secret message and the embedding algo-
rithm used to hide the message are available to an attacker. This can provide
a useful sample for testing and comparison.
• Fully blind attack: This is perhaps the most challenging scenario for steganal-
ysis. An attacker only has information regarding the stego-object. They will
have no access to a cover-object or stego-system. This limits the potential
for many statistical and system attacks, and a steganalytic will have to work
by identifying arbitrary features of the stego-object.
• Chosen-steganography attack: The stego-object and the embedding algo-
rithm are known.
• Known-steganography attack: In this attack, all components related to stegano-
graphic activity are typically known, this includes the stego-object, the em-
bedding algorithm, and the cover-object.
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2.3.4 Steganalysis as a Testbed for Steganography
Although the primary goal of steganalysis is to prove the existence of steganogra-
phy, it is important for an author to develop a robust steganographic scheme. One
step in achieving this is by using steganalytic techniques to test and demonstrate
the security and robustness of proposed steganographic systems. An embedding
algorithm should not only be evaluated by the visual imperceptibility it offers.
A secure, complex scheme should also demonstrate resistance to steganalysis as
means to go beyond basic steganography as the primary goal is to now demonstrate
resistance to steganalysis. This concept can be captured through five well known
techniques discussed by Sadek et al. [127]. Their discussion, though aimed primar-
ily towards video, is certainly applicable to other digital forms of steganography
and steganalysis. It illustrates the following ideas:
• Perceptual transparency: This is the fundamental concept of steganogra-
phy upon which the academic field is built. Once the existence of hidden
information is reliably discovered, the steganographic scheme is considered
broken. Any system that poorly implements the embedding algorithm can
often be directly visible (e.g., a flicker in a video, excessive noise in a picture,
or arbitrary audible noise in an audio file). Steganalysis in this case is simple
and can usually be achieved through visual analysis.
• Histogram type analysis: Histogram techniques are well known, especially
amongst traditional DCT-based schemes where histogram distortion caused
by manipulation of coefficients could be utilised for steganalysis [51]. For-
mally, histogram attacks are used to observe changes in an image or frame
from a statistical perspective. These generally include not only simple mea-
sures such as the average, the mean, the maximum and minimum, the vari-
ance, entropy, chi-square etc., but also higher order ones such as skewness
(asymmetry of the curve) and kurtosis (sharpness of the peak).
• Robustness against compression: Testing a modified carrier file’s suscep-
tibility to compression is an important factor. How it deals with various
compression algorithms will determine how easily the stego-file can be dis-
tributed and through which channels.
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• Bit error rate: This is a calculation linking the stego-content that has been
embedded and the information that can be successfully extracted. In cases
where data is likely to be lost (due to compression), additional message bits
can be embedded to ensure that the secret message maintains its integrity.
• Robustness against manipulation: Signal processing changes, whether acci-
dental or intentional, can impact any contents hidden within a file. Deter-
mining the resistance to these types of attacks is important in many settings.
The steganalytic techniques discussed above are not only useful when attempt-
ing to identify the presence of steganography, but are often used to validate the
strength and robustness of a given embedding algorithm. This is an important
practice when conceptualising new schemes to ensure that it will offer basic resis-
tance to steganalysis.
2.3.5 Steganalysis in the Real-World
The majority of research in steganography and steganalysis is conducted in what
is often defined as a laboratory environment. In this setting, any scheme presented
can be constructed under a set of parameters that define the experiment. This
is often needed because the real-world is highly variable and difficult to model.
Because of this, there is a lack in research endeavours that evaluate the practices
of steganography and steganalysis outside of a laboratory environment. However,
several stego-systems and steganalytic tools have been evaluated by researchers.
Work by Khalind et al. [89], looked at the false positive rate of the StegDetect
steganalysis tool developed by Niels Provos. Their research helped determine the
most efficient methods for use of the tool to minimise the risk of false positive
occurrences.
Similarly, research by Ker and Pevny [86] evaluated the “universal pooled ste-
ganalyzer” presented in [87]. Their research aimed to determine that the presented
method could be applied to a number of steganography embedding algorithms. In
addition, their work attempted to consider the problems surrounding a payload
spread across multiple file types. The emphasis of this research was that it would
focus on practical applications and could be tested over real-world data.
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2.4 Video Steganography
Video content is ubiquitous, it is a format that has been given multiple platforms
for widespread distribution through the Internet. Media sharing and hosting web-
sites have transformed the way in which users access digital content to make it
more accessible. The pervasive nature of video means that these files can be easily
shared and distributed. This provides an ideal avenue for steganography as secret
messages can be embedded in digital video and exchanged with rarely any reason
to justify suspicion.
The large embedding capacity available to video is a highly desirable component
for steganography. By accommodating larger messages, video steganography can
reduce the risk of detection as modifications can be made over a larger spectrum of
redundancy. This has become one of the major advantages associated with video
steganography when compared to alternative forms of media.
Video files offer a high amount of flexibility for those constructing a stegano-
graphic scheme. Digital video combines spatial and temporal dimensions to pro-
duce a three-dimensional array. This provides potential for steganography from
the spatial domain by borrowing techniques from image steganography, and in
the temporal domain, where compression features are often used [71, 135]. With
regards to video steganography, research is more commonly carried out in the tem-
poral domain. Any steganographic redundancy identified in this domain provides
an ideal basis for a steganography scheme. This is largely related to compres-
sion components of various video formats such as MPEG-2, MP4, AVI and FLV.
Figure 19 shows the common methods of embedding for video steganography.
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Figure 19: Overview of techniques available for video steganography
As a form of digital representation, video streams contain a high degree tem-
poral redundancy. This is commonly seen with macroblocks, which are groups of
pixels. Adjacent frames can share identical or highly similar macroblocks between
them, which for the purposes of compression should be minimised [128]. Man-
aging and reducing temporal redundancy is a task handled by the compression
algorithms of video formats to keep each file at a practical size.
It is generally considered that steganography schemes for video function in
either compressed or uncompressed data [68]. Although research is actively con-
ducted in both, there are significant challenges for the latter. Uncompressed data
that contains secret information may be compressed at a later stage. Therefore,
a steganography scheme must be robust enough to survive potentially significant
changes. Because of this, it is far more common to see video steganography more
actively pursued within compressed video formats. In this state, the content is
already compressed, so it is unlikely to be exposed to severe changes in the fu-
ture. However, it is important to ensure that if lossy compression does occur, then
these features must keep the embedded message, as any secret message bits stored
within the lossy features will be sanitised. The early research into this problem
was presented by Chae in 1999 [24].
As seen with image steganography and particularly with video, many of the
early and modern schemes are influenced by conceptualisations of watermarking
algorithms [30]. These techniques are often adapted for steganography but rely
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less on robustness, instead focusing on imperceptibility and capacity.
2.4.1 Steganography in Uncompressed Data
Uncompressed files have a large amount of redundancy that is lost during future
compression to save storage space. Because of this, steganography in uncompressed
video data has the advantage of high capacity. However, it is uncommon to find
video in this state, as stored and shared offers few practical benefits.
Attempts have been made to advance the development of steganography in
uncompressed video. Xu and Ping [161] presented a method in which a secret
message is embedded into low-frequency DWT coefficients. However, this method
lacks robustness and is sanitised by compression techniques.
Block error correction schemes for steganography have been examined over
uncompressed video. The Hamming-code technique in particular, which is a well-
known method for error detection, has been tested extensively over image steganog-
raphy [11]. This technique has been extended to video where frames are isolated
and treated individually with an embedding algorithm that uses the Hamming
code technique to perform video steganography. In this method, the cover-object
is pre-coded with the addition of adding extra data so that the minimum amount
of redundancy is achieved. This extra data is called a codeword which will consist
of length n bits. The codeword contains parity information to accommodate a
message that will be embedded of length (n − k) bits where k is the predicted
message. The advantage of this technique is in its ability to detect and correct
a single bit error of added parity. A proof of concept of this technique over un-
compressed video was presented by Mstafa and Elleithy [108]. It showed that the
Hamming code over video provides a high PSNR ratio of 51 dBs, when maintain-
ing a relatively small payload (16-Kbits per frame). However, the authors had not
considered the robustness of their technique and did not test if it would survive
compression.
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2.4.2 Spatial and Transform Domain Techniques in Video
For image steganography, spatial domain techniques are common as they are con-
sidered simple to implement. However, they are often vulnerable to cover mod-
ification and statistical steganalysis. Transform domain techniques improve on
this by offering robustness and some level of resistance to statistical steganalysis.
With the increased popularity for video steganography, researchers have extended
spatial and transform domain methods to video. MSU StegoVideo [39] is a stego-
system for spatial domain steganography over video. This tool embeds data in the
lower bit-planes of individual frames to perform spread-spectrum steganography in
AVI video files. Besides the steganalytic vulnerabilities, one challenge for spatial
domain steganography in video is to maintain a desirable capacity. These schemes
often have to encode the message with error-correcting code in multiple locations
to resist potential video compression. This additional measure can significantly
reduce the capacity available for any given message to be hidden.
The major advancements in transform domain embedding come from the ef-
forts conducted in image steganography. In recent years, these methods have
been extended to video. Transform domain techniques, particularly DCT-based
steganography has been applied to video with the MPEG-2 format. Early video
steganography schemes conceptualised this by embedding secret messages using a
DCT-based approach [24]. To perform this, the secret message and target frames
from the cover-object are transformed into 8x8 macroblocks. Coefficients from the
secret message are quantized and encoded then embedded into the corresponding
coefficients from the cover-frame. This method of embedding still faces the chal-
lenges of video processing, where embedded data is lossy and susceptible to file
modification. However, if each frame is treated individually, there is potential for
higher capacity for an embedded message.
2.4.3 Pixel-Value Differencing
Tri-Way Pixel-Value Differencing (TPVD) is an embedding technique adapted
from the original image steganography method called Pixel-Value Differencing
(PVD) [159]. For the image scheme, the embedding operation segments a file
into non-overlapping pairs of neighbouring pixels. A calculation is given to the
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prediction error between them and is used to hide the secret message. This pro-
vides relatively high capacity while maintaining imperceptibility. For video, this
scheme uses the underlying concept that locally complex regions will yield the
highest PSNR. Smooth areas provide small pixel-value differences, whereas locally
complex regions provide a wider deviation between neighbouring pixels and are
optimal for data embedding. TPVD [137] is a video steganography method that
fragments and classifies vertical, horizontal and diagonal directions. The main
advancement of TVPD over PVD is that PVD isolates two-pairs of neighbouring
pixels along a one-directional edge. TPVD extracts four-pairs of neighbour pixels
to provide a wider array of prediction error. Figure 20 demonstrates how four-pair
pixels are represented.
Figure 20: 4-pair neighbouring pixels, from [137]
This scheme offers high capacity, an improvement over the original PVD scheme
by embedding data in a wider array of image features. The algorithm for TPVD
specifically targeted frames with maximum scene change to exploit any temporal
redundancy.
2.5 Motion Estimation Schemes
Capacity is one of the three desirable features of any successful steganography
scheme. Video files are a popular media format for this due to the high embedding
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capacity offered by most schemes. Motion estimation and vector modification
schemes provide this due to the significantly large number of vectors available
per-frame. Motion vectors are a key component in video compression to reduce
temporal redundancy between successive frames [70]. The Motion Vectors (MV)
are bi-dimensional pointers used to represent the position of a macroblock in one
frame based on the position of the macroblock in another frame, as shown in
Figure 21. Steganography by MV modification is highly desirable as it is resistant
to video processing techniques and provides a robust solution.
Figure 21: Motion vector representation
MV steganography is a technique observed in the temporal domain of video
files. MVs are a component of video compression that describe movement between
frames as a method of identifying and reducing redundancy. For this, each frame
is typically divided into 16 x 16 MacroBlocks (MBs), for which, each MB is taken
and the reference frame is analysed for a matching MB to pair it to in the target
frame. The position estimation between the reference and target frame for an MB
is described by a MV. These compression features are used for steganography by
embedding secret message bits in the LSB of MV components.
A common compression technique for spatial redundancy in video frames is to
limit the amount of data represented in each frame. The MPEG standard is a
common example of this, where motion estimation is achieved by splitting frames
into three categories; I-frames, P-frames, and B-frames, shown in Figure 22. Intra-
frames (I-frame) is the key frame of the three, it is completely self-referential,
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meaning that it only relies upon the information stored within itself. Prediction-
frames (P-frames) reference previous I-frame or P-frames to identify redundant
data. This leads to the generation of forward-only MVs. Bi-directional frames
(B-frames) result from an encoder that is generated using previous and/or future
reference frames resulting in bi-directional MVs. The resulting MVs are adaptive
and any particular values they hold are dependant on how complex the given scene
of motion will be.
Figure 22: Illustration of frames in MPEG compression, from [66]
Early work in motion estimation steganography was influenced by research in
watermarking [82, 168]. The underlying principle is to embed data in the least
significant bits of a candidate MV’s horizontal or vertical components, where the
magnitude is above a predefined threshold. The original research experimented to
identify the ideal threshold value. It was discovered that lower thresholds would
accommodate a higher capacity but introduce distortions, therefore a careful ap-
proach should be taken to achieve high capacity without affecting the object’s
integrity. Embedding data within high threshold magnitude motion vectors would
mean that data is typically embedded within noisy areas to conceal any distortions.
In 2006, this method of embedding was adapted for the purposes of steganography
by Xu et al [162]. This was achieved in parallel to similar work carried out by Fang
and Chang [43] who instead conceptualised a method to utilise the phase angles
of a motion vector. Both researchers followed the same principle, that modifying
MVs with larger magnitudes would introduce fewer distortions.
A typical scheme for MV steganography can be modelled as a function that
is inserting additive noise into the horizontal and vertical components of the first
motion vector for target frames. This can be described similarly to the equation
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formulated by Wang et al [151].SV hk,l = V hk,l +Nhk,lSV vk,l = V vk,l +N vk,l (5)
The example shown in eq.(5), describes a standard formulation of MV steganog-
raphy as additive noise Nhk,l, N
h
k,l into the horizontal SV
h
k,l and vertical SV
v
k,l com-
ponents of a MV [151]. k = 1, 2, .....N, and l = 1, 2, ..., Lk, where N describes the
frame number and Lk describes the number of MVs in the kth frame.
Additional protocols can be added to manage and control any potential distor-
tion, or determine when a MV is a suitable candidate. For an improved MV-based
scheme, the embedding algorithm integrates a control mechanism for MV steganog-
raphy to embed within specific X or Y-components of a target motion vector of
the kth frame. This could be a feature controlled by the user or predetermined by
the stego-system. This can be formulated as shown in eq. (6).SV hk,l = V hk,l + Chk,lNhk,lSV vk,l = V vk,l + Cvk,lN vk,l (6)
Where k = 1, 2, .....N, and l = 1, 2, ..., Lk, where N describes the frame number
and Lk is the first MV of the kth frame. The additional control adds C
h
k,l and
Cvk,l that are either user or system controlled features to determine whether the
horizontal or vertical components of the MV as used.
This results in a stego-object being visually indistinguishable from the cover-
object, as shown in Figure 23, where data is embedded using control features for
the first x or y MV in each target frame.
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Figure 23: Cover-object and stego-object result from the Steganosaurus MV tool [126]
It was later realised that a selection rule based solely on MV magnitude would
not be capable of ensuring minimum prediction error. In 2011, Aly presented a
selection rule in which MVs associated with large prediction errors are selected to
accommodate this [7], thereby improving steganographic security.
An alternative scheme for MV steganography was proposed, that was inspired
by Fridrich et al’s model for Pertubed Quantization (PQ) [53]. The adapted scheme
for video aimed to apply the concept to the temporal domain of video, by embed-
ding message bits at the same time that motion estimation is determined. In
addition, only suboptimal MVs were selected for embedding. As no additional
modifications are required to the stego-object, the compressed data appears to be
naturally generated. This would preserve the statistical qualities of modified MVs
and increase steganographic security [23]. To test the steganalytic resistance of
this scheme, Cao et al. subject their algorithm to a previously presented steganal-
ysis scheme, tailored specifically for MV-based steganography [167], it had shown
to outperform competing MV schemes.
2.5.1 Challenges for Video Steganography
Typical video files are an amalgam of three data streams upon which, generate a
functional video. These are frames, audio, and metadata. Each feature provides a
unique avenue for steganography. When compartmentalized into these three com-
ponents, stego-systems can adopt features from pre-existing stego-systems. For
steganography, this presents an interesting range of possibilities. The high tempo-
ral redundancy offers image steganography techniques a unique advantage where
data can be split among many frames as opposed to a whole message directly in a
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 58
single image. This increases the imperceptibility between cover-object and stego-
object by keeping PSNR quality high with a generally indistinguishable solution.
Similarly, the audio components of a video file would imply that audio steganogra-
phy schemes are applicable. Finally, the metadata used to describe the structure
of a video file has been used for steganography [141]. However, video steganogra-
phy schemes can also be subject to a wider variety of attacks and limitations to
the embedding operation. Therefore, one would need to confidently understand
how any embedded data might be effected by compression, change of frame rate,
format switching, and modification of frames during video processing.
The evolution of video steganography has followed a similar theme to that
of more traditional approaches. Modern schemes identify redundancies within
various components of a file, this could be within individual frames, audio data, or
metadata. Over time, schemes evolve in complexity by focusing on resistance to
steganalysis. Embedding algorithms are extended to use cover codes or optimise
the impact of an embedding algorithm to present a more steganographically secure
scheme. Ultimately, one should aim to achieve ideal embedding efficiency without
compromising the integrity of the carrier file and diminishing imperceptibility.
2.6 Video Steganalysis
Intuitively, the field of steganalysis must be advanced for any domain that its coun-
terpart can be applied to. The emergence of video steganography has inevitably
led to steganalysis of video. The pursuit of video steganography is justified by
the many advantages it offers. Capacity and flexibility for steganographic schemes
are shared in parallel to the popularity of video files as a form of media. As a
solution, video steganography provides a wide variety of embedding algorithms
that can be customised to any particular component of a video file that contains
steganographic redundancy. When compared to traditional steganalytic methods,
video steganalysis will have to adopt a flexible approach. For a blind attack, it
has to be assumed that a steganographic scheme can hide secret messages within
any aspect of the video file. Generally, this means that an attacker would need to
account for the possibility of spatial and frequency-based image schemes, temporal
compression schemes, audio schemes and metadata/auxillary schemes.
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This section provides an overview of existing work in the field of video steganal-
ysis. Although relatively new, much of the steganalytic focus has been directed
towards motion estimation schemes, particularly MV steganography.
2.6.1 Motion Estimation Steganalysis
Schemes for MV steganography were first presented in 2006 [162]. However, it
wasn’t until 2008 that the first steganalytic scheme capable of detecting MV
steganography was presented. Work by Zhang et al [167] detected the first MV
schemes that had been constructed as additive noise to the horizontal and vertical
components of MV. Although successful, the accuracy of this scheme is dependant
entirely on the video used. Positive detection varied between 87.6% and 100%
while negative detection varied between 76.8% and 100%. These changes in accu-
racy were based heavily on the existence of frames with complex motion. Locally
complex regions were difficult for the detection scheme to attack.
Su et al [147], implemented a similar steganalytic scheme to analyse the early
ME watermarking concepts [82, 34, 168]. Their steganalytic scheme functioned
by calculating the difference between two adjacent MVs and extracting features
directly from the statistics of those differences. It performed similarly to the work
of Zhang that found the success and performance of such a scheme relied heavily
on the distribution and properties of particular MVs. This created a challenge in
the field to find a more consistent method for ME/MV-based steganalysis.
In 2012, Cao et al, attempted to improve upon existing MV-based steganalysis
by using a reversion technique that decompresses the stego-object into a spatial
state [22]. The data is then compressed back into its initial format with no further
embedding involved. This revealed that the altered MVs would revert to their
prior values. At this point, features can be extracted and any observation of MV-
reversion would indicate the presence of steganography. Their results had shown
to outperform other existing techniques at the time. However, the scheme relies
heavily on the compression algorithm for MPEG being used in both stages of initial
compression and recompression. This would mean that practical use is limited and
any deviation from the exact embedding mechanism could heavily influence their
results.
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MV schemes are generally constructed as targeted attacks. This means each
steganalytic scheme will work only on a particular MV-scheme. If the stegano-
graphic scheme is advanced, the performance of a targeted attack will drop or
fail completely. Attempts have been made towards universal steganalysis of MVs
that would be applicable to a wider array of embedding schemes. This was the
culmination of work carried out by Wang et al [151], who presented the Add-or-
Subtract-One (AoSO) scheme for video steganography. Their work demonstrated
that MVs extracted from a cover video will be least locally optimal according to
the SAD (Sum of Absolute Difference) values. This slight influence that modified
MVs imposed on the SAD, can be used to calculate the optimal SAD values from
a localized region of MVs to extract features accordingly.
2.6.2 Intra-Prediction Mode (IPM) Steganography and Ste-
ganalysis
A large number of steganography methods embed secret information during the
encoding process. As a result, these methods have high computational complexity
and can be difficult to model in real-world parameters. Especially when these
methods are slow and ineffective in a practical environment.
Research in steganography by Intra-Prediction Modes has been presented by
Hu et al. [72], and by Yang et al. [163] as an improvement to Hu’s method.
The motivation of their research was to develop an embedding algorithm that
resolves many of practical challenges for video steganography. The method pre-
sented by Hu aimed to perform steganography over H.264 objects, by targeting
the components of I-frame intra-prediction. These features are part of the H.264
coding standards and were introduced to reduce spatial redundancy and improve
compression efficiency.
This method of steganography is performed by embedding a single secret mes-
sage bit into each qualified 4x4 luma macroblock. To do so, the embedding algo-
rithm would exploit 4x4 Intra-Prediction Modes (I4PM) and hide secret message
data by modulating the intra-prediction modes of qualified intra 44 luminance
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blocks. Because of the high number of macroblocks for a given I-frame, IPM algo-
rithms demonstrate low computational complexity and offer considerable stegano-
graphic capacity.
Research by Zhao et al. [172], attempted steganalysis of IPM steganography.
Their research presented a low-dimensional method to detect non-optimal (mod-
ified) IPMs, under the assumption that H.264 encoding generates optimal IPMs
modulated by specific encoding control algorithms. Based on this assumption,
if spatially compressed IPMs are decompressed, then stego-modified IPMs would
likely revert to their prior optimal value when subjected to a encoding algorithm.
2.7 Conclusion
In summary, this chapter has presented an overview into the background and state-
of-the-art surrounding steganography and steganalysis. There has been a focus on
topics that are relevant to this thesis, in addition to a comprehensive overview
of many well-known and influential techniques. This Chapter has illustrated how
researchers in steganography and steganalysis have advanced the field to its current
state-of-the-art and identified areas that require further exploration.
One of the most underlying principles of steganography is that it is inherently
advanced through the practices of steganalysis. This has been observed throughout
the literature review, as new advancements in steganography are often developed to
combat novel steganalytic methods and provide an optimal scheme for hiding secret
information. These methods often aim to achieve high capacity while maintaining
a low rate of detection against strong steganalytic attacks, this is a complex task,
as a compromise is often needed between these two features or the steganographic
method will risk being detected.
The application for steganography in the real-world are discussed to highlight
unexplored avenues of research in steganography and steganalysis. From this, it
is clear that system-based attacks in steganalysis are a relatively under-researched
area and advancements in this domain will help develop the field, particularly for
practical steganography and steganalysis. The two major types of steganalytic at-
tack (statistical and system attacks) are discussed to show the differences between
them and illustrate where they can be effectively applied. Further discussion is
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given towards forensic steganalysis, a method developed to extend the scope of
steganalytic investigation to include the extraction of a secret message.
Avenues of research for video steganography and steganalysis have been dis-
cussed at length. It has been shown that there is a particular focus given to MV
embedding as a form of steganography. This method is certainly interesting for
steganography, but its practical applications have not yet been fully explored and




Research in steganography and steganalysis has advanced rapidly in the past two
decades [174]. However, there are still major gaps in the field that have led to
stego-systems being a security concern for its users.
Much of the existing literature in steganography models the field as a data
hiding and detection problem. Because of this, statistical methodologies have a
justified but at times overshadowing impact on the field. These methods can be
effectively applied in what is often defined as a laboratory environment [88], but
faces challenges in real-world scenarios. When applied to a practical stego-system,
the impact of steganography schemes over a cover-object is not simply exclusive
to the embedded message, as such, a wide array of features must be considered.
This lack of consideration is what gives potential to system attacks.
In laboratory environments, commonly accepted frameworks exist to define
conditions for steganographic experimentation [152, 20, 17]. These remove the
ambiguities and some of the difficulties surrounding the real-world problems that
might impose additional mathematical challenges. In these environments, param-
eters can be adjusted so that the requirements of a steganography scheme can be
more easily applied. However, steganography and steganalysis are real-world prob-
lems and if improperly implemented, will lead to damaging consequences due to
their practical nature. For example, detection accuracy of a steganalytic method
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can vary greatly depending on the scheme and cover. In some cases, detection
methods provide accuracy as low as 51.30% over known stego-systems [93], which
is still, however, considered a successful attack. In a practical setting, particu-
larly where millions of files may require analysis, detection accuracy becomes more
pressing and the effectiveness of the rule for successful steganalysis (>50% positive
detection rate) can become diminished. In addition, if a stego-system is vulnerable
to multiple steganalytic attacks, performance should be the determining factor for
the optimal attack.
Furthermore, a focus on steganalysis as a detection problem has led to the
development of stego-systems that devote considerable effort to provide resistance
to statistical attacks. This is seen, for example, with OpenPuff [113] where the
stego-system provides resistance to known statistical tests (Chi Square, Entropy,
Monte Carlo, Compression, Mean Value). While this is an advantageous feature
for a stego-system, it frequently comes with a lack of consideration for system vul-
nerabilities. This can lead to the development and even popularisation of many
stego-systems that might be vulnerable to system attacks. From this, it is impor-
tant that the research and experimental methodology followed through this thesis
adopts a robust framework to ensure that any formal outputs are of high quality.
This chapter presents and discusses the experimental methodology used in
subsequent chapters (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6). The rest of this
chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the testing and evaluation framework
for this thesis. Section 3.3 provides an overview and discussion of the dataset
selection and generation procedures to justify the primary choices for constructing
the necessary datasets. Section 3.4 presents the experimental methodology that
is followed in this thesis, in this section, emphasis is given to explore each step of
the experimental process. Finally, a brief summary of the chapter is discussed in
Section 3.5.
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3.2 Constructing a Testing and Evaluation Frame-
work
This thesis examines the practicality of system attacks, and a series of high-level
steganalytic schemes are proposed and constructed to demonstrate the scope and
limitations of system steganalysis. To evaluate each scheme, a framework for
testing should be carefully defined and used. This will ensure that testing does
not introduce any bias and does not lead to false conclusions. The test framework
can be adequately described through three components as follows:
Component 1 Datasets must be produced for testing and validation. For
this, the method of dataset creation must be consistent, comprehensive, and re-
producible. Each dataset element is a file pair consisting of a cover-object and a
stego-object. These are used to determine detection accuracy and false positive
rate of any proposed steganalytic schemes. For each dataset, secret messages and
cryptographic keys are randomly generated. This mitigates the risk of flagged
signatures being linked to weak cryptographic implementations and ensures that
traceable steganalytic features are generated from the system vulnerabilities.
Component 2 Accuracy testing must be comprehensive. To ensure confidence
in the accuracy of a steganalytic scheme, enough datasets (minimum of 100) must
be constructed to determine with a certain degree of assurance that a steganalytic
scheme is detecting the presence of steganography with suitable accuracy. This is
in contrast to the standards set for typical steganalysis, in which a steganalytic
scheme can be deemed successful provided it detects steganography at a rate higher
than that of a random guess (50%). To prove that no bias is introduced in these
tests, at least 50% of files used for the generation of datasets should be randomly
obtained. Detection accuracy is calculated as a frequency of occurrence based on
the number of instances in which a stego-object is correctly classified.
Component 3 Steganalytic schemes derived from high-level features are sus-
ceptible to false positives (as with many other steganalytic methods). Compre-
hensive testing should be carried out for any steganalytic scheme presented. Tests
generated for false positives should be performed over a significant number of files
(minimum 1000). To ensure that no bias is introduced, datasets generated from
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files will consist of at least 50% randomly obtained files. False positives are cal-
culated as a frequency of occurrence based on the number of instances in which
clean object is misclassified as a stego-object.
3.3 Dataset Selection and Generation
The data used in the experimental phases of this research consist exclusively of
digital media content. This includes the use of images (JPEG), document (PDF),
audio (WAV), and video (MP4, MPEG, FLV, and AVI) to support the testing and
evaluation of the constructed methods and to help answer the proposed research
questions presented in Chapter 1. The content of each dataset component is rele-
vant to the requirements for each associated experiment. Typically, stego-systems
offer a variety of embedding operations across different file formats. To provide
a comprehensive analysis, it is important to ensure that a significantly large and
diverse collection of relevant file types are available for testing. As such, appro-
priate file formats were identified and used as a filtering option when constructing
the Datasets.
To ensure that the experimental methodology is robust, steps have been taken
to ensure that no bias is introduced in any part of the experimental procedure.
From a scientific perspective, it is important to ensure that specific data objects
are not being picked with the intention of giving ’expected’ results. The most suit-
able way to address this concern is to randomly obtain a dataset that is gathered
without influence from the experimental participants. A pseudo-randomised we-
bcrawler using a shuﬄe function provides an ideal means to obtain a video dataset
unaffected by selection bias. However, video files can be computationally expen-
sive in resources and a limit must be imposed to ensure that experiments are con-
ducted within the projects allocated time-frame. To address this, the webcrawler
was given a full week to pseudo-randomly download videos from the Internet and
successfully obtained 5,000 video files. This can be labelled the DMOZ dataset as
the DMOZ archive was used to psuedo-randomly generate a list of URLs.
The second challenge of dataset generation through this methodology relates
directly to the pseudo-randomly downloaded data. It is important to question
how the author of any experiment conducted this way would be certain that any
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downloaded contents are not already affected by some form of steganography?
The presence of steganography in the downloaded dataset has the potential to
impact the experiments and any given results. To address this, a second dataset
is generated by our own trusted source. This is called the Kent Digital Media
Archive and is discussed in further detail in Appendix D. The videos generated
from this dataset are used primarily for tests associated with detection accuracy
and its purpose is to ensure that tests are not performed over data that might
be unknowingly modified by a steganographic algorithm. The Kent Digital Me-
dia Archive currently hosts over 2,000 videos. However, when testing detection
accuracy, only 100 stego-objects are created for each experiment. This is largely a
limitation based on resource constraints as the generation of stego-objects can be
computationally demanding and time-consuming. The presence of both datasets
will ensure a robust unbiased methodology.
3.4 Experimental Methodology
The experimental methodology for this thesis has been designed to support the use
of case studies. Each case study reflects a steganalytic investigation and analysis
of a practical stego-system with focus given to the capabilities and feature of video
steganography tools. The purpose of each case study is to address the research
questions that were proposed in Chapter 1; specifically, to answer “How are system
attacks best used within the scope of steganalysis?” and “Can system attacks be
successfully applied to achieve practical results over video steganography?”. There
are several key steps to the experimental methodology that has been proposed.
The first step involves the identification of video steganography tools. Each
tool must available to the public and demonstrate the capability to perform video
steganography. Many video stego-systems are available as open-source or com-
mercial products and it is important that the full scope of video stego-systems are
identified to ensure a comprehensive and accurate representation of video steganog-
raphy in the real world.
The second step involves data collections and building of the required datasets.
Relevant file types are identified based on the features of each stego-system and
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a comprehensive sample of files are obtained. The full collection is managed be-
tween two datasets, the first comprises a significant sample of pseudo-randomly
downloaded files from the Internet (DMOZ), which are to be used for false positive
testing. The second dataset uses the KDMA database to test detection accuracy
of any proposed attacks. The DMOZ dataset is intended to represent a sample of
files that might be observed in the real world.
The third step involves an analysis of each stego-system using the constructed
datasets to examine the functionality of each stego-system that had been identified
in step 1. Stego-systems are grouped according to their functionality and system
steganalysis is carried out to identify vulnerabilities that can lead to detecting each
steganography tool. The steganalytic investigations are performed as case studies
to demonstrate the real world impact of each tool.
Any steganalytic attacks discovered from the associated case studies are eval-
uated on their effectiveness through an experimental testing phase. In this step,
detection accuracy and false positive rates are observed using the relevant datasets
(KDMA and DMOZ) to determine the strength of any presented detection meth-
ods.
Figure 24 (below) illustrates the process for the experimental methodology used
in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.






















Figure 24: Flowchart illustrating the experimental methodology for this research
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As shown in Figure 24, R1, R2, and R3 illustrate research steps that produced
formal outputs. These three components reflect case studies that examine and eval-
uate the state-of-the-art in video steganography and system steganalysis. These
steps intend to produce original research by presenting novel attacks against well-
known steganography systems. In each case, the identified stego-systems have not
yet been subjected to the efforts of steganalysis in academic literature, therefore
the research conducted and presented through each case study can be considered
novel.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has presented and discussed the experimental and research method-
ology decisions in this thesis. This research endeavour is supported by a series
of case studies that evaluate the scope of application for system steganalysis and
determine the capabilities of system attacks to video steganography. The method-
ology has been discussed to provide clarity and justification for each step of the
experimental procedure followed. Two primary datasets exist to support the re-
search, the first of which comprises a large sample of pseudo-randomly downloaded
data from the Internet, and the second dataset is constructed from our own trusted
source of student generated images. The use of both datasets will provide a robust
methodology and ensure that selection bias is avoided while giving certainty that
data used for accuracy tests are trusted.
The experimental process followed in this thesis is largely driven by an analysis
of dataset generated components. Each component can be considered an artifact
created for steganographic testing. This will typically consist of a pair of objects
(cover-object and stego-object) for an associated stego-system. From this a suf-
ficiently large sample should be generated to provide confidence when observing
for consistency. This will form the initial foundation for the steganalysis testing





The rapid advancement of digital steganography has left a wide gap between aca-
demic research and its practical applications. This was observed early on by An-
dreas Westfeld in 2006 [157], who demonstrated that image-based stego-systems
feature a range of implementation vulnerabilities based on weak cryptographic im-
plementations and encoding functions. The increasing interest in video steganog-
raphy can be related to many of the apparent advantages offered by video media.
This has led to the development of video steganography tools that may encounter
similar vulnerabilities to those previously seen in image steganography tools. These
video stego-systems exist as free and commercial products offering a steganogra-
phy solution to protect user data and facilitate secure communications. Analysis
of these video steganography tools can help close the gap between current aca-
demic advancements and the existing solutions on offer. To examine practical
stego-systems, system attacks are used to evaluate existing video steganography
tools that have emerged to become popular and widely available.
In this chapter, an investigation is conducted into the scope and application
of system attacks over video. This investigation is carried out by identifying a
range of video steganography tools which are grouped and analysed according to
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their embedding capabilities. The first case study examines a series of tools that
perform steganography by end-of-file injection. The second case study examines a
single stego-system using motion vector steganography.
Video-based stego-systems appear to adopt one of two main approaches to per-
forming steganography. In one instance, the stego-system can adapt an embed-
ding algorithm from state-of-the-art academic literature, however, this can present
a range of challenges, especially with video-based media. Alternatively, a stego-
system can implement a novel method of steganography, one that won’t impact a
given object in a known way. Redundancy in digital representation can be iden-
tified throughout many of the components of a media file, and this is especially
prevalent in video. The presence of multiple encoding streams (video, audio, and
metadata) will ensure that video media files can accommodate a wide variety of
embedding methods. Because of this, practical video stego-systems have shown
a particular predisposition for embedding in high-level file features. This chap-
ter examines these video steganography tools and discusses the implementation
vulnerabilities that make each stego-system susceptible to steganalysis.
The contributions of this chapter are the following:
• A series of video stego-systems are identified and subjected to steganalysis
via system attacks. Each video steganography tool is publicly available as
either an open-source solution or as a commercial product. It is shown that
there are fundamental similarities among many of the video stego-systems
available.
• The research in this chapter demonstrates coding challenges in video stego-
systems that leave them susceptible to system attacks. The focus in this
chapter is given to vulnerabilities surrounding weak encoding, poor cryp-
tographic implementation, and weaknesses in pre- and post-processing over
video.
• This work demonstrates that each stego-system can be broken by a series
of system attacks and, in every case, it is possible to detect the presence of
steganography with high accuracy.
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The rest of this chapter is presented as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief sum-
mary of existing literature that is relevant to this Chapter. Section 4.3 Presents the
stego-systems that have been used as part of the two case studies in the chapter.
This section continues to discuss the impact that stego-systems can impose over
relevant image/video files through their invasive embedding methods. Section 4.4
presents the first case study against video steganography tools that share a com-
mon theme in their functionality. This section continues to demonstrate how each
tool can be broken by the efforts of steganalysis and provides a series of experi-
ments to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks. Section 4.5 presents
the second case study against a single stego-system that uses MV-embedding. In
this section, the impact of the embedding algorithm is discussed from a practical
approach and a proposed attack is evaluated to demonstrate the effectiveness of
system attacks over MV embedding. Finally the chapter conclusions are discussed
in Section 4.6.
4.2 Background
Although system attacks are considered a known method for detecting the pres-
ence of steganography, research into these techniques is often overlooked in favour
of statistical steganalysis. As a result, only a relatively small amount of literature
exists on the field. A popular example of the usefulness of system attacks refers to
the early steganalysis of the F5 steganographic scheme created by Andreas West-
feld [155]. The embedding scheme focused on modifying the DCT coefficients of a
JPEG picture with a matrix encoding operation, to improve embedding efficiency.
At the time, most researchers were focused on attacking the impact of the embed-
ding operation using techniques typical of statistical steganalysis [50]. However,
Niels Provos pointed out that the JPEG compression algorithm consistently im-
printed a comment into the header of the JPEG file that could be used as a very
reliable detector for the presence of F5 steganography [46]. Work carried out by
Johnson et al. has also examined tools that leave digital fingerprints upon modi-
fied carrier files. In these cases, it is possible to use systems attacks to detect the
presence of steganographic schemes [76, 78, 79].
In 2006 Andreas Westfeld carried out a study to confirm the idea that many
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end-user tools suffer from weaknesses in the encryption and encoding components
of a stego-system [157]. The research looked at a small number of image steganog-
raphy tools to conclude that implementation vulnerabilities existed and stegan-
alytic attacks could be constructed. However, this study was limited to image
steganography tools and did not cover video steganography at all.
Finally, research by Ker et al. [88] has looked into the problems brought forth
by a lack of practical steganalysis. Their work aims to address the concept of
bringing steganography and steganalysis out of the laboratory and into the real-
world. Their research is very relevant to this thesis and it explains the problems
that lead to the generation of system vulnerabilities, but they note that there is
only a small amount research on video steganalysis.
4.3 Stego-Systems
This chapter analyses seven video steganography tools: StegoStick, OurSecret,
Masker, OmniHide Pro, BDV DataHider, Max File Encryption, and Steganosaurus.
This comprises a significant proportion of the small number of video stego-systems
available to the public. For each stego-system, system vulnerabilities are identified
based on their steganographic strategy and it is shown how different attacks can
be constructed leading to a reliable detection method. The analysis is split among
two different case studies based on the functionality of each stego-system.
4.3.1 Impact of a Stego-System
This section discusses the impact of a stego-system, with a focus given to the
pre- and post-processing requirements of an embedding algorithm (e.g., double
compression).
The gap between theoretical and practical steganography exists largely due to
the challenges of designing a secure stego-system capable of fulfilling the parame-
ters of a practical environment. This is because the real-world is highly variable
and can be difficult to model consistently. When a laboratory-based embedding
algorithm is developed into a practical stego-system, a steganographic model must
be considered as a coding problem in addition to a data hiding and detection
CHAPTER 4. ATTACKS AGAINST VIDEO STEGO-SYSTEMS 75
problem. This avenue of research has not yet been fully explored, especially with
regards to video steganography and steganalysis.
In general, the strength of a steganography scheme is influenced heavily by the
choice of cover-object. If the cover is capable of concealing the secret message, then
a steganography scheme can be used with confidence. However, if the cover fails
to provide enough redundancy, the scheme is doomed to fail. In digital steganog-
raphy, it is frequently the cover properties that determine the effectiveness of the
process. An embedding algorithm that is capable of distributing data throughout
the cover should be harder to detect than one which embeds all data in a single
area. However, to practically achieve this, many steganography methods have pre-
and post-processing requirements for hiding a secret message. These can be key
identifiers for the presence of steganography. This is in depth discussed in Section
3.5.
System attacks identify implementation vulnerabilities in the stego-system and
use side-channel information to prove the existence of steganography. In many
cases, stego-systems are too invasive and leave detectable traces in the stego-object
that can be detected by system-attacks. By observing the impact of the stego-
system, the warden can determine the best possible approach for their attack. If a
signature is identified, it can be used as a component of a steganalytic attack and
trace the use of steganography to detect the stego-system. Detectable features
in these cases, are not exclusive to the embedding process. Through this, the
features may not relate specifically to the secret message, but will often be an
important part of the steganography process. This is often seen to be a product
of compression taking place and introducing predictable changes to the header or
footer of a file, as shown in Figure 25.
Figure 25: Pixelknot v1.01 - Cover-object header (top) and stego-object header (bottom)
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In this case, the header changes are linked to the use of publicly available
compression libraries. For example, the Pixelknot stego-system is based on the F5
embedding algorithm. This method works in the transform domain to substitute
the LSB of target DCT coefficients. The resulting stego-object deviates subtly
from the cover-object, as the compression algorithm has an impact on many of
the object’s features. This includes the size of the stego-object, as can be seen in
Figure 26. This figure shows files sizes of files obtained from a variety of sources
(random Internet downloads, KDMA archive, and the Dresden Image Database)
when compared between cover-object and stego-object. The size of Pixelknot
stego-objects are consistent and provide strong insights into the impact of the
Pixelknot stego-system.
Figure 26: Pixelknot v1.01 - Changes to file size between cover-objects and stego-objects
There are many other ways in which the overly invasive nature of real-world
stego-systems reduce these tools to simple cryptographic implementations. Stego-
systems sometimes use a predictable string of bytes (a signature) to let the extrac-
tion algorithm know where the secret data is hidden. If identified by an attacker,
it can immediately be used as part of a system attack to detect the presence of
steganography for that specific tool. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
The use of weak keys can also be a problem for stego-systems. In a typical
stego-system there are two types of keys. Steganographic keys and cryptographic
keys. A steganographic key controls the embedding and extraction process, while
a cryptographic key encrypts the secret message before embedding. When im-
properly implemented, these can become obvious identifiers for the presence of
steganography. In the worst case, both keys can be guessed or retrieved to provide
a plaintext version of the secret message. To mitigate this, the stego-system should
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ensure that keys are not susceptible to brute-force attacks [52] and that the PRNG
is providing sufficiently random data.
4.4 Case Study: EOF Injection Steganography
This first case study provides an evaluation and steganalysis of a series of video
steganography tools. All tools discussed in this case study are similar in their
functionality and will be used to determine if system attacks can be extended to
video steganography and to evaluate the current practical state-of-the-art.
4.4.1 Embedding Algorithms
An exhaustive search has revealed nine video steganography tools available to
the general public. This includes the six named above and in addition, MSU
StegoVideo, OpenPuff (discussed in chapter 5), and Steganosaurus (discussed in
chapter 3). From this, it is observed that four distinct embedding algorithms are in
use, namely EOF Injection by the six EOF tools listed above, metadata/auxilliary
embedding by OpenPuff steganography, DCT by MSU StegoVideo, and motion
vector by Steganosaurus. The limitations of the DCT implementation of MSU
StegoVideo has been examined at length by [160, 99, 28]. This chapter focuses on
the implementation of EOF injection by the six noted video steganography tools.
This is certainly considered a weak form of steganography and the impact of this
method is discussed alongside an identification of concrete system vulnerabilities
for each stego-system.
4.4.2 Data Injection Tools
Six video steganography tools have been found to use EOF injection techniques
(OurSecret, OmniHide Pro, Masker, StegoStick, BDV DataHider, and Max File
Encryption). This is a method where secret message data is simply appended to
the end of a given object after the final byte of data from the cover. For these six
tools, this is performed over video files as shown in Figure 27. This is considered to
be one of the simplest and weakest methods of steganography, which provides an
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ideal example to illustrate the gap between literature and practical stego-systems.
Many of these tools demonstrate poor practices in steganography, which make
them highly susceptible to system and statistical attacks.
Figure 27: EOF data injection in FLV file
The choice to inject all secret data sequentially in a single file area is a very
weak method of steganography. Statistically, this is easy to identify as the in-
creased entropy is obvious. This can be illustrated fairly easily through the binary
visualisation shown in Figure 28. The image on the left shows a visualisation of
a cover-object with no secret data embedded. The image on the right shows a vi-
sualisation of a stego-object modified by EOF injection (within the marked area).
This would happen in most stego-systems based on EOF injection.
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Figure 28: EOF injection shown through binary visualisation with a cover-object (left)
and stego-object (right)
The high entropy of encrypted data, paired with sequentially clustered em-
bedding, makes its presence easily identifiable. However, to a casual observer,
this may not be immediately apparent. This method of steganography can be
subjected to a series of system attacks as the overarching impact of EOF stego-
systems can be high. As data is simply injected, no bit substitution or replacement
techniques generally take place. Because of this, file size will always increase as
should entropy, if strong encryption is used.
When looking at each stego-system individually, a series of unique system-
vulnerabilities can be identified and isolated for each, relating to weak implemen-
tations and encodings.
To provide an overview of each stego-system, Table 4 shows the details for
each tool analysed in this chapter 1. Based on an observation of downloads across
multiple sites, it can be confidently determined that many of these tools are still
downloaded on a weekly basis, showing that these stego-systems are currently in
use.
1Many of the tools listed in Table 4 do not show the number of downloads on their host site
or any other centralised form. These figures have been gathered from a number of downloading
sites and added. It can be safely assumed that the actual number of downloads is significantly
higher that the figures shown here.
CHAPTER 4. ATTACKS AGAINST VIDEO STEGO-SYSTEMS 80
Toolkit Price / Downloads Resource location
OurSecret v2.5.5 (12/06/2012) Free / 247,700+ http://www.securekit.net/oursecret.htm
OmniHide Pro v1.0 (16/08/2011) $8 / 24,000+ http://omnihide.com/
Masker v7.5 e59 / 16,272+ http://www.softpuls.com/masker/
StegoStick Beta (16/06/2008) Free / 9098+ http://stegostick.sourceforge.net/
Max File Encryption v2.0 (19/07/2013) Free / 3982+ http://www.softeza.com/fileencryption/
BDV Data Hider v3.2 (01/06/2010) $14.99 / N/A http://www.bdvnotepad.com/products/bdv-datahider/
Table 1: Summary of EOF injection tools and downloads taken as of 15/08/2018
4.4.3 System Steganalysis
In the following, implementation vulnerabilities and weak security practices are
discussed. This research aims to demonstrate examples of implementation vul-
nerabilities and weak encoding in video stego-systems that make system attacks
viable and effective.
4.4.4 OurSecret
Formerly called “Steganography”, OurSecret provides the capability for video
steganography on a wide variety of video formats. This tool is currently avail-
able as version 2.5.5, and offers an option for data protection by the use of an
encryption key as well as a steganographic key. As a freely available product,
the OurSecret tool imposes no restrictions or limitations on use or functionality.
Research carried out by Adonis in 2007 identified a weakness within previous ver-
sions of this tool (affecting v.1.7.1 and 1.8) that allowed an attacker to replace
the user password with their own to extract embedded contents. However, this
vulnerability as discussed was limited to JPEG images only [3].
Similar to the vulnerability identified by Adonis in 2007, it is still possible to
extract the full embedded contents from a video file modified by OurSecret. In the
absence of a password, the embedding algorithm will use a fixed 16-byte string. As
this 16-byte hexadecimal string is used in place of a user-provided password, an
attacker can simply copy this value into any OurSecret encoded files using a hex
editor and bypass the user-provided password with this null-password string. This
simple modification will deceive the tool into recognising a carrier file as having no
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password requirements. As a result, the attacker is then able to access and extract
the full hidden contents. This can be considered a Null-Password Vulnerability.2
Figure 29 illustrates the Null-Password exploit in practice. These are the final
26 bytes of a file modified by OurSecret. The highlighted bytes are the Null-
Password replacing the original 16 bytes of a file that were injected by OurSecret.
This simple change grants the attacker full access to the hidden contents with no
need for the secret key.
Figure 29: Null-password replacing any previous user password
Weak stego-systems often implement their own signatures as identifiers for the
presence of steganography. This won’t be apparent to a casual observer, but can
be easily identified by an attacker looking to break the stego-system. OurSecret
provides a consistent 40-byte string, as shown in Table 5. This is a sequence
of hexadecimal characters that occurs within all OurSecret modified video files,
across all formats and encoding options. This can be classified as a valid signature
to identify the existence of any contents hidden with OurSecret. This signature
appears directly after the final byte of data. The presence of signatures provide
multiple practical advantages for steganalysis. If their length is sufficiently long,
detection accuracy will be high enough to mitigate any concern for false positives.
In addition to this, if the string is completely unique to the stego-system by being
part of the encoding process as opposed to being a common feature (compres-
sion/double compression), then the signature should be suitable for tracing the
presence of steganography back to the relevant stego-system. For the purposes of
a digital forensic investigation, this would be very valuable information.
2This vulnerability is an improvement to the JPEG exploit as referenced on CVE-2007-0163,
where this weakness was not mentioned.
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9E 97 BA 2A 00 80 88 C9 A3 70 97 5B A2 E4 99 B8 C1 78 72 0F
88 DD DC 34 2B 4E 7D 31 7F B5 E8 70 39 A8 B8 42 75 68 71 91
Table 2: OurSecret signature
The OurSecret stego-system is a highly suitable example to illustrate the gap
between steganography in the laboratory and steganography in real-world scenar-
ios. It is completely oblivious to many security recommendations, as evidenced by
the use of weak cryptography and encoding. Because of this, a system attack based
on the identified signature can be constructed to detect the presence of OurSecret
steganography.
4.4.5 OmniHide Pro
OmniHide Pro is a commercial product capable of embedding data within image,
audio, video and other media. Released in 2010 for the Windows operating system,
OmniHide offers a Trial and a Pro version, the former providing only limited
functionality. OmniHide Pro costs $8, and will provide the user with all the
tools’ features. In the following, only the the Pro version is subjected to system
steganalysis.
Figure 30 shows a typical stego-object through an hexadecimal editor. It reveals
the same embedding method of OurSecret, also employing EOF data injection. Re-
viewing the offset where the unmodified file would have ended, it is apparent that
the OmniHide Pro tool also suffers from several vulnerabilities that can compro-
mise the security of a users’ data. OmniHide embeds information within videos
by appending the data directly to the end of the file. The first sequence of bytes
are followed by a string of white space characters. These are reserved bytes to be
replaced by longer file names that are embedded into the carrier.
Figure 30: First 11 bytes of embedded content
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Figure 31 shows that it is possible to identify the name of the text document
embedded within the video. For the purposes of these tests, a single file was em-
bedded called “ATest.txt”. This converted ASCII is the first string of identifiable
information. Using a hex viewer, this data follows the offset in which the unmodi-
fied file would have ended. The presence of a file name that is so easily identifiable
within a carrier file raises many security concerns. For example, if an attacker
has access to the users’ computer, it may be possible to identify the initial file
still present in a plain text format. It is best practice for steganography tools to
fully encrypt a file before embedding. This provides an additional layer of security
and will make it more challenging for any attackers to identify the existence and
location of hidden contents, to then recover them. OmniHide Pro clearly lacks this
fundamental feature.
Figure 31: Hex string of embedded data, converted to ASCII
Further examination of OmniHide Pro revealed other characteristics of the
embedding algorithm that can be considered as security weaknesses from a ste-
ganalytic perspective. As the file size of the carrier increases proportionally to the
embedded content, it is apparent that no compression is taking place during the
embedding process. This is again against recommended best practice, as file com-
pression should be used to reduce the size and redundancy of embedded contents.
Figure 32 captures the end of file characteristics of data injected by OmniHide Pro
(approximately 19MB in this case). This reflects the size of the carrier file prior
to data injection. A subtraction between these two values will allow any attacker
to quickly and accurately calculate the size of the injected hidden contents.
Figure 32: File size of the unmodified carrier
This inclusion of file size is an important characteristic, as extraction functions
of a EOF stego-system use this information to determine where to begin looking
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for hidden data. However, other stego-systems may hide this information so that
it is not as easily detectable as the case for OmniHide Pro.
4.4.6 Masker
Masker is a commercial application that claims to offer secure video steganography.
The latest stable format, version 7.5, was released in 2009 and can be accessed as
either an evaluation version for a limited period of time, or alternatively, can be
purchased for e59. Masker provides the option of several different encryption
algorithms to secure user data, this includes: Blowfish, CASTS, DES, Serpent-
256, AES-256, TripleDES and TwoFish. Masker does not work over MP4 files,
but is capable of processing the following file formats: AVI, MOV, MPG, MPEG,
ASF, MPA and MPE. Upon examining the functionality of this tool, there are
several concerning weaknesses with the stego-system. It is apparent that Masker
shares many vulnerabilities with the previously discussed tools. Analysing an AVI
file with a small amount of embedded content, it is apparent that Masker also
employs EOF data injection.
Figure 33 illustrates the EOF injection technique adopted by Masker. The first
10 bytes in the image are the final part of the source file. The highlighted bytes
reflect the start of Masker’s embedding. Using a hex viewer, these EOF injection
algorithms are trivial to detect and exploit.
Figure 33: Masker embedding
Similarly to OurSecret, it is possible to identify a distinctive sequence of bytes
that can uniquely characterise the embedding algorithm. This is consistent across
the varying embedding options, irrespective of the encryption algorithm used or
the choice of secret key. This string can be considered to be a signature for the
Masker steganography tool and, due to its unusual length, it will ensure a high
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detection rate.
The signature identified and shown in Table 6 shows a 73-byte string that is
consistently embedded in stego-objects modified by Masker steganography. The
consistency of injected data leaves this stego-system susceptible to the construction
of simple steganalytic schemes. These attacks break the tool from a steganalytic
perspective. Similar to a vulnerability within OmniHide Pro, it is possible to
identify bytes that reflect the size of embedded contents.
9E 8D DB 50 73 C2 BF 65 B8 1E 03 AE D5 62 C6 CC 71 9A B9 B9 48 49 D2 64 EE
49 B7 63 7B EF EB A1 01 04 40 7B F0 ED 2D 86 47 E1 5F FC 7C 41 C9 8B C9 02
CA 1C 07 21 EE 8D 32 66 47 7C 8F E1 4E E8 AE 66 AB 32 E3 D2 F9 A1 0E
Table 3: 73-byte Masker signature
Having identified the existence of a signature, it is possible to create a simple
script to detect the presence of steganography. An automated script would be
easily capable of detecting a signature with a length of 73 bytes to a high degree
of accuracy. From an academic perspective, this type of vulnerability completely
breaks the tool’s capability for secure steganography. In Section 3.3, further dis-
cussion is given in the approach towards signature steganalysis based on the strings
that have been identified.
4.4.7 Max File Encryption
Max File Encryption is a cryptographic tool with video steganography capabilities.
The current version is 2.0, released on 07/2013. Analysis of Max File Encryption
using the aforementioned test framework has provided similar discouraging results
and illustrates many of the same mistakes. By employing EOF injection, it displays
a concerning number of weaknesses. Upon inspection on a hex editor, it is apparent
that the carrier file contains key components of the program, such as the libraries
and public key tokens used, and other artifacts. Not only this can lead to a large
number of signatures, it is also possible to identify key parts of the program source
code through this.
Figure 34 identifies an embedding characteristic identical to that of OmniHide
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Pro. This tool injects information illustrating the file size of the unmodified carrier.
This provides an attacker with the opportunity to estimate the size of embedded
content. Provided an attacker has access to the source computer, it may be possible
to identify the hidden file, generally the only one matching that exact size.
Figure 34: File size of embedded contents
Max File Encryption appears to be another generic EOF injection tool con-
taining a number of already familiar vulnerabilities. The presence of these vulner-
abilities negate any security features offered by the tool.
4.4.8 StegoStick
StegoStick is a free open-source steganography tool that claims to have the capabil-
ity to hide any file type into any other file type. This concept, although appealing,
becomes significantly less tempting upon the realisation that it employs EOF data
injection for video. The current release is a beta version from 08/2013. At present,
the examination of the tool has not revealed any form of signature that can be
used. The only recoverable information that could be extracted from the stego-
system identifies the file types embedded into the stego-object.
Figure 35 shows an ASCII representation of hex data captured from a StegoStick
carrier file. Varying file types were embedded in video files such as PDF and TXT.
These were identifiable during analysis and had been present in every test. The
ability to extract embedded file types can provide small insights such as what file
types to look for on a suspect computer. Although this tool uses EOF injection,
which is again a very poor form of steganography, StegoStick does apparently not
have the same number of security issues found in the previously analysed tools.
Figure 35: StegoStick embeds the file type of hidden data
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Even though signature steganalysis may not be possible in this case, system
attacks are still possible over StegoStick. This is shown in Section 4.4.
4.4.9 BDV DataHider
BDV DataHider is a commercial steganography application developed by Bedavlad
Software. The most recent release is 3.2, available from 06/2010. This tool can be
purchased for $14.99. Similar to the other listed video steganography tools, BDV
DataHider employs EOF injection techniques. Although the developers express
high confidence in the quality of the tool and state “There is nothing more powerful
on the market when you want to transfer unnoticeably (sic) some files over Internet
or on a flash drive” [142]. However, it is apparent that the embedding algorithm
features very similar weaknesses to those previously exposed. A major identifiable
vulnerability is provided by the tools’ interface.
Under the model of system steganalysis, an attacker can obtain valuable side-
channel information about the BDV DataHider stego-system. The tool has a catch
that will inform the user if data can be embedded or has been embedded within a
video file. This is shown in Figure 36.
Figure 36: Data Hider provides its own detection system.
This information illustrates that a signature exists within stego-objects that
the stego-system is looking for to determine whether or not embedding and or
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extraction of a message is possible. This information is represented through the
following sequence of bytes (as shown in Table 7) inside a stego-object modified
by BDV DataHider.
FB EA D8 81 25 0F F9
Table 4: Signature for BDV DataHider
To determine that these bytes are related to the tool’s detection function, they
can simply be removed from a stego-object that contains BDV steganography. The
stego-system will once again inform the user that “the file can be used to create
secret storage”.
4.4.10 Constructing a System-Attack
The practical applications for system attacks are wide-ranging, providing efficient
methods to detect the presence of steganography. Analysis of each tool in this chap-
ter has shown that system attacks have practical applications to video steganog-
raphy. However, it is important to consider if these methods can achieve useful
results as a method for real-world steganalysis.
For each stego-system discussed in this chapter, it is possible to obtain side-
channel information that can be constructed into a system attack. These stego-
systems demonstrate the use of not only a weak method of steganography, but
also weak encoding. The method of steganography used in each case is simple to
detect, but the presence of a weak system implementation provides an attacker
with multiple avenues of steganalysis (detection of EOF, detection of secret key,
detection of secret message). The traditional model for steganography must be
extended to consider the method as a coding problem and therefore, a whole
avenue of security parameters and practices should be included.
System steganalysis has identified and proven the functionality of each stego-
system. Furthermore, the analysis has exposed a number of implementation, en-
coding and key related vulnerabilities across each stego-system. For each case
presented, an attacker can construct efficient and highly accurate attacks to de-
tect discovered signatures within stego-objects. Proof-of-concept scripts for each
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attack is shown in Appendix A.3 - A.5.
4.4.11 Testing
A testing framework for system steganalysis was presented in Chapter 3. For each
stego-system discussed in this chapter, system attacks were constructed and eval-
uated through a proof-of-concept detection attack. For each video steganography
tool, 100 stego-objects were produced from the KDMA dataset to test the accuracy
of signature-based system-attacks. The results of these tests are shown in Table
8. False positive tests for each stego-system were carried out over a significantly
larger sample size of 5,000 randomly downloaded files.
Table 5: Accuracy and false positive tests for signature steganalysis
Steganography Scheme Dataset Size Detection Accuracy FP Avg Runtime
OurSecret 100 100% 0% 1.95s
OmniHide Pro 100 100% 0% 2.35s
Masker 100 100% 0% 3.21s
BDV DataHider 100 100% 0% 3.6s
MaxFileEncryption 100 100% 0% 1.76s
The results for signature steganalysis show high accuracy paired with a zero
false positive rate. In most cases, these promising results are based on the signifi-
cant length associated to each signature. From a practical standpoint, there is low
risk of identifying these signatures within natural digital media making them ideal
for the purposes of steganalysis against many of the existing video stego-systems.
4.4.12 Generalising EOF Injection Attacks
There are two main advantages when using signature detection schemes for ste-
ganalysis. Firstly, the method is highly accurate; a sufficiently long and entropic
sequence of bytes will ensure that the signature is unique and that it is highly
unlikely to appear in natural digital media. This also leads to the second advan-
tage. Signature detection methods constructed from a system attack will trace the
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use of steganography to a specific stego-system via targeted steganalysis. As evi-
dent from the findings in this chapter, there are many EOF-based stego-systems
and system tracing provides an additional practical advantage in a steganalytic
investigation.
One of the challenges surrounding signature steganalysis of video relates to pro-
cessing requirements for the system attack. Video files are large and the method
presented to detect signatures would not be ideal in a practical environment (over
potentially millions of files). Therefore, faster methods can be constructed as a
first stage attack against EOF systems. A generalised attack against EOF in-
jection would reduce the sample size of suspicious files significantly. Therefore a
generalised attack can be constructed to reduce the initial sample size and provide
a broad spectrum for detecting all EOF injection stego-systems. This method is
constructed to detect the presence of arbitrary atoms, as shown in Figure 37. In
this case, the final atom of the MP4 tree represented encrypted, high entropy data
that MP4 parsers cannot read.
Figure 37: Arbitrary atom shows use of EOF injection
The presence of this arbitrary atom is identified for every EOF-based stego-
system. As such, a proof-of-concept (shown in Appendix A.6) has been constructed
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to detect EOF steganography across all relevant stego-systems with the exception
of Masker 3. There are two main advantages to using this attack. Firstly, this
provides an ideal method to develop an underlying suspicion of steganography. If
detected, then more accurate methods (such as signature attacks) can be used.
Secondly, this is significantly faster to perform when compared with signature
attacks. This provides an ideal opportunity to reduce a sample size of potential
stego-objects.
Tests were performed to determine detection accuracy using 100 stego-objects
from the KDMA dataset. False positive rate of the generalised attack was tested
over the DMOZ dataset of 5000 clean files for each stego-system. The results are
shown in Table 6.
Steganography Scheme Data Size (Steg/Clean) Detection Accuracy False Positive Avg Runtime
OurSecret 100/5000 100% 0% 0.01s
OmniHide Pro 100/5000 100% 0% 0.01s
BDV DataHider 100/5000 100% 0% 0.01s
MaxFileEncryption 100/5000 100% 0% 0.01s
Table 6: Tests performed to analyse performance of generalised attack
As a first stage steganalytic attack, the generalised method provides high ac-
curacy and a zero false positive rate. This limitation of this method is that it
cannot provide system tracing at which point signature-based system attacks can
be implemented.
4.5 Case Study: Motion Vector Steganography
This second case study presents a steganalysis and evaluation of the video steganog-
raphy tool “Steganosaurus”. The goal of this case study is to contribute to the
comprehensive evaluation of the state-of-the-art in practical video steganography
and determine if system attacks can be successfully applied. Relevant background
to this work is first discussed.
3Masker performs EOF injection over AVI files, to detect this a different method would need
to be constructed
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Steganosaurus [126], is a video steganography tool created by James Ridgway
and released in 2013. The stego-system uses motion vector embedding in the X
or Y coordinates of the first macroblock of a frame. This is described as tempo-
ral domain steganography in which an embedding algorithm is using the temporal
redundancy of video compression to modify target motion vectors. The large num-
ber of motion vectors available per-frame, alongside the relatively small amount
of changes introduced will ensure that a stego-object is visually indistinguishable
from the cover-object. The Steganosaurus stego-system is shown in Figure 38.
Figure 38: Interface of Steganosaurus v1.0
4.5.1 Impact of Pre- and Post-Processing requirements
Any embedding operation for motion vector steganography should avoid embed-
ding secret message bits directly within a compressed file, because the resulting
changes would introduce noticeable distortions and corrupt the target motion vec-
tors. To resolve this, a transcoding step is introduced during embedding. In this
step, a file is compressed again and new motion vectors are created to embed secret
message bits. Visually, the transcoding solution that is the stego-object, should
be indistinguishable from the cover-object. However, compression will likely intro-
duce changes that are ideal for steganalysis. This happens mainly because focus
has only been directed to maintaining imperceptibility with the use of a transcoder.
The transcoder for Steganosaurus was built using functions of the “avcodec”
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and “avformat” libraries of FFMPEG. This rewrites the structure of an MP4 file
as shown in Figure 39. One key observable feature resulting from the structural
modification is the re-positioning or insertion of the “free” atom. An atom can
be considered a self-contained data component of the MP4 file structure. In cases
where atoms (such as MDAT) are added, modified or removed, the tree is also
changed. As a result, lengths of atoms may need to be recalculated. In this case,
with the “MDAT” atom, further adjustments are made and this is supported by
the “free” atom which minimises the need for unnecessary adjustments [143]. An
arbitrary shift in the stego-object can be a clear indicator at a high-level of the
presence of steganography.
Figure 39: Unmodified file MP4 (left) and MP4 carrier produced by Steganosaurus (right)
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A steganalytic scheme can be constructed to detect arbitrary ordering of the
MP4 file structure and, in particular, the modifications caused by the transcoding
component of the Steganosaurus stego-system. This is shown below and a sample
script can be seen in Appendix. A.1. The purpose of this steganalytic scheme
is to identify a particular file structure that is almost never encountered in the
typical MP4 file format. Although this can be used to develop an underlying
suspicion of the use of Steganosaurus steganography, it should be used alongside
other steganalytic techniques to reduce any potential for false positive occurring
from natural use of “avcodec” and “avformat” libraries.
for file in /TestSets/*.mp4
do
mp4file --dump ‘‘${file}’’> /tmp/mp4dumpfile
sed ’6,7!d’ /tmp/mp4dumpfile >/tmp/tmp1
for line in $(< /tmp/tmp1); do
echo $line | sed ’s/.*(\(.*\))/\1/’>>/tmp/tmp2
done
if egrep -q "free|mdat" /tmp/tmp2; then
echo -e \ "${file}" "Atom Test - Arbitrary file strucuture found"
else
echo -e \ "${file}" "Atom Test - No Steganosaurus Steganography found"
fi
Listing 4.1: Sample script to detect changes to the MP4 structure by Steganosaurus
The structural deviation between cover-object and stego-object is only one
of the changes made during the transcoding process by the Steganosaurus tool.
The use of the function “avformat write header” configures a file header for the
stego-object. The header describes the stream configuration for a video file and
metadata details regarding format and codecs. This description appears as a
consistent sequence of bytes as shown in Figure 40. For a stego-object with a
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header produced by Steganosaurus, the header format will be consistent with the
“avformat write header” function and produce predictable byte sequences.
Figure 40: ASCII representation of header signature with codec use
Known as a magic prefix, this is a consistent sequence of bytes that appear as
a result of the transcoder creating a unique header for stego-objects. In this case,
this digital imprint appears as an ISO codec fingerprint in the header and can
be used as another predictable feature for system steganalysis. The transcoding
process provides a unique signature that can be implemented into a simple script
to markedly simplify the process of steganalysis. The sequence of bytes produced
are shown in Table 1. 4.
1C 66 74 79 70 69 73 6F 6D 00 00 02 00 69 73 6F 06
D6 97 36 F3 26 D7 03 43 10 00 00 00 86 67 26 56 05
Table 7: Header fingerprint left by Steganosaurus
Used within a script, this signature creates a system attack that provides a high
level of accuracy due to its significant length. The sample code (as shown below)
uses signature steganalysis to identify the presence of Steganosaurus steganogra-
phy. The full script can be seen in Appendix. A1 & A.2.
4ISO details available at http://www.ftyps.com/
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for file in /TestSets/*.mp4
do
xxd -p "${file}" > /tmp/tmp1
tail -c 40 < /tmp/tmp1 | tr -d ’\n’ > /tmp/tmp2
if grep -q -c
"1C6674797069736F6D0000020069736F06D69736F326D70343100000008667265605"
/tmp/tmp2; then
echo -e \ "${file}" "Signature Test - Steganosaurus content detected"
else
echo -e \ "${file}" "Signature Test - No Steganosaurus Steganography
found"
fi
Listing 4.2: Sample script to detect signatures introduced by Steganosaurus
Additional steps can be taken to reduce the potential of false positives occurring
from the use of the “avformat write header” function. The signature detection
scheme can be concatenated with other steganalytic features. For instance, a
concatenation of atom detection alongside the signature script would significantly
reduce the likelihood of false positives while increasing detection accuracy. The
sequence is shown in Figure 41. In this, atom analysis is carried out as a first stage
featur, that will filter out a large selection of candidate files and reduce the total
runtime for the script. The second stage of the script is run once the presence
of steganography is suspected. A signature detection script will run to detect
consistent byte patterns typical with the use of the “avcodec” function. Runtime
of this process is often slower than atom detection, so it advisable to run it in the
second stage after filtering has been carried out and a small sample of potential
stego-files is available.
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Figure 41: Illustration of the proposed sequence for concatenated script
4.5.2 Testing
The steganalytic schemes constructed to detect Steganosaurus steganography were
tested and evaluated following the test framework described in Section 3.4. Each
scheme is tested independently and then concatenated to provide a juxtaposition.
Tests are carried out in two stages. Firstly, accuracy tests are run over 100 MP4
files from the KDMA dataset, of which the full 100 are modified. The intention
of this test is to determine if the stego-objects can be correctly identified and
compute a rate at which each scheme can accurately perform positive detection.
The second test is performed to determine a false positive rate. This is conducted
over a significantly large number of files (5,000) that are clean all of steganography.
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These files were randomly downloaded from a URL list that was generated pseudo-
randomly from the DMOZ directory [9]. The results are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Tests performed for detection accuracy and false positive rate
Steganalysis Scheme Detection Accuracy False Positive Rate Average runtime
Atom Detection 100% 10.9% 0.06s
Signature Detection 100% 0% 3.28s
Script Concatenation 100% 0% 0.60s
The tests performed for the steganalytic scheme for Steganosaurus demonstrate
that system attacks provide an ideal alternative route for steganalysis. High level
features extracted from a stego-object can be linked to the use of steganography
and trace that use to the related stego-system. In addition to this, tests were
carried out for detection of this steganographic scheme amongst other well-known
stego-systems. This is shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Tests performed to demonstrate tool tracing
Steganography Scheme Dataset Size Positive Detection False Positive
Steganosaurus 100 100% 0%
OpenPuff 100 0% 0%
OurSecret 100 0% 0%
OmniHide Pro 100 0% 0%
BDV DataHider 100 0% 0%
StegoStick 100 0% 0%
Datasets were created for known video steganography tools that use the MP4
file format, including: OpenPuff, OurSecret, OmniHide Pro, BDV DataHider,
and StegoStick. The steganalytic scheme provided 100% accuracy and had shown
to detect Steganosaurus steganography exclusively. This ensures that the use of
steganography can be directly and accurately traced to its corresponding stego-
system. The high accuracy and low false positive rate of these tests demonstrate
the effectiveness of system attacks over MV-embedding, ignoring the direct impact
of the embedding algorithm and instead opting to attack pre- and post-processing
requirements of the embedding operation.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a comprehensive study of the practical state-of-the-art
in video steganography. In total, seven video steganography tools were identified
and broken by a series of system attacks. The analysis was split into two separate
case studies based on the functionality of the tools and experiments were conducted
to evaluate the effectiveness of each attack. Results of the analysis had shown
that many of the publicly available video steganography tools use a weak form
of steganography. In other cases where more effective embedding methods are
used, the steganographic security of the stego-object can still be compromised. A
summary of findings is shown in Table 10.
Toolkit Embedding Algorithm Vulnerabilities Identified
OurSecret Data injection - EOF 40-byte signature, full retrievable contents with null password
OmniHide Pro Data injection - EOF Recover hidden filename and size, found pseudo-signature
Masker Data injection - EOF 73-byte signature, hidden file size can be determined
StegoStick Data injection - EOF Hidden file type recoverable
Max File Encryption Data injection - EOF Multiple signatures
BDV Data Hider Data injection - EOF 14-byte signature
Steganosaurus Motion Vector Embedding atom and signature detection
Table 10: Summary of the vulnerabilities found
This chapter has shown that video steganography in its practical state has
concerning technical and methodological issues. In many cases, the embedding
algorithms use a weak form of steganography that is simple to detect and the
resulting process of steganalysis can be straightforward. In addition, it is clear that
video steganography is largely considered a data hiding and detection problem;
however, there appears to be a lack of awareness support video steganography as
a coding problem. As a consequence to this, developers of video steganography
tools have failed to consider the invasive impact that embedding algorithms can
impose in the real world.
The following points can be considered as contributions of this chapter:
• Contribution 1: Evaluated the state-of-the-art in practical video steganog-
raphy.
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• Contribution 2: The scope of system attacks have been extended from image
steganography to video steganography to demonstrate that the applications
for system steganalysis are wide-reaching and effective
• Contribution 3: Work in this chapter has presented a series of novel system-
attacks against popular methods for practical video steganography.
This research has identified an exhaustive list of video steganography tools that
are available to the public. An analysis of each tool has exposed the gap between
academic literature and the real world. From this, it is clear that many of the tools
share similar features and functionality which as a consequence, increases the risk
associated to their use. System attacks have been previously explored in academic
literature over image steganography and until now had not been discussed with
respect to video steganography. This contribution provides support to the advan-
tages of system attacks to show that their scope of application goes beyond image
and perhaps into other unexplored avenues of steganographic research. The high
rate of detection accuracy shown in the experimental results provides a founda-
tion of evidence to the practical benefits of system attacks. However, continued
research into system steganalysis over stronger steganographic systems will help
understand the scope and limitations of this research. In the next chapter (Chap-
ter 5), a state-of-the-art stego-system is identified and examined to further test
the scope of system attacks.
Chapter 5
Steganalysis of the OpenPuff
Stego-System
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents two attacks against the OpenPuff stego-system. The first is
an attack targeting its MP4 embedding algorithm for video steganography. The
second attack focuses on the OpenPuff embedding algorithm for PDF steganogra-
phy. OpenPuff is an interesting stego-system from a steganalytic perspective, as
it has achieved praise from many sources [113] and boasts a diverse range of em-
bedding capabilities, a feature that is unusual. Typically, a stego-system should
provide a single embedding method and focus attention on a single scheme to
ensure it satisfies all security requirements. In other cases where a stego-system
provides embedding options across multiple file types, typically a simple method
of steganography is used for each format, this is a bad practice as it generally
simplifies the process of steganalysis. This is a feature that is often seen with
EOF injection steganography tools. However, OpenPuff offers unique embedding
approaches across multiple file formats. In addition, a few of these methods ap-
pear unique to OpenPuff, and have not been identified elsewhere. This effort by
OpenPuff demonstrates an attempt to bridge the gap between academic research
and the practical applications of steganography and has probably contributed to
its success.
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In previous chapters of this thesis, system attacks have been applied to video
stego-systems, the results so far have shown that video-based stego-systems fea-
ture a variety of implementation vulnerabilities, many of these can be used as
possible avenues of steganalysis. In addition, where a steganalytic attack can be
constructed, it is often seen to give high accuracy with a low rate of false posi-
tives. In this chapter, the scope of system-steganalysis is extended to the OpenPuff
stego-system. This tool is considered by its author to be highly suitable for the
purposes of steganography.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview
of the OpenPuff stego-system. This section discusses the features of the tool
and the cryptographic implementation it employs. Section 5.3 is split into two
main subsections. 5.3.1 presents the first system attack against the MP4 features
of OpenPuff video steganography. This subsection discusses the impact of the
embedding algorithm over stego-objects and identifies traceable features that can
be used for the purposes of steganalysis. This is built into an attack as a proof-
of-concept, and evaluated. Subsection 5.3.2 presents the second attack against
the PDF features of OpenPuff document-based steganography. This subsection
similarly discusses the impact of the embedding algorithm over stego-objects and
traceable features are used in a proof-of-concept attack to evaluate the proposed
method. Finally, section 5.4 provides a summary of the contributions and the
results obtained.
5.2 OpenPuff
OpenPuff is a tool capable of performing steganography over a large number of
different file formats, concretely (as listed on the tool’s website) sixteen, covering
media such as images (bmp, jpx, pcx, png, and tga formats), audio (aiff, mp3,
NEXT/SUN, wav), video (3gp, mp4 mpg, wob) and Flash/Adobe formats (flv,
swf, and pdf).
OpenPuff (currently in version 4.0) is marketed as “Yet not another Steganog-
raphy Software” and is a free semi-open-source tool, which uses the libObfuscate
v.2 library, developed by the same author, to perform its cryptography related
tasks. The libObfuscate library implements a number of encryption algorithms
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(including AES, Anubis, Camellia, CAST-256, Clefia, Frog, Hierocrypt3, Idea-
NXT, MARS, RC6, Safer+, SC200, Serpent, Speed, Twofish, and Unicorn-A).
This large selection of sixteen block ciphers is employed to realise the concept of
multi-cryptography, first introduced by its author, where the cipher used to en-
crypt data is picked pseudo-randomly. It is important to note that, as shown in the
architectural design in Figure 42, these block ciphers are used in the insecure ECB
mode, strongly against common practice. It may well be pertinent to add that
most of these block ciphers are considered to be very weak or, in some cases, totally
broken. LibObfuscate also implements four hash functions, all producing a 512-bit
digest. These are Grostl, Keccak (the new SHA-3 standard), SHA-2 and Skein.
OpenPuff also offers a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator
(CSPRNG) based on AES but not following any known PRNG standard. It is
perhaps relevant to stress that, although libObfuscate’s source code is available,
OpenPuff is in itself closed source, so exact details regarding the functionality of
the steganography algorithms are unknown. This is also against best practice and
is considered a security problem.
Figure 42: OpenPuff cryptographic architecture, from [113]
Although details are not available on the tool’s website, third party sites reveal
large download numbers (these figures are as of 27/09/2017), as shown in Table
11. It is reasonable to expect the total numbers of downloads to be significantly
higher than those found and shown below.
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Website Downloads in Last Year Total Downloads











Table 11: Approximate download figures for OpenPuff as of 15/08/2018
OpenPuff limits the amount of data that can be embedded within a cover-
object. This ensures that the resulting stego-object does not raise suspicion and
will introduce minimal statistical deviations. The author of OpenPuff has tested
the tool for resistance to statistical steganalysis based on a suite of CSPRNG tests
using Ent [113]. Table 12 shows the following results on 64 KB, 128 KB and 256
MB samples:
Test Result
Bit entropy >7.9999xx / 8.000000
Chi square 20% <deviation <80%
Mean value 127.4x / 127.5
Monte Carlo error <0.01%
Serial correlation <0.0001
Compression test 0%
Table 12: Results from tests using Ent Suite [113]
OpenPuff’s resistance to statistical steganalysis attempts to provide increased
security when hiding data. However, the data whitening process requires a large
number of carrier bytes for data injection/substitution, and this results in fewer
bytes being reserved for the user’s data.
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5.3 Attacks on the OpenPuff Stego-System
In this chapter, two separate components of the OpenPuff stego-system are sub-
jected to steganalysis via system attacks. The aim of this is to provide further
insight into the practical applications of system attacks and system steganaly-
sis. Firstly, steganalysis of OpenPuff MP4 steganography is performed to extend
the scope of system attacks and determine if practical results can be achieved
against this stego-system. Secondly, the PDF steganography feature of OpenPuff
is subjected to system attacks to determine if the vulnerabilities associated with
OpenPuff are isolated to video, or if they exist across multiple embedding features
in OpenPuff.
5.3.1 Steganalysis of OpenPuff MP4 Steganography
In this subsection, a system attack is presented over the MP4 component of the
OpenPuff stego-system. OpenPuff is a multi-feature steganography tool that pro-
vides several methods for embedding secret data across file types. MP4 steganog-
raphy was selected as an ideal carrier to attack as this file type is commonly used
throughout the Internet and has become a ubiquitous form of video content.
5.3.1.1 MP4 Data Structure
The embedding algorithm for OpenPuff in part manipulates technical metadata
and video metadata in a video file. The technical component used to describe
metadata in MP4 files is known as Atoms or Boxes [166]. An atom in an MP4
file is a feature that describes metadata for a given object. This includes com-
ponents relating to: video frames, audio frames, interleaving AV data, captioning
data, chapter index, title, poster data, user data, and technical metadata [94]. The
structure of each atom is derived from a type that is identified as a four-byte print-
able character [61], such as: ftyp, moov, or mvhd. The MP4 file is based directly
upon the MPEG-4 part 12: ISO structure, which derives from the QuickTime file
format [170]. Through this, atoms are represented as a data hierarchy of parent
and child atoms describing the structure and content of a video file.
Figure 43 shows the structure for MP4 atoms. The first “trak” atom (left) is
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a media “trak” while the second is called the hint “trak” (right). This hierarchy
derives from type “moov” which is placed as a top-level atom [61]. The moov
atom acts as an index of the video data and is the component of an MP4 required
for video playback. It is this structure of the MP4 file that is modified by the
OpenPuff embedding algorithm.
As previously discussed, the video stego-systems that were observed in Chapter
4, hide secret information by injecting data at the end of a video file. OpenPuff
is a novel stego-system from what has been previously studied, as it performs
steganography by embedding data within MP4 files by modifying their metadata
and atomic structure. This embedding approach, paired with a robust security
implementation provides resistance to classical statistical steganalysis [113]. How-
ever, it is still possible to detect the presence of OpenPuff steganography.
Figure 43: Atomic structure of MP4 video file
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5.3.1.2 Impact of the OpenPuff MP4 Embedding Algorithm
Figure 44, shows the atomic structure and metadata output of an MP4 video
file modified by OpenPuff. If compared to an unmodified file, the major features
(atom size and offset) for each atom remain identical. OpenPuff does not perform
modifications directly to these features of the atomic structure, as this would
corrupt the playback quality of a stego-object. Instead, OpenPuff modifies semi-
redundant atom components that remain unmodified in pre- and post-processing
phases.
Figure 44: Data size of corresponding MP4 atoms
The features modified by the OpenPuff stego-system are called flags. Flags
are reserved space, considered to be a semantic component of the MP4 atom. For
OpenPuff these features appear to be consistently modified in any given stego-
object. Flags are components of an atom that are preserved in a null state for
future use. The OpenPuff stego-system uses this form of digital redundancy to
embed secret information. However, this is a feature that once identified, leaves
the OpenPuff stego-system vulnerable to steganalysis.
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As shown in Figure 45, the flag field of the target STTS (Time to Sample) atom
has been modified by the OpenPuff embedding algorithm. The STTS atom typi-
cally contains data concerning the duration of a given media sample. This reveals
that embedding method uses injection techniques as opposed to substitution over
target features. OpenPuff’s modification to MP4 atoms is a consistent feature of
the embedding algorithm and will occur regardless of cover size, embedded data
size/type, and key usage.
Figure 45: MP4 atoms with their respective flag values, cover-object (left) and stego-
object (right)
Modifications to the reserved space will occur consistently across a number of
atoms in an MP4 file. However, the data embedded into each flag is inconsistent
as it is based off pseudo-random encrypted data, implying that it is not possible
to construct a signature from any single atom. Following the hierarchy of the MP4
atoms, modifications to the flag value occur from the type mvhd and child atoms
of type moov. Table 13 provides a sample of modifications to a single MP4 file
across 24 atoms (other file samples may consist of more or fewer atoms).
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Atom (Handler) Value (Pre-Stego) Value (Post-Stego)
MVHD (parent atom) Null 8240 (0x00002030)
MDHD (video) Null 16384 (0x00004000)
HDLR (video) Null 9570320 (0x00920810)
DREF (video) Null 2097474 (0x00200142)
STSD (video) Null 2105600 (0x00202100)
STSS (video) Null 3146304 (0x00300240)
STTS (video) Null 12583425 (0x00C00201)
CTTS (video) Null 2129922 (0x00208002)
STSC (video) Null 4352 (0x00001100)
STSZ (video) Null 49216 (0x0000C040)
STCO (video) Null 671744 (0x000A4000)
ELST (video) Null 1538 (0x00000602)
MDHD (audio) Null 131650 (0x00020242)
HDLR (audio) Null 48 (0x00000030)
SMHD (audio) Null 147474 (0x00024012)
DREF (audio) Null 8708 (0x00002204)
STSD (audio) Null 589836 (0x0009000C)
STTS (audio) Null 262288 (0x00040090)
STSC (audio) Null 8388800 (0x008000C0)
STSZ (audio) Null 2105600 (0x00202100)
STCO (audio) Null 1179666 (0x00120012)
ELST (audio) Null 4194576 (0x00400110)
META (audio) Null 10752 (0x00002A00)
HDLR (audio - sub meta) Null 532545 (0x00082041)
Table 13: Sample of differences between cover-object and stego-object flag values
It should be noted that several flags are reserved in the MP4 file structure to
provide metadata configurations and compatibility tests [10]. The reserved flags
are unmodified by the OpenPuff embedding algorithm, as arbitrary changes could
corrupt the video. Samples of these reserved flags are given in Table 14.
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Atom Value
TKHD (video) 15 (0x0000000F)
TKHD (audio) 15 (0x0000000F)
VMHD (video) 1 (0x00000001)
URL (video) 1 (0x00000001)
URL (audio) 1 (0x00000001)
ESDS (audio) 0 (0x00000000)
Table 14: Reserved flags that will not be modified by the OpenPuff embedding algorithm
for MP4
As evident from these findings, a steganalytic method can be constructed to
detect the presence of modified flags within an MP4 file. The next section discusses
the experimental setup for constructing a system attack against the OpenPuff
stego-system.
5.3.1.3 Constructing a Distinguisher
The detection of OpenPuff MP4 steganography is a binary decision for an attacker.
In one instance, flag values are null and for each case, the relative weight of sus-
picion is reduced. In the second instance, flags have an arbitrary value and the
relative weight of suspicion increases cumulatively for each encountered non-null
flag. Therefore, an efficient method of attack would be to concatenate the result of
positive and null values from the flag space of each atom. From this, it is possible
to determine with high confidence whether or not a file should be considered a
stego-object.
A simple script can be developed as a proof-of-concept for this system attack (as
shown in the Appendix A7). The objective of this script is to detect OpenPuff MP4
steganography with a high rate of accuracy and do so in an automated manner
so that it would be practical over a significantly large dataset. The detection
method would need to incorporate the capability for MP4 file parsing so that
the full metadata structure can be extracted and for atom flags to be isolated.
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This method would simply check flag values to determine “ifnull” while skipping
important flags that have been reserved by the compression algorithm. For each
instance “ifnull” is found to be modified, the result can be concatenated to calculate
a relative confidence threshold. For each additional result of identifying modified
flags, suspicion of OpenPuff MP4 steganography is increased. The threshold used
to determine a stego-object in this environment is evaluated in two separate cases
of >50% and >90% flags modified in a given object. These are tested in over two
separate datasets labelled Dataset 1 and Dataset 2.
To evaluate this proof-of-concept, the script is given the same testing environ-
ment originally discussed in Chapter 3. This includes the use of pseudo-randomly
generated data embedded in each MP4 file, with pseudo-randomly generated pass-
words that are unique to each stego-object.
5.3.1.4 Testing and Results
The following section presents two configurations for the testing and evaluation
of the presented proof-of-concept. This set-up consists of two datasets used to
evaluate detection accuracy and false positive rates. Data is embedded for each bit
rate possible for OpenPuff steganography (12%, 14%, 17%, 20%, 25%, 33%, 50%).
Datasets are taken from two sources to test detection accuracy for each detection
threshold, the first dataset consists of 700 videos pseudo-randomly downloaded
from the Internet. The second dataset consists of 700 videos taken from our own
self-created collection, the Kent Digital Media Archive (KDMA). Table 15 shows
results for Dataset 1.
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Embedding Ratio Dataset size Detection Accuracy Run time
.12 100 100% 3.67s
.14 100 100% 3.68s
.17 100 100% 3.56s
.20 100 100% 3.84s
.25 100 100% 3.84s
.33 100 100% 3.85s
.50 100 100% 3.87s
Table 15: Detection accuracy for Dataset 1 > 50% flags modified
As shown in Table 15, detection accuracy gives a perfect score for each em-
bedding ratio tested. Table 16 shows identical results for Dataset 2, which has a
higher threshold for identifying OpenPuff stego-objects.
Embedding Ratio Dataset size Detection Accuracy Run time
.12 100 100% 6.13s
.14 100 100% 6.20s
.17 100 100% 6.10s
.20 100 100% 6.28s
.25 100 100% 6.16s
.33 100 100% 6.16s
.50 100 100% 6.22s
Table 16: Detection accuracy for Dataset 2 > 90% flags modified
The difference in run time for the two sets of tests is justified in that the dataset
sourced from the KDMA database consists of significantly larger MP4 files than
those randomly downloaded from the Internet.
Finally, Table 17 shows false positive (FP) rates for each dataset consisting of
2,500 MP4 files and were tested against varying thresholds for atom modification.
From these tests zero false positives were identified.
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Dataset Dataset size FP rate
1 (>50%) 2,500 0.0
2 (>90%) 2,500 0.0
Table 17: False positive rate for Dataset 1 and Dataset 2
Flag modification appears to be a feature unique to OpenPuff MP4 steganog-
raphy. It has not been identified as a method of embedding for any other practical
application or stego-system. Furthermore, the majority of flags are not modified by
any compression features for MP4, suggesting that it is highly unlikely to observe
modified flags in any MP4 files clean of steganography.
This section has extended the scope of system attacks over video and has deter-
mined that OpenPuff’s embedding algorithm, although novel, illustrates another
case study for the gap between theoretical and practical steganography. The sys-
tem attack constructed to detect OpenPuff MP4 steganography has given a high
rate of detection accuracy to demonstrate that it can be applied as a highly prac-
tical avenue of steganalysis.
In the next section (subsection 5.3.2), the attack against OpenPuff is extended
to the PDF embedding algorithm. The aim of this is to determine whether the
implementation vulnerabilities for OpenPuff MP4 steganography are an isolated
case, or whether they can be observed across multiple features of the tool.
5.3.2 Steganalysis of OpenPuff PDF Steganography
In this subsection, a system attack is presented over the PDF component of the
OpenPuff stego-system. PDF documents, although frequently used, are an un-
explored area for steganography. The contributions of this research are twofold.
Firstly, additional steganalysis of OpenPuff should provide further insights into the
implementation vulnerabilities surrounding the tool. Secondly, this work aims to
provide a practical steganalytic attack via system steganalysis to detect OpenPuff
PDF steganography.
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5.3.2.1 Related Work
Known steganalytic results against OpenPuff are surprisingly scarce. The au-
dio component of OpenPuff was examined by [97], who were able to success-
fully detect OpenPuff steganography as implemented on an older version of the
tool(v3.10). The authors proposed the StegAD scheme to detect audio steganog-
raphy in cloud services, using an enhanced version of the RS algorithm originally
proposed Fridrich et al. [47].
The use of PDF steganography has been explored both inside and outside
academic literature. Several embedding algorithms have been proposed by re-
searchers, while a number of tools exist for public and commercial use. In current
literature, algorithms can either target the PDF format directly, or exploit a form
of ASCII steganography, which can then be converted from one text-type format
to another. Rafat & Sher [125] propose an ASCII based steganography algorithm
to allow conversion between MS Word and PDF files without losing any of the
embedded content.
Alizadeh et al. [5] examine a number of existing techniques for PDF steganog-
raphy including word/character embedding and the manipulation of incremental
updates. However, these are not robust and cannot be used outside of the PDF
environment. The authors also examine similar but more efficient embedding algo-
rithms such as steganography via hidden PDF components and the manipulation
of margins and TJ operators. The authors continue the work of Zhong et al. [173]
to develop two similar algorithms. The first has slightly better security but lower
capacity and the second offers higher capacity but worse security.
Furthermore, tools such as StegoStick, DeEgger Embedder, and wbStego are
examples of what is available to the general public to perform steganography over
PDF files.
On the other hand, there are only a handful of published steganalytic attacks
against PDF in the existing literature. One such example is a detection method for
word shift steganography in PDF, by Lingjun et al. [96]. The authors propose a
blind steganalytic attack against steganography through inter-word space length,
through the analysis of the statistical properties of spacing.
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5.3.2.2 The PDF Data Structure
The contents of this section and the description of the PDF data structure are
largely based on [90]. The Portable Document Format, known widely as PDF, is a
document format published originally by Adobe as a proprietary model in 1993. It
was not until 2008 that it was published as an open standard, as ISO 32000-1:2008.
The functionality of a PDF file is largely determined by a series of objects such
as dictionaries, arrays, streams and other values (character sets, operators, etc.)
that act as metadata to describe the file. The PDF syntax is best understood by
thinking of it in four parts, as described below:
• Objects. A PDF document is a data structure composed by a small set of
basic types of data objects.
• File structure. The PDF file structure determines how objects are stored in
a PDF file, how they are accessed, and how they are updated. This structure
is independent of the semantics of the objects.
• Document structure. The PDF document structure specifies how the basic
object property types are used to represent components of a PDF document:
pages, fonts, annotations, and so forth.
• Content streams. A PDF content stream contains a sequence of instructions
describing the appearance of a page or other graphical entities. These in-
structions, while also represented as object, are conceptually distinct from
the basic objects that represent the document structure.
In [90], a stream object is defined as a sequence of bytes. Furthermore, a stream
may be of unlimited length, whereas a string shall be subject to an implementation
limit. For this reason, objects with potentially large amounts of data, such as
images and page descriptions, shall be represented as streams. A stream consists
of a dictionary followed by zero or more bytes bracketed between the keywords
stream (followed by newline) and endstream. The keyword stream that follows
the stream dictionary is followed by an end-of-line marker consisting of either a
CARRIAGE RETURN and a LINE FEED, or just a LINE FEED and not by
a CARRIAGE RETURN alone. The sequence of bytes that make up a stream
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lie between the end-of-line marker following the stream keyword and the end-
stream keyword; the stream dictionary specifies the exact number of bytes. There
should be an end-of-line marker after the data and before endstream; this marker
shall not be included in the stream length. There shall not be any extra bytes, other
than white-space between endstream and endobj. Figure 46 provides illustrative
examples of the PDF format. Both objects and streams play an important role in
OpenPuff steganography over PDF files.
Figure 46: Components (left) and structure (centre) of a PDF file. The code to the right
is that of a minimalist PDF example, all from [73]
5.3.2.3 Impact of the OpenPuff PDF Embedding Algorithm
OpenPuff claims that data is pre-encrypted with multi-cryptography before being
embedded into a file. The message is then scrambled (shuﬄed with random in-
dexes), whitened (mixed with a high amount of noise, taken from an independent
CSPRNG seeded with hardware entropy), and encoded (with adaptive non-linear
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encoding, that takes original carrier bits as input). OpenPuff PDF steganogra-
phy embeds data through the modification of end-of-line (EOL) markers, called
“white-space characters”. In particular, the carriage return (CR) and line feed
(LF) characters which are used to denote newlines in the metadata of a file. These
are represented by 0x0A and 0x0D in hex, which for the purposes of steganalysis,
can be used as a key identifier for the detection of OpenPuff PDF steganography.
As shown in Figure 47, the CR and LF characters are flipped once modi-
fied. Embedding modifications by OpenPuff should be undetectable by forensic
and metadata parsers. This emphasises that the OpenPuff embedding algorithm
requires a more focused analysis.
Figure 47: Hex analysis of EOL components as modified by OpenPuff
When the original file employs exclusively the 0x0A character, OpenPuff oper-
ates in exactly the opposite fashion. Again, it is the coexistence of both 0x0D and
0x0A markers that reveal hidden contents, because the tool never flips all available
values, as it has a maximum capacity of 50%. Because of this, a method can be
constructed to perform a system attack against the OpenPuff PDF steganography
method and extract CR + LF characters.
5.3.2.4 Testing and Results
To evaluate this system attack against OpenPuff PDF, a proof-of-concept has been
created (as shown in the Appendix A8) to detect this method of steganography and
examine how effective it can be in a practical environment. To test the accuracy
of the attack, two separate experiments are performed. The first uses a small
dataset and non-random data embedding. The second comprises a significantly
larger dataset and pseudo-random embedded data.
In the first round of testing, a total of 3,000 PDF files were downloaded from
the Internet. These were accessed through a web-crawler that traversed three
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separate locations. The first was a random selection of URLs generated from
the DMOZ archive [9]. The second dataset of PDF files was downloaded from
the Archive.org website and the third set of PDF files were obtained from Google
Scholar. These were tested in three batches of size 1,000 candidate PDF files which
were run through the OpenPuff embedding algorithm and successful carriers were
embedded with a small text file that contained a single letter “a”. This resulted
in a total of 50 successful candidate carrier files that had information embedded
via OpenPuff. In addition to this, false positive rates for the distinguisher were
also tested. Tables 18 and 19 provide an overview of these tests.
Datasets Number of files Processed by OpenPuff (%) Detection Rate
Dataset 1 1000 10 (1.0%) 100%
Dataset 2 1000 13 (1.3%) 100%
Dataset 3 1000 27 (2.7%) 100%
Table 18: Detection accuracy for first series of tests
Number of files False Positives / Negatives Accuracy
3000 (FP test) 13 / 1 99.6%
Table 19: False positive results from first series of tests
The selection process for OpenPuff appears to be highly restrictive, based on
the small number of successfully modified files (approximately 1.6%). Due to the
exclusive modification of white-space characters, a PDF file can only be used if
the file contains enough carrier bytes.
The second round of testing included a significantly larger dataset. These
were downloaded in three separate instances from Archive.org, using the search
phrases “PDF”, “Computing”, and “Medical”. The new datasets comprised a
total of 13,000 PDF files. From this, 135 were eligible candidates for OpenPuff
steganography.
For each eligible PDF file, OpenPuff embedded random data at the maximum
capacity offered by the tool (50%). The distinguisher demonstrated results similar
to those shown for the first series of tests with again 100% accuracy for each
stego-object analysed (see Table 20).
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Datasets Number of files Processed by OpenPuff (%) Detection Rate
Dataset 1 5000 56 (1.1%) 100%
Dataset 2 5000 67 (1.3%) 100%
Dataset 3 3000 12 (0.4%) 100%
Table 20: Detection accuracy for second series of tests
False positives produced similar results to those shown on the first series of
tests. A false positive rate of 0.5% should ensure that investigative time spent
addressing any flagged objects is minimal (see Table 21). This method of false
positive testing covers a diverse range of PDF files. In this case, the files have
been obtained randomly from different creators and sources and in some cases do
not specifically follow official standards.
Number of files False Positives / Negatives Accuracy
13000 (FP test) 68 / 0 99.5%
Table 21: False positive results from second series of tests
The detection component of the system attack can be extended to include an
estimator. This feature determines the maximum possible number of bytes that
could be embedded within each file. The following formula estimates the maxi-
mum possible embedded size by using least squares [101].
maxhiddensize=0.2204*occurf11+0.2117*occurf21+0.2115*occurf31-194.6563
From a practical standpoint, this feature is particularly useful as it provides
any practitioner with support to perform forensic steganalysis of stego-object (ex-
traction of the secret message). The estimator was tested against a series of files
to show the accuracy for each. Table 22 shows a sample of 10 files with the given
maximum capacity for each PDF file and the scheme’s estimation. Each file is
from a self-created dataset using the presented proof-of-concept (Appendix A8).
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File Maximum Capacity (bytes) Estimation (bytes) Error (%)
Test File 1 80 90.64 +13.3
Test File 2 112 110.74 -1.1
Test File 3 64 54.25 -15.2
Test File 4 544 545.19 +0.2
Test File 5 224 218.34 -2.5
Test File 6 864 858.92 -0.5
Test File 7 80 84.01 +5.0
Test File 8 1232 1219.72 -0.9
Test File 9 80 76.62 -4.2
Test File 10 416 412.68 -0.7
Table 22: Estimator results
The attack shown in this section demonstrates a method for the detection
of the OpenPuff PDF embedding algorithm. This was evaluated by a proof-of-
concept and tested against a total of 16,000 PDF files, which showed a high rate
of detection accuracy and a low rate of false positives. This attack paired with the
estimator adds credibility to system attacks as a practical method of steganalysis.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, two separate system-attacks have been presented against the Open-
Puff stego-system. The first is an attack against the MP4 embedding algorithm
that detects arbitrary modifications to MP4 flags. The second attack is against the
OpenPuff PDF embedding algorithm, which identifies arbitrary changes to stream
data to determine the presence of steganography.
While it is clear that OpenPuff gives consideration to the coding problems
associated with real-world steganography, the security improvements have been
implemented at the expense of a weak embedding algorithm. The stego-system
has not demonstrated weaknesses surrounding poor implementation and encoding,
but to avoid these challenges, OpenPuff has used a method of steganography that
can be detected with a steganalytic method that offers high accuracy and is optimal
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as a practical attack.
The results of both experiments present an unprecedented vulnerability in the
OpenPuff stego-system. This research has demonstrated that the vulnerabilities
associated with the OpenPuff stego-system are not isolated to any single embed-
ding algorithm and creates the suspicion that other embedding features of Open-
Puff will be highly vulnerable to similar steganalytic efforts. This presents an
avenue of future work to explore whether multi-functional stego-systems are typ-
ically weaker than a counterpart that focuses exclusively on a single embedding
feature.
In addition, this chapter has shown that the presented attacks extend the scope
of system steganalysis to video and PDF and can achieve practical results. Each
method gives support towards the practical applications of system attacks and
demonstrates a successful endeavour to bridge the gap between steganalysis in the
laboratory and steganalysis in the real-world.
There are several novel contributions from this chapter that can be discussed.
• An attack against the MP4 component of the OpenPuff embedding algo-
rithm. The presented method has shown an optimal rate of detection accu-
racy and efficiency and can extend to any other steganographic tools (existing
or emerging) that might adopt similar practices in the embedding operation.
• A second novel attack has been presented against the PDF component of the
OpenPuff embedding algorithm. The presented method provides a stegana-
lytic resource to the community from the proof-of-concept experimentation.
This gives support 0to a domain that otherwise has a limited scope of existing
research.
• System attacks have proven to be an effective method of breaking the Open-
Puff stego-system over MP4 and PDF as demonstrated through this chapter’s
case studies. This research not only supports the applicability of system at-
tacks to video and PDF, but also exposes the coding challenges surrounding
video steganography.
Finally, the results of this chapter have shown that there is potential for future
work, as OpenPuff appears to be a highly popular stego-system that is still in
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use. It is important to understand how the other embedding features of OpenPuff





There has been a rapid growth of interest and progress in steganography over
the past two decades. New avenues of application have been explored and tools
are developed to support an increasingly large community of users. Video stego-
systems have emerged as a modern paradigm that provide an ideal method of
communication. This is in part due to the pervasive nature of video content, but
also the many specific advantages that relate to video steganography.
From a practical approach, video cover-objects provide a multiple paths for
steganographic embedding. Video files are an amalgam of data streams (frame,
audio, auxiliary) and different methods of steganography are applicable to all of
them. However, many existing stego-systems avoid any mathematical and coding
challenges and use only very simple methods of steganography. This is evident
from previous chapters, where auxiliary channels are employed to avoid dealing
with the security considerations for temporal/transform domain embedding. In
addition, the impact of these methods over video will generally not be as appar-
ent to a casual observer when compared to other forms of steganography. New
stego-systems are continually emerging but there is a lack in the development of
blind steganalytic system-attacks capable of detecting a range of implementation
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vulnerabilities across many different stego-systems.
Previous chapters of this thesis have explored practical methods for system
steganalysis with a particular focus given to video (Chapters, 3, 4, and 5). This
chapter presents the culmination of this research, and presents a framework to
evaluate implementation vulnerabilities that can form the basis of practical system
attacks.
In this chapter, a framework is evaluated for automatic system steganalysis,
based on the construction of a classifier to detect implementation vulnerabilities
introduced by stego-systems. This classifier operates on attributes that are ex-
tracted from the training data using pattern-matching. The choice of classifier is
Naive Bayes classifier as it provides flexibility over a simple signature-matching
system.
The framework has been applied successfully to a wide variety of schemes and
across different formats, because it has been designed to be as general as possible.
Hence, it makes very few assumptions on the underlying nature of the stenography
tool or cover media being used.
The resulting framework has several improvements on previous work in this
field. First, it decouples attribute extraction from classification. Also, this work
presents a generalisation phase that is able to improve results, provided that train-
ing media objects are representative of real-world media objects. Finally, the
trained classifier can operate even when some of the obtained fingerprints for a
given steganographic tool are not present in observed media, as the constructed
model may combine several different findings for a given tool.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 provides a discus-
sion of related work in the field and gives an overview of Bayesian classification.
Section 6.2 applies this framework to a series of datasets created with several
steganography tools. In this section, the method is discussed and the performance
of approach is evaluated to provide a general discussion of its limitations. A con-
clusion is given in Section 6.3, where final thoughts and insights surrounding the
contributions of this work are discussed. 1
1The research in this chapter was conducted as a collaborative effort with Uni-
versity Carlos III of Madrid. I would like to thank Dr Alejandro Cervantes and
Professor Pedro Isasi, who developed the framework.
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6.1 Related work
6.1.1 System steganalysis
System attacks rely on unintentional implementation vulnerabilities that are often
relatively independent of the steganographic scheme. This has been briefly dis-
cussed before. Previous research [141, 140] used system-type attacks to examine
and evaluate the current state of steganography tools, with a focus on video-based
applications. This work found that many of the most accessible and popular tools
share similar embedding schemes and were highly susceptible to system attacks.
Chen et al. have discussed the concept of file structure steganography and its
application to images. Their work has shown how implementation vulnerabilities
can be used to reliably find signatures [25]. They noted that one particular ad-
vantage of this type of approach is that it is not affected by techniques typically
employed to increase resistance against statistical steganalysis. Cantrell exam-
ined file-structure based steganography with a focus on digital documents [21].
This work further emphasised the need for steganalytic systems that exploit the
very common vulnerabilities arising from a poor handling of metadata during the
steganographic process.
System attacks have already been successful in the field of steganalysis. In [14],
the authors propose an attack that is aimed to detect the use of steganographic
software independently of the actual media used. The process simply compares
the average values of bits at fixed positions of both an unmodified object and
the corresponding stego-object when subject to the steganographic tool. Results
showed that many tools were introducing anomalies that could be easily used to
detect stego-objects. However it must be noted that if the anomaly is not present
at the exact same position in all files, this method can’t detect it. Also, objects are
only labelled as stego-objects if all the regularities are present, due to the problem
of false positives.
Another work [115] extends this idea to the search of binary or hexadecimal
patterns by proposing a recognizing automaton that can also find regularities that
are not restricted to specific positions in the analysed objects. This method was
used for steganography on image files, and different policies were defined for the
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header, content, and tail parts of those formats.
The implementation of sequence extraction presented in this chapter is an
extension of this type of approach. However, it is more powerful in several ways.
First, this method uses a formal definition of a pattern by using a specific grammar.
This makes clear the type of regularities that the system is able to detect. A more
complex grammar might be used with increased detection capabilities. Similarly to
the most recent work [115], the process of pattern extraction and verification is not
restricted to specific positions in the file. However, in this case, assumptions are
not required for a given object that is analysed. This allows the presented method
to work with a broad range of different file formats. Third, phases for pattern
extraction and classification are separated. This is done so both that components
can be substituted if required. Finally, a probabilistic classifier is generated that
is more complex than simple signature detection. This is performed to complete a
task using a combination of patterns that are not necessarily present in all given
objects. In the discussion of the results, cases are identified and discussed where
classical signatures were found. This method is tested over several stego-systems
not covered in previous works and presents multiple new results.
6.1.2 Overview of Bayesian Classification
Bayesian Probabilistic Classification is a broad but well-established research area
with algorithms currently deployed in many different real-world scenarios and fields
of research. A general definition for all such systems would state that each relies
on the construction of a Bayesian Network [117], that takes as evidence a feature
set extracted from the data; the feature set can be queried to make a prediction
for the class to which data belongs. Prior knowledge of the problem can be used to
determine the structure of the network, and known data is used to learn the net-
work parameters, the structure and/or the Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs)
required to execute queries. In addition, some approaches employ Markov Chains
to reflect the temporal dimension. A good introduction to Bayesian Probabilistic
Classification can be found in [63].
Similar strategies have recently been used in a computer security context. For
instance, in [81] the authors construct a Network Intrusion Detection System
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(NDIS) that uses byte patterns as attack signatures for generating alerts. This
Bayesian Network can even act dynamically (providing stateful detection) [36].
However, learning the parameters for the Bayesian Network can be a very complex
process. Also, there are circumstances in which there is not a priori knowledge of
the best structure for the network. For these reasons, simpler approaches are often
preferred. For example, in [6, 109, 74] the authors employed a Naive Bayes Clas-
sifier [42], which is equivalent to a simple Bayesian Network with no inter-feature
dependencies.
For this work, the steganalysis detection problem can be formulated as a bi-
nary classification problem. In this case, cover-objects are defined as belonging to
Class0 (or negatives) and stego-objects belong to Class1 (or positives). Each ob-
ject (Xi) is represented by a set of up to N attributes (Xi = {Ai1, Ai2, · · · , AiN}).
The principle of Bayesian classification is to estimate the posterior class prob-
ability of an observation, Xi, using the empirical probabilities obtained from a
previous sample of the domain. For any class k, Pr(Classk|Xi) can be estimated
from Pr(Xi|Classk) using the Bayes Theorem
Pr(Classk|Xi) = αPr(Classk)Pr(Xi|Classk) (7)
where α = 1/P (Xi) is independent of the class.
In the general case, obtaining Pr(Xi|Classk) is not a trivial task, because the
distributions of features may have multiple dependencies and correlations. How-
ever, previous experience in this domain suggests that this needs not be the case
for the problem being addressed. Also, a simpler model can be more accommo-
dating to analyse a broad class of steganographic schemes, as features are not the
same for all schemes. For these reasons this work uses the simplest approach to
Bayesian classification, the well known Naive (or Simple) Bayes classifier [42].
This approach is based on a strong assumption, which is the conditional in-
dependence of the distribution of values for each attribute (Eq. 8). This kind of
model is simple enough to train, and has proved to be reliable even in scenarios
where it is well known that there is at least a partial violation of its theoretical
assumption [40].





Where Pr(Aij|Classk) is an abbreviated notation for the probability of observ-
ing the particular value Aij as the j−th attribute for any object of class Classk.
The most probable class is assigned to an unknown observation (Eq. 9). If
classes are balanced then αPr(Classk) is also constant, and only in this case the
class can be selected by using the one producing a maximum product of likelihoods.
This is called the Maximum Likelihood Rule.
For this particular domain, the values for each feature are obtained by finding
the matches of a set of patterns in the file extracted from training data (shown
later in this chapter). The resulting N attributes are used then to predict the class
of the file using Eq. 9.





Where each factor Prp(Aip|Classk) is the probability of obtaining the value
Aip in files of class Classk, when the pattern p is applied to a file Xi.
Let us assume that the possible values obtained when matching pattern p on
the available objects are vpt ∈ {vp1, vp2, · · · }. Then, the task of model construction
becomes equivalent to obtaining the probability distributions Prp(vpt|Classk), for
each specific value vpt. This can be done by replacing the actual distribution by
the empirically estimated Pr∗p(vpt|Classk), calculated as a frequency. First, each
pattern is matched against both a set Set0 of cover-objects and a set Set1 of
stego-objects. Then, for each value vpt thus obtained, calculate its frequency using
Eq. 10.
Pr∗p(vpt|Classk) =
Count(vpt) ∀objects ∈ Setk
|Setk| (10)
These constitute the empirical Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) of the
constructed Naive Bayes Model.
The previous concepts are used in Steps 3 and 4 of the procedure, Model Gen-
eration and Model Refining. An overview of the framework is shown in Appendix
B.
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6.2 Experimentation
In this section the framework is applied, as described in the previous section, to
datasets created with 11 different steganography schemes. Results are then gener-
ated to evaluate the success of the presented approach. For eight of these schemes,
results are obtained that can be considered either important or promising, while
for the remaining three, the presented approach was not successful. A discussion
of the results on these latter approaches is given as future work.
To begin, a description of the data generation process is provided. Data gen-
eration is critical for creating a robust experimental setting, because an incor-
rect generation process would lead to the detection of phantom vulnerabilities,
i.e. introduced by the datasets (such as the detection of repeated passwords or
predictable file names, etc.), instead of real vulnerabilities of the steganography
schemes themselves. Then, a discussion is given on how the values of some pa-
rameters that are of relevance to this framework are decided. After that, the
global results over all datasets are presented, followed by a detailed description of
the actual solutions found, and how to use them to automate detection for each
steganography scheme.
6.2.1 Data generation
Traditional models in steganalysis often rely on knowing everything about the
system, with the exception of a secret key that is shared between the two par-
ties. This is known as Kerckhoff’s Principle [62]. This presented steganalytic
approach, instead, can be considered as a blind attack with a known cover [65].
The framework does not assume any pre-existing knowledge on how each stego-
system fundamentally operates. A classifier is trained that works by extracting
features from both cover and stego-objects, to build a distinguisher that does not
rely on any preliminary knowledge or assumption.
To ensure that the process of dataset generation did not introduce any bias
into the solution, passwords and embedded contents were kept unique to each ob-
ject. For any given stego-system, 100 pairs of stego-objects and cover-objects are
generated from our own repositories (such as the Kent Digital Media Archive),
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and from external souces such as archive.org. The passwords were created ran-
domly, using the service at http://randomkeygen.com, using different password
tables as sources (256-bit WEP, 156-bit WEP, 128-bit WEP, 64-bit WEP, “Decent
Passwords”, etc.).
Contents to be embedded were created randomly thanks to the service at
https://www.random.org/bytes/. Content size varied between 1-byte and 10KB.
This process thus ensures that each message and key was unique inside a given









Table 23: Steganography tools used in the experiments.
It can be argued against the generality of the use of only 100 pairs of objects. In
this sense the framework has been limited by the size of the datasets for practical
reasons, as the whole process of collecting, encoding data, etc. had to be repeated
for each of the analysed tools. Let’s suppose that one identifies a given sequence
of bytes as consistently found in all stego-objects for a given tool. Later, when
testing on a different collection of objects, that sequence may not match any
object if it included some bytes that are linked to a specific encoding option that
was not used in the collection. If this system detected additional sequences for this
tool, then this may not affect the result, but in a general case, this is an obvious
problem. There is no easy way to go around this problem besides training the
model with larger and more diverse collections of objects, which is why the results
are presented as a methodology or framework. In this sense, results are reported
that may be general but are likely open to improvement.
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6.2.2 Experimental Process
For each dataset, the experimental procedure was performed as described in Al-
gorithm 2, and N -fold cross validation was used. This method splits the available
data in N disjoint subsets called folds, and then performs N experiments. On each
experiment, one fold is reserved to evaluate the model (validation set) and the rest
is used for training. The procedure generates N models as a solution. Results for
the N experiments are averaged, to provide a final overall result for the procedure.
For each experiments, N = 10 is used as this is a commonly used technique in
relevant academic literature [8].
As a measure of accuracy, the classification success rate is used, that is, the
average number for the sum of true positives (stego-objects correctly classified)
and true negatives (cover objects correctly classified). This measure is calculated
by testing the trained model on a validation set that was randomly extracted from
the generated data set and was not used for neither attribute extraction nor model
generation.
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Algorithm 2 Experimental procedure for N-fold cross-validation experiments
with constant length of patterns (N = 10 for the experiments)
Sample data into N arrays TRN, TST, V AL
for fold = 1 to N do
cnstlen← 10
while success < Threshold do
Patts ← ∅
for cover,stego ∈ TRN do
Patts ← Patts ∪ extract(cover, stego, cnstlen)
end for
Patts ← Patts ∪ generalize(Pats)
Model ← ∅
for pattern ∈ Patts do
for cover,stego ∈ TRN do
Model ← Model ∪ getCPT0(pattern, cover)












This procedure calls several functions:
• extract is the function that searches for patterns.
• generalize is the function that creates the generalized patterns.
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• getCPTi is the function that calculates the conditional probability tables for
each class i.
• refine performs Model Refining.
• test classifies a set of labelled objects, and obtains a result in terms of success
rate.
The Pattern Extraction phase requires two parameters: the length of the pat-
tern constant part (cnstlen), both for Flag Replacement patterns and for EOF code
injection patterns. For Flag Replacement another parameter is required, varlen,
the maximum length of the variable part. The actual length of the variable part
(varlen) was allowed to take any values between 1 and 5 for all the experiments.
The value of cnstlen is important, because longer patterns are less likely to
produce false positives. However, searching only for long patterns reduces the
chance of finding consistent but shorter signatures. In order to set the best value
for this parameter, a maximum value was first used and a candidate model was
generated. Then, this model was tested on a separate set of objects (test set)
that were not used for training. If the success rate obtained on this test set did
not reach a certain threshold, the training process is refined, decreasing the value
of cnstlen in fixed steps. Otherwise, the training process stops and the model is
considered final.
Also, in the Pattern Extraction phase, the search can explore all or only a part
of each file. Preliminary experimentation found that it was enough to search 1
KB of data at the start of the file (or at the start of the injected code, generally
towards the end of the file) to attain good results. Thus, these two sections are
explored for each of the files in the given pair. This limit is optional, and can
be increased depending on the available computational resources. Also if specific
knowledge of file structure for a format is available, search can be directed to the
specific sections of the file that are known to be likely to be modified as a side
result of the embedding process (headers, etc.). For the subsequent phases, model
generation and validation, the whole file was always considered: that is, a search
is performed for these patterns on the whole length of the file.
For the clustering mechanism used for pattern generalisation, a distance thresh-
old (Th) has to be defined. This is the maximum percentage of bytes that may
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differ in patterns that belong to the same cluster (intra-cluster distance). The
value of Th = 0.20 is set after some experimentation, as it tended to lead to good
results.
Table 24 summarizes the parameters used in the experiments.
cnstlen varlen Explored Th
10→ 2 (steps of −1) {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 1 KB 0.20
Table 24: Parameters used in the Experimental Procedure.
6.2.3 Experimental results
Results and new findings are shown in this section, corresponding to three different
steganographic tools that had no previous known attacks. Results are also included
over a number of other tools with published weaknesses and for each case due
citation is given.
The experiments were performed using 10-fold cross-validation. Results are
the average success rate for the 10 folds. In Table 25, the success rate is provided
as attained in the experiments that can be considered successful, and for which
further analysis is performed in section “ Discussion on the solutions”. In these
cases a success rate of practically 100% was obtained for most of the data sets,
which means that vulnerabilities can be automatically identified that are related
to weak coding of the steganographic tools.
Conversely, Table 26 shows that the presented method was not able to ob-
tain satisfactory results in all the analysed steganography schemes, due to several
reasons, for the OpenPuff tool. Partial results are commented in depth in “ Con-
clusion”.
Even when this automatic process can be useful as an attack, true insight on
the nature of the vulnerability requires further explanation of the results. In some
cases, models are obtained that are capable of detecting stego-objects, in other
cases, the classifier is identifying a regularity in the cover-objects. It is possible
that a single regularity is found that is able to perform classification, while in
others, several different regularities were found and had to be combined in order
to detect the use of steganography. Therefore, in order to be certain that the
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Tool Method Format Success Rate Refs.
Verification of previous results
F5 F5 Scheme JPEG 100% [51]
OpenPuff Flag Replac. MP4 100% [141]
OurSecret EOF Data Inj. MP4 100% [140]
OmniHide Pro EOF Data Inj. MP4 100% [140]
Masker EOF Data Inj. AVI 100% [140]
—New results—
OpenPuff Flag Replac. FLV 100%
DeepSound Unknown WAV 99.5%
Pixelknot F5 Scheme JPEG 100%
Table 25: Average Success Rate for successful experiments.
Tool Format Matched files Success Rate Comments
OpenPuff MPEG 80% in extended 99.5% False negatives
dataset Base data set not general
OpenPuff MP3 47.5% of our 100% Results not general
data set enough
OpenPuff WAV 0% No patterns found
Table 26: Average Success Rate for unsuccessful experiments.
resulting solutions are truly useful, the results have to be analysed case by case.
Thus, a detailed description of a representative solution is included for each of the
analysed steganography schemes in the following section.
6.2.4 Discussion on the solutions
This section shows and discusses the relevant parts of the model identified for
the data sets for which satisfactory results were obtained. Not all the patterns in
those models are listed, as the training process generates many redundant patterns.
Instead, the “best” patterns in each model are provided. This section is included
in order to provide useful sequences for detection of stego-objects that allows in
some cases to avoid the use of a full Bayes classifier, and instead requires only a
simple “signature detection” mechanism.
Best patterns are selected manually using one of the following criteria: either
they match the greatest number of files in the corresponding data set (that is,
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the generality of the pattern), or they have a high success rate over the files they
actually match. In tables 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34, two values are provided:
“matches” means the percentage of objects of the proper type where the pattern
was found, while “success” is the classification success rate measured only on those
matched objects.
6.2.4.1 OpenPuff FLV
Though it was possible to detect many patterns that were useful to classify some
of the files, no pattern alone matched all files and provided a 100% success rate. In
Table 27, it is shown that patterns 1 and 2 are some of the patterns that were found
more commonly. These two patterns achieve a 100% success rate if combined in a
single model such as the Naive Bayes model. That is why results of 100% for this
tool are reported in Table 25.
Pattern 1 is related with the default null values located in the FLV header, to
describe streamID. Research into FLV steganography through metadata tags has
been discussed before in the academic literature, showing that stego-systems can
embed data into metadata tags without corrupting the file whilst maintaining a
good degree of imperceptibility [33, 107].
Pattern Matches Distribution Success
1 0000 0012 0001 3600 79.0% Cover: 100%
0000 ???? ???? 0200 0000 0000
0a6f 6e4d 6574 6144 Stego:
¬ 0000 0000
2 0141 0900 0039 0000 68.0% Cover: 100%
0000 ???? ???? 0000 0000 0017
0000 014d 001f ffe1 Stego:
¬ 0000 0017
Both patterns 1 or 2 100.0% 100%
Table 27: Best patterns found for the OpenPuff FLV tool.
A method that ensures detection of stego-objects over the FLV scheme would
use both patterns, 1 and 2, as in the following:
• If the sequence 0000 0012 0001 3600 0000 ???? ???? 0200 0a6f 6e4d
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6574 6144 is found and any value in the indicated positions is not 0000
0000; OR
• If the sequence 0141 0900 0039 0000 0000 ???? ???? 0000 0000 014d
001f ffe1 is found and the value of those positions is not 0000 0017, then
the object can be classified as a stego-object.
This method covers 100% of the files and achieves a 100% success rate in
distinguishing cover from stego-objects with this tool. Thus, it can be considered
a new steganalytic result over this tool and format.
6.2.4.2 OpenPuff MP4
In this case, it was possible to find a single pattern that matched all files and
provided 100% success. Auxiliary patterns were also identified that have shown to
be successful. These results are shown in Table 28.
Pattern Matches Distribution Success
6600 0000 1c64 7265 100% Cover: 100%
6600 ???? ???? 0000 0000 0000
0100 0000 0c75 726c Stego:
¬ 0000 0000
6961 0000 0020 100% Cover: 99%
6d64 6864 0000 0000
???? ???? Stego:
¬ 0000 0000
Table 28: Best patterns found for the OpenPuff MP4 tool.
These results are consistent with the findings published in [141] for the Open-
Puff MP4 steganography scheme.
Using the patterns that has a 100% success rate would yield the following rule
for quick classification: All stego-objects include the pattern 6600 0000 1c64
7265 6600 ???? ???? 0000 0100 0000 0c75 726c where the value of the vari-
able part is not 0000 0000.
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6.2.4.3 DeepSound WAV
The tool DeepSound proved to be more of a challenge. For DeepSound, patterns
extracted straight away from a pair of cover and stego-objects were never found in
any different pairs. When pairs of stego- and cover-objects were analysed, patterns
were found that had shown to never be consistent over more than one pair.
However, in this case good results were obtained by introducing the generaliza-
tion process, as all the patterns that were found in separated pairs of objects could
be automatically combined in the extended pattern shown in Table 29. Bytes that
had different values across the data in that pattern were replaced by the general
sign “*” and are not used to extract the attribute value. This model was able to
achieve perfect accuracy results in the experiments.
There were, however, two cover-objects and one stego-object whose values for
this feature were different from the rest. This posed a problem for the cross-
validation experiments, that did not reach 100% success for the folds where those
files were not used for training, thus the resulting value of 99.5% in Table 25. This
problem was the result of the limited number of objects used for training (see
section “ Data generation”). The reason for reporting 99.5% accuracy was thus
related to fact that a small number of objects of these types were available. It may
be related to characteristics of the cover object, but further analysis is pending to
provide insight of the singularity of these objects.
Table 29 describes one of the models that used those objects for training, where
the aforementioned problematic values were included.
From these results, a simple method can be described for the detection of
steganography with DeepSound. In every stego-object the pattern 1000 6461
7461 bc** **** **** **** 0500 0300 0400 0300 0400 can be found (the values
of the “*” positions should not be taken into account). Note that because two
different attribute values for the stego-objects are given, for this detector, part of
the value can be replaced by the wildcard character (*). This may be useful to
avoid any bias that might be introduced in the data generation procedure. This
pattern matched all the available stego-objects and none of the cover-objects, and
is thus far the first steganalytic result reported on DeepSound.
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Pattern Matches Values Prob. Success
1000 6461 100% Cover: 100%
7461 bc** 0000 0000 0000 0.96
**** ???? 0000 0000 0000
???? ???? 0000
???? ???? feff feff 0200 0.02
???? ???? 0200 0400 0400
0000




0400 0400 0500 0.98
0300 0400 0300
0400
f4ff f4ff 0500 0.02
0300 0400 0300
0400
Table 29: Best patterns found for the DeepSound WAV tool Probability values are listed
behind each of the alternative values for a feature.
6.2.4.4 F5 JPEG
For this tool, a pattern has been identified that matches every file pair and achieves
a 100% success rate in classification. This pattern is shown in Table 30. Cover-files
have random values after the first byte of the file, while stego files have a constant
string as shown in the Table.
Pattern Matches Values Success
ffd8 ???? 100% Cover: ffe1 100%
???? ???? ???? ¬ 0010 4a46 4946




Table 30: Best patterns found for the F5 JPEG tool
The signature found by this system was ffd8 ffe0 0010 4a46 4946 0001
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0000 0001, which is the start of a constant block of data inserted by the F5
algorithm implementation. This block then contains a known and relatively long
signature that translates to the ASCII string “JPEG Encoder Copyright 1998,
James R. Weeks and BioElectroMech.” and was previously reported in [51]. If
the extraction tool is run with the aim of searching for patterns with a longer
variable part, it manages to extract the complete long signature, further showing
the viability of the presented approach. This signature was not found in cover
objects, where the block starts with the value ffd8 ffe1 and then continues with
different, unrelated values.
It is important to note that this result indicates a problem with the data
generation process. The header ffd8 ffe1 corresponds to cover-objects in EXIF
format, but the tool generates JFIF format, where that header changes to ffd8
ffe0. Because it didn’t include files of JFIF format in the cover-files, the method
includes the value ffd8 ffe1 as constant part of this signature. If the data had
included cover-files of both types (EXIF and JFIF) files for output, the model
would have included two patterns, each one matching one of the two versions of
the header.
6.2.4.5 Pixelknot JPEG
Pixelknot is an popular steganography application for Android devices, available at
the Google Play store, which is part of The Guardian Project, a group of developers
that make open-source secure mobile apps for everyone but particularly tailored
for Journalists, Human Rights Activists and citizens in repressive regimes. Their
web is at https://guardianproject.info. This issue has been responsibly disclosed
to their team before publication.
For Pixelknot, which had no previous reported weaknesses, it was possible to
detect the exact same vulnerability than for F5. The signature found can also
be used to classify files with a 100% success rate (see Table 31). This is not
entirely surprising, as the developers recognise their tool is based on F5. What is
interesting is that the long pattern present in F5 is not present in Pixelknot, but
despite this slight improvement in security, other identical patterns are present
and identified by the framework.
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Pattern Matches Values Success
ffd8 ???? 100% Cover: ffe1 100%
???? ???? ???? ¬ 0010 4a46 4946




Table 31: Best patterns found for the Pixelknot JPEG tool
6.2.4.6 OurSecret MP4, Omnihide MP4 and Masker AVI
The approach has been applied to three algorithms known to use EOF data in-
jection. Models were then generated that were able to achieve 100% accuracy in
each case.
The framework was able to extract several constant patterns for these files.
In all cases patterns matched all the stego-files and never matched any of the
cover-files. This is, of course, the best case scenario for the steganalyst.
In Tables 32, 33 and 34, as attributes are not given, you can list the probability
of matching cover-objects or stego-objects.
• For OurSecret, it was possible to find a signature that had previously been
found (manually) by previous work on this steganographic scheme [140]. In
Table 32, the first 10-byte patterns detected are listed, which can be joined to
form the full signature 9e97 ba2a 0080 88c9 a370 975b a2e4 99b8 c178
720f 88dd dc34 2b4e 7d31 7fb5 e870 39a8 b842 7568 7191.
• For OmniHide, a sequence of bytes was detected with the value 2020 in stego-
objects that was not present in any cover-object. Although this sequence can
be used to classify the data with 100% success rate, as a signature it is prob-
lematic as it is relatively low entropy, so has the potential to lead to many
false positives. It simply encodes a series of blank spaces to accommodate
file names, whose hexadecimal code is 0x20. a test was conducted for false
positives to determine the chance of this signature appearing naturally in
MP4 files. These results can be seen in Section 6.3.5.
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Matches
Pattern Cover Stego
99b8 c178 720f 88dd dc34 0% 100%
2b4e 7d31 7fb5 e870 39a8
c178 720f 88dd dc34 2b4e 0% 100%
7d31 7fb5 e870 39a8 b842
720f 88dd dc34 2b4e 7d31 0% 100%
7fb5 e870 39a8 b842 7568
Plus the rest of the patterns
included in the 40-octet signature
Table 32: Best patterns found for OurSecret MP4 tool
Matches
Pattern Cover Stego
2020 2020 2020 2020 2020 0% 100%
2020 2020 2020 2020 2020
Table 33: Best patterns found for OmniHide Pro MP4 tool
• For Masker, the signature 3030202020202020 was identified. This signa-
ture was consistently present in the initial 1KB of the stego-object. This
pattern can be used for classification, though it can also be seen as a weak
detector due to its low entropy. It can be expected that it might lead to an
large percentage of false positives. So it is important to continue pursuing
the identification of different signatures. This was successful and a longer
signature was found that appears in a variable position in each of the stego-
objects. This finding is consistent with previous results in [141]. The full
73-octet string that can be used as signature is:
9e8d db50 73c2 bf65 b81e 03ae d562 c6cc 719a b9b9 4849 d264 ee49
b763 7bef eba1 0104 407b f0ed 2d86 47e1 5ffc 7c41 c98b c902 ca1c
0721 ee8d 3266 477c 8fe1 4ee8 ae66 ab32 e3d2 f9a1 0e.
In Table 34 the three first patterns found are shown that are part of that
signature.
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Matches
Pattern Cover Stego
9a9e 8ddb 5073 c2bf 65b8 0% 100%
1e03 aed5 62c6 cc71 9ab9
8ddb 5073 c2bf 65b8 1e03 0% 100%
aed5 62c6 cc71 9ab9 b948
5073 c2bf 65b8 1e03 aed5 0% 100%
62c6 cc71 9ab9 b948 49d2
Plus the rest of the patterns
included in the 72-byte signature
Table 34: Best patterns found for Masker AVI tool
6.2.5 False Positives Testing
For each format and tool that has presented a signature, a large number of files
obtained from various sources in which steganographic content was not expected
or assumed. This is to determine whether the proposed signatures are likely to
occur naturally inside cover files. Table 35 shows the signatures used for each
tests.
Tool Number of Tests Signature
F5 JPEG 2000 ffd8 ffe0 0010 4a46
4946 0001 0000 0001
OpenPuff FLV 1000 6= 0000 0000 and 0000 0017
OurSecret MP4 2000 See Table XIII
OmniHide Pro MP4 2000 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020
Masker AVI 1000 3030 2020 2020 2020
OpenPuff MP4 2000 Atom detection
OpenPuff MPEG 1000 Arbitrary values
Pixelknot JPEG 2000 ffe0 0010 4a46 4946
4946 0001 0100 0001
DeepSound WAV 1000 0500 0300 0400 0300 0400
Table 35: Test signatures for the false positive analysis
Table 36, shows the results for false positives tests across known signatures.
For each test a new batch of cover files were used. JPEG images were down-
loaded from the Dresden Image Database [64]. Videos were tested across MP4,
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AVI, FLV and MPEG formats. These files were obtained from YouTube (25%
of files), Archive.org (50% of files) through an automatically generated query, and
our own KDMA archive (25% of files). Audio WAV files were obtained from WAV-
source.com.
Tool Method Format False Positive Rate
F5 F5 Scheme JPEG 0%
OpenPuff Flag Replac. MP4 0%
OurSecret EOF Data Inj. MP4 0%
OmniHide Pro EOF Data Inj. MP4 0%
Masker EOF Data Inj. AVI 0%
OpenPuff Metadata FLV 0.4%
OpenPuff Metadata MPEG 0%
Pixelknot F5 Scheme JPEG 0%
DeepSound Unknown WAV 0%
Table 36: Tests for false positives across known signatures
The false positives for Masker only consider the shorter signature. If the full
73-byte signature is used, there is a rate of zero false positives. For OpenPuff FLV,
the 0.4% rate for false positives comes from corrupted FLV files downloaded from
Archive.org.
6.2.6 Limitations of the framework
Steganographic schemes have been identified where the presented results were con-
sidered unsatisfactory. However, it was still possible to find some regularities that
can be exploited in order to improve the proposed framework.
• For OpenPuff MPEG, it was possible to find patterns capable of classifying
all files with great accuracy, achieving a success rate of 99.5%. This is due
to the model generated in one of the folds being unable to classify just one
of the test files. This file was correctly classified with the rest of the models
generated in cross-validation.
However, these results did not generalise well. The patterns detected depend,
as concluded after further analysis, on particular details of the compression
mechanism of the MPEG file. When tested on additional objects taken from
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a different source, 20% of those objects were not matched by the model. For
that reason, one might consider that the work on this steganographic scheme
is not concluded yet.
In Table 37, a model with a single pattern is shown that is able to classify
the remaining 80% of the provided objects correctly. Considering only these
“vulnerable” objects, cover-objects always matched the pattern and had one
of three different specific values that were never present in the stego-objects.
Note that 25% of the “vulnerable” stego-objects were not matched by the
pattern (the value False is returned in this case), but this situation was
never found in cover-objects.
Pattern Matches Distribution Prob. Success
01ba 4400 0400 100% Clean: 100%
0401 43** ???? 2bf8 21ff 0.33
0000 01bb 000c 3bf8 21ff 0.18
**** **** ???? ebf8 21ff 0.49
c0c0 20e0 e0e6 75% Stego:
0000 01c0 None of the above 0.75
False 0.25
Table 37: Best patterns found for the OpenPuff MPEG tool, frequencies listed calculated
over the 80% of the objects that were vulnerable to the attack.
These results can be jointly used to design a method to detect files with
hidden info embedded with this scheme. Note that in this case, a signature
that simply matches any stego-object is not provided. Instead the method
should search the file for the string 01ba 4400 0400 0401 43** ???? 0000
01bb 000c **** **** ???? c0c0 20e0 e0e6 0000 01c0 (where the * can
be any value). If the value extracted for this pattern is either 2bf8 21ff,
3bf8 21ff or ebf8 21ff, the MPEG is clean. If the value is different, or
the pattern does not match the object, it is a stego-object produced with
OpenPuff.
• For OpenPuff MP3 files, patterns were found that provided 100% accuracy
but did not match all the available objects. The detected regularity was
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only found in 47% of the files. This result is not good enough for us, be-
cause perfect (or near perfect) accuracy was required, as discussed in the
Introduction.
For roughly half of the object pairs in the dataset, a constant string was
detected that was consistently found in cover-objects but was never found
in stego-objects. This string (0000 3483 8000 004c 414d 4533 2e39) can
be used to definitely classify an object as clean, if present.
An in-depth analysis of the objects matched by this pattern showed that
the steganography scheme under study systematically inserted a block of
data inside the stego-object. It was detected that, for the cases where this
signature is found, the cover-object had a section of data that started with
414d 4533 2e39 3155 5555 or 414d 4533 2e39 3255 5555 and was filled
up to the length of 256 bytes with a series of 5555 constant byte values.
The steganographic process removed the filling bytes and inserted a block of
256 bytes just after the four initial bytes (0000 3483 8000 004c), ending it
with the rest of the signature (414d 4533 2e39) which was shifted exactly
256 bytes away from its original position.
Even if the framework was unable to break this steganography scheme, it
provided us with useful insights as to how this flawed stego-system funda-
mentally operates.
• For OpenPuff WAV, the pattern extraction mechanism was unable to find
any consistent patterns. Thus, it was unable to successfully perform clas-
sification. This may mean that either the given definition of pattern was
insufficient to describe the kind of modifications performed by the steganog-
raphy scheme, or that this scheme has no vulnerabilities that can be detected
by a system attack, thus being a good candidate for a targeted statistical
attack.
6.2.7 Scope and limitations of approach
Experimental results shown that the approach to steganalysis presented in this
chapter was able to detect steganography via signature detection across a range
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of different stego-systems and embedding algorithms. This was achieved without
any prior assumptions to which kind of scheme would be used and demonstrates
an effective blind attack. Although the pattern extraction mechanism could be ex-
tended using a more powerful grammar for pattern definition, the current version
was enough to provide confident results over several stego-systems. However, there
are stego-systems without this type of vulnerability and therefore, these methods
are complementary to the statistical attacks developed for each media type. More-
over, findings by this method are specific to a given stego-system and its release.
The effectiveness may change as the tool is advanced over time.
In this experimental setting, there were some practical limitations due to the
computational resources available. For instance, if modifications are introduced
into unexamined object areas, it would not be possible to locate them. Generally
it would be optimal to limit the search to small sections both at the beginning and
the end of the files. This practical limitation can be overcome by either increasing
computational effort dedicated to pattern extraction, or by implementing a more
efficient search strategy. Other paths can be explored in the future.
Another practical limitation is due to the fact that the framework operates at
the byte-level. Certain software might only introduce bit-level changes that might
not be easily recognised by the software.
Though the Naive Bayes Classifier has performed well in this setting, it has ob-
vious limitations from a theoretical perspective if features do not show the property
of conditional independence. However, domain knowledge suggests that, because
the changes are largely unintentional, this assumption works for at least some of
the features detected by this framework. This limitation can be overcome by learn-
ing these dependencies from the training data and constructing a more complex
Bayes Network when generating the model.
Data Generation is a tricky matter as it has been shown in this Chapter. If a
vulnerability is not traced back to the tool code (which is not generally available),
it may happen that the vulnerability found is linked to certain characteristics of the
cover file. Universality of the results, that is, whether the findings are applicable
to every object generated using a given tool could be improved by increasing the
number and diversity of files in the data set. This would provide the chosen method
with representative training examples for a wider range of possibilities. However,
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even in the case that generated data does not cover all cases (for instance, when
a given signature is not present in 100% of the examples of a given tool), partial
success is useful to trace the vulnerability in code.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter has presented and tested a framework for the autonomous detec-
tion of steganography. The constructed method has shown to be particularly
effective as a supporting framework for system steganalysis as the detection ca-
pabilities have proven to be optimal against weak encoding, and vulnerabilities
typically associated to pre- and post-processing modifications. The use of an au-
tonomous framework can provide useful insights into a steganalytic investigation
and in cases where it may not provide optimal detection accuracy can instead sup-
port the efforts of steganalysis by identifying artifacts that may be of relevance to
an investigator.
This research emphasises a key point in the field of steganography: Steganalysis
should be extended beyond the scope of the embedding algorithm. A practical
model for steganography must consider the impact of steganography on the whole
stego-object. Any traceable features, be that from the scheme itself or from an
implementation component2, can compromise the security of the stego-system.
The vulnerabilities automatically identified by the framework were consistent
with the results shown in previous chapters, in addition, this method can success-
fully perform system steganalysis against schemes for which no vulnerabilities had
been discovered. The proposed approach can work reliably even with a limited
number of training cases and it is flexible enough to scale with the computational
resources available. This allows for a framework that can increase accuracy as
needed based on the parameters of the practical model.
As evident by the obtained results, the presented framework can provide useful
steganalytic insights, even in cases where it cannot fully break a stego-system.
2It has been observed empirically that many libraries for image processing leave traces of
their use in the resulting images. This is, in many cases, due to old copyright messages that are
no longer relevant but can still severely impair the security of the stego-system, as seen with F5
and Pixelknot.
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This was shown to be useful as a reverse engineering feature. In cases where it
could not consistently identify signatures, the framework was capable of identifying
the exact parts of a file that were modified by the stego-system. This provides us
with a fundamental understanding of how a given stego-system operates. This can
be a good starting point in a practical investigation, as it provides valuable early
insights that may lead to more significant findings.
There are several contributions from the research in this chapter that can be
summarised through the following points:
• This work has evaluated and supported the work in previous chapters by
obtaining identical results through an autonomous system
• Several embedding schemes for stego-systems have been broken by the frame-
work for which there previously existed no method of detection
• The research in this chapter continues to support the extended scope of
application for system steganalysis to video steganography by breaking the
FLV feature of OpenPuff
Chapter 7
Evaluation
Steganalysis as a counterpart of steganography demonstrates a sense of duality.
Formally, its primary purpose is the process of detecting the presence of steganog-
raphy and proving its existence. However, steganalysis also advances the state-
of-the-art in steganography by identifying weaknesses in the methodology and
application of steganographic schemes. From this, steganalysis strengthens and
advances the next generation of steganographic research. This impacts not only
lab-based environments, but also steganography in the real world provided that
there is sufficient awareness. This thesis has set out to address the latter and re-
search the practical applications for system attacks over video steganography. In
doing so, the results of this work contribute to the field of steganalysis by success-
fully applying system attacks to achieve practical results over video steganography
and by identifying many of the existing concerns and challenges within the relevant
practical state-of-the-art.
To effectively evaluate this research, it is important to provide a baseline set
of standards for practical steganography that can be used to contrast the exper-
imental and methodological results. The following are considered the four main
principles for practical steganography [46].
1. The stego-system must preserve a model of the cover-object in that the
resulting stego-object should appear indistinguishable from the cover-object
2. The embedding method should reflect some form of naturally occurring pro-
cess so as to not introduce obvious, predictable, or arbitrary modifications
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3. The stego-system should be capable of resisting known steganalytic attacks
4. The impact of embedding should be minimised to ensure that the stego-
object
All of the stego-systems examined in this thesis can be broken by the efforts
of system steganalysis. It can be shown that it each case where a stego-system
can be detected with a high rate of accuracy, that the steganography tool fails to
address at least one of the four principles for practical steganography. In chapter
4, the first case study analysing EOF injection tools demonstrates a complete
disregard for at least three of the standards (2, 3, and 4) and covers a significant
majority of the publicly available resources in video steganography. The second
case study focusing on MV-embedding, presents a tool that makes great effort to
address these four principles but fails at the third and is vulnerable to signature
steganalysis as a result of the coding problem in practical steganography.
In Chapter 5, the OpenPuff tool is analysed to demonstrate the practical appli-
cations for axillary embedding. The presented system attack successfully detects
OpenPuff steganography over MP4 and PDF with a high rate of accuracy (100%),
once again reflecting a failure to suitably address the four principles. In this case,
the detection capabilities of the attack presented in Chapter 5 specifically exploits
the second principle. The OpenPuff embedding algorithm for MP4 does not re-
flect any naturally occurring process by embedding secret data in null atoms of
flags. This appears arbitrary when considering MP4 compression standards and
leads to a highly invasive and detectable steganographic implementation. As such,
system attacks prove to be a highly capable detection method over this type of
steganography.
System attacks as a viable method of steganalysis are highly dependant on
how these four principles are addressed by stego-systems. A Lack of considera-
tion towards addressing these points will provide a means to use system attacks
and break the associated stego-system. As such, awareness and following well-
established best practices in the field appears to be one of the major challenges in
the field of practical video steganography.
These four principles for practical steganography have a direct impact over the
experimental results obtained in this thesis. The highly capable system attacks
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presented in earlier Chapters rely heavily on attacking stego-systems that fail to
suitably address each point; however, these stego-systems are fully representative
of the current state-of-the-art in practical video steganography and reflect many
of the present and future challenges in the field, thus strengthening the position
of system attacks in the domain of video steganalysis. If a stego-system can suit-
ably address the four principles for practical steganography then the impact and
effectiveness of system steganalysis will be restricted.
The research in this thesis has endeavoured to answer the two following re-
search questions that were first presented and discussed in Chapter 1.
1. How are system attacks best used within the scope of steganalysis?
2. Can system attacks be successfully applied to achieve practical re-
sults over video steganography?
From this, the practical state-of-the-art has been examined to identify an ex-
haustive list of video stego-systems that are publicly available. To address the
first research question, system attacks were used as a method of steganalysis to
break the stego-systems listed in Chapters 4, 5, & 6. It has been shown that they
are an ideal method to attack steganographic systems in the real world and can
be useful in evaluating practical steganographic tools and techniques. It is also
evident from this research that system attacks are best used when a stego-system
fails to address any of the four key principles for practical steganography. In this
case, system attacks are likely to provide optimal results and demonstrate a high
rate of detection accuracy.
To address the second question, novel detection methods were constructed
under the scope of system attacks. These detection methods offered a high rate of
accuracy with a low rate of false positives. Video steganography was the primary
focus for system attacks in this thesis and it was that in each case, each stego-
system could be broken by the practices of system attacks using a representative
sample of practical video steganography.
The results of this work have produced formal outputs and novel contribu-
tions by addressing the two research questions. To suitably answer each question,
novel detection methods have been produced that did not previously form part
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of existing relevant academic literature. These detection methods present highly
effective techniques to detect steganography across a wide-range of stego-systems.
Furthermore, the presence of an autonomous framework for system steganalysis
can provide useful steganalytic insights for both existing and new/emerging stego-
systems.
7.1 Evaluating Experimental Results
To effectively evaluate the findings of this thesis and the associated experimental
results it is important to determine what is considered successful in the scope of
steganalysis. As mentioned in earlier chapters, a steganography scheme is typically
considered broken if a detection method is capable of determining the presence of
steganography at a rate higher than that of a random guess (50%). This is a well
recognised concept in academic literature and if this research is to follow this rule
of thumb, the novel detection methods presented in this thesis are successful and
can be used with a high degree of confidence.
However, this concept should not be deemed sufficient for successful steganal-
ysis in the real world as it can lead to detection methods that are considered
successful but yield a significantly high rate of false positives. In contrast to this,
it was proposed in Chapter 3 that system attacks should offer a significantly higher
rate of detection accuracy. This proved to be true for many of the detection algo-
rithms presented in the experimental sections of this thesis (OpenPuff, OmniHide,
OurSecret, BDV Datahider, etc.). The high rate of detection accuracy associated
to the use of system attacks occur for several reasons.
Firstly, it is clear that many practical video stego-systems are using weak meth-
ods of steganography that can be simple to detect and a far behind the academic
state-of-the-art. Secondly, the process of steganography in the real-world is highly
invasive and can leave many detectable traces that are both predictable and simple
to use as traceable fingerprints. Thirdly, system attacks are often overlooked in
academic literature in favour of alternative methods, this lack of awareness can
strengthen the scope of system attacks as new and emerging stego-systems may
repeat the same mistakes.
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7.1.1 Successful Implementations of System Attacks
The experimental results in Chapters 4 and 5 provided a foundation of evidence
that illustrates the potential for system attacks over video. Steganalytic methods
presented in each chapter demonstrated 100% detection accuracy Furthermore, the
use an autonomous framework in Chapter 6 supported these findings by achiev-
ing comparable, and in many cases identical results to those observed in previ-
ous chapters. The scope of system-based vulnerabilities among stego-systems has
been extended by this framework as it has achieved successful results over stego-
systems and steganographic scheme not yet subjected to steganalysis (OpenPuff
FLV, MPEG, DeepSound).
Table 38 provides a summary of successful system-attacks against stego-systems.
In each case, detection accuracy is 100% or near (99.5%) demonstrating that these
attacks can be applied to achieve practical results over a wide-range of steganogra-
phy tools. The use of an autonomous framework to identify signatures for steganal-
Tool Method Format Success Rate
OurSecret EOF Data Inj. MP4 100%
OmniHide Pro EOF Data Inj. MP4 100%
Masker EOF Data Inj. AVI 100%
BDV Data Hider EOF Data Inj. MP4 100%
Max File Encryption EOF Data Inj. MP4 100%
Steganosaurus MV MP4 100%
OpenPuff Flag Replac. MP4 100%
OpenPuff Metadata FLV 100%
OpenPuff Metadata MPEG 99.5%
OpenPuff Metadata PDF 100%
F5 F5 Scheme JPEG 100%
Pixelknot F5 Scheme JPEG 100%
DeepSound Unknown WAV 99.5%
Table 38: Average Success Rate for all successful experiments.
ysis provides an ideal solution for digital forensic investigators. Signature-based
detection scripts are simple to implement and have demonstrated highly practical
results. In this sense, the autonomous framework can provide the foundation for
building a signature database capable of detection a comprehensive and diverse
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range of stego-systems. Although the primary goal was to test this over video
steganography, the results have shown that this is capable of performing well over
alternative data formats such as image and audio.
False positive rates provide another means to evaluate the efficiency of a con-
structed attack. Results that incorrectly classify cover-objects as containing a se-
cret message will add to investigative time and increase resource demand. Because
of this, it is ideal for a constructed attack (especially when considering practical
methods) to maintain a low rate of false positives. Table 39 presents the false
positive rates across all experiments conducted in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
Tool Method Format False Positive Rate
OurSecret EOF Data Inj. MP4 0%
OmniHide Pro EOF Data Inj. MP4 0%
Masker EOF Data Inj. AVI 0%
BDV Data Hider EOF Inj. MP4 0%
Max File Encryption EOF Inj. MP4 0%
Steganosaurus MV MP4 0%
OpenPuff Flag Replac. MP4 0%
OpenPuff Metadata FLV 0.4%
OpenPuff Metadata MPEG 0%
OpenPuff Metadata PDF 0.5%
F5 F5 Scheme JPEG 0%
Pixelknot F5 Scheme JPEG 0%
DeepSound Unknown WAV 0%
Table 39: Tests for false positives across all experiments
The experimental results have shown that the system attacks presented in ear-
lier chapters provide a low rate of false positives, supporting their suitability for
use as viable methods of detection. Across 84.6% of the stego-systems analysed,
signatures were high entropy which provided a zero rate of false positives during
testing. The remaining cases reflect methods where the construction of a finger-
print might be through the concatenation of smaller signatures or patterns. As
such, entropy may be lower and would be associated with a higher false positive
rate.
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7.1.2 Limitations
Although system attacks have shown to be highly capable of successfully perform-
ing steganalysis in the real world, there are obvious limitations in their application.
As demonstrated through the attacks on OpenPuff MPEG, an autonomous frame-
work acquired strong results; however, these did not generalise well as patterns
depended on specific compression features. In any environment where there could
be variants in pre- and post-processing, it is unlikely that the success rate will
be consistent and in some cases, might be unsuccessful. Because of this, system
attacks can be limited in their scope to stego-systems that present highly pre-
dictable patterns. Resource management should also be taken into consideration
when constructing system attacks. Particularly when identifying signatures, it is
understood that many of the fingerprints identified will typically be present in pre-
dictable features of a given object. Because of this, an attack can limit the number
of usable features to maintain efficiency. However, if exploring an unknown stego-
system, pre-existing assumptions could lead to a steganalyst to miss key features
that might offer optimal results for detection. In cases, this can be overcome by
increasing the available computational resources or by implementing more efficient
search strategies.
Data generation has also been a challenge in the scope of this research. To
ensure that any results obtained are robust, the experimental methodology and
data generation phases must be unbiased. System attacks have shown to rely
heavily on signatures and are often capable of being traced back to an associated
stego-system (if sufficiently entropic). However, it may occur that a given-object
already contains the signature. If the data generation is sufficiently representative,
this insight will demonstrate that the presented attack is not strong enough and
should be improved. The challenge in this sense exists when the data is not
sufficiently representative, from this potential signatures may infrequently match
features generated by pre- and post-processing of a given object.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis has evaluated the scope and limitations of system attacks, with a
focus on video steganography and steganalysis. The results of this research have
shown that system attacks provide a practical application for steganalysis capable
of achieving practical and accurate results. This work contributes to an area of
steganalysis that has remained largely unexplored in academic literature.
It is important to acknowledge that steganography in the real-world should
be modelled as a coding problem as well as a data hiding and detection prob-
lem. A lack of awareness into this paradigm has led to the development of many
stego-systems with serious implementation vulnerabilities. In each case, these vul-
nerabilities markedly simplify the process of steganalysis and can provide an attack
with strong signatures that offer a high rate of detection accuracy. Throughout
many of the case studies presented, it was evident that weak encoding methods can
lead to object-wide steganalytic attacks. A steganographic system must undoubt-
edly adopt strong security principles and practices to ensure that any user is safe.
However, many of the stego-systems analysed throughout this thesis should now
considered unsafe and unfit for use, and if this trend continues, the applicability
for system attacks will continue to grow.
Video stego-systems have shown to be particularly vulnerable to system ste-
ganalysis. System attacks can be highly accurate for detecting the presence of
steganography and tracing its use to any particular stego-system or tool. The
work in this thesis has presented a series of novel system attacks against video
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stego-systems, as case studies, to demonstrate the scope and application for sys-
tem attacks as a method of practical steganalysis. The work throughout this thesis
has provided several contributions that are outlined below.
• Firstly, the applications for system attacks are evaluated over video steganog-
raphy and its scope has found to be wide-reaching. This work has shown
that these methods can be applied to achieve practical results over video
steganography and fulfil the requirement for practical steganalysis in the
real-world.
• Novel steganalytic methods are constructed to detect popular and well-
known video stego-systems. Each steganalytic attack presented is capable of
detecting the presence of steganography with a high rate of accuracy and a
low rate of false positives. This is often linked to highly entropic signatures
identified for each stego-system. Furthermore, many of the attacks presented
are capable of tracing steganography to its corresponding stego-system. This
is a useful feature, especially for forensic practitioners and investigators.
• Insight is given to better understand the gap between steganography in the
laboratory and steganography in the real-world, with a particular focus on
video driven steganography. The scope of this endeavour involved using a
series of case-studies to demonstrate how steganographic implementations
ignore best practice and, by doing so, endanger its users. In light of this,
system attacks become a desirable method for steganalysis, where it would
be far more practical to detect implementation vulnerabilities of the stego-
system as opposed to alternative methods.
8.1 Challenges for System Steganalysis
System attacks have shown to be an effective method of steganalysis against practi-
cal stego-systems. However, it cannot be claimed that as a method of steganalysis
it is viable for each and every scenario.
The paradigm for practical steganography suggests that the highly variable
nature of the real-world makes it challenging to incorporate steganalytic concepts
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formulated in a laboratory environment. In cases where this happens (as seen
throughout this thesis), a stego-system is defeated by what is initially deemed
to be a requirement for the embedding algorithm to function (i.e., converting a
file to the frequency domain for DCT steganography). This leads to the creation
of steganalytic attacks against features seemingly unrelated to the steganographic
method. From this, implementation vulnerabilities are largely identified by the im-
pact of pre- and post-processing changes made by the stego-system, these changes
are often performed to prepare a file for secret message embedding, but the pro-
cess ultimately modifies key features in a predictable fashion. Raising awareness
to fully understand this problem could impact the scope of system steganalysis.
It was noted in Chapter 3 that when predictable changes occur, it can be due
to the use of publicly available libraries being used in a privacy aware environ-
ment. In these cases, the libraries are not developed with security and privacy in
mind, especially for the purposes of steganography. A secure vetting of reliable
libraries for steganography tools would be a highly recommended and valuable
addition to the development of practical stego-systems. This would also reduce
potential applications for system attacks. However, it is apparent that for as long
as steganography in the real-world is to be considered a coding problem, there will
always be potential for system attacks.
8.2 Future Work
Steganography and steganalysis are continuously evolving fields of research. Ad-
vancements in steganography often inspire the development of new stego-systems
and from this, there will always be a need for a diverse range of research in ste-
ganalysis. Going forward, there are many different avenues to consider for future
work. The steganalytic attacks presented in this thesis are being consolidated
into a framework that is being used to determine the presence of steganography
throughout the Internet under the EPSRC project EP/N024192/1 (SEEK).
The work in this thesis has explored the applications for system attacks over
video media, an area that was largely unexplored. However, there is significant
potential for continued research in system steganalysis. It is important to raise
awareness into the impact of system attacks and improve many of the poor security
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practices that occur in practical steganography. For this reason, it would be desir-
able to explore alternative methods of steganography that show growing interest
and complexity. Ideal avenues of research can include: document, executable files,
game-based, and network (TCP/IP)-based methods.
Chapter 6 presented a framework to automate signature detection based on
implementation vulnerabilities of stego-systems. As noted in the detailed discus-
sion of each scheme, the framework is able to obtain a series of patterns that can
be joined in a successful model for classification. However, a specific method for
selecting the optimal patterns in the model has not been implemented. This step
is not straightforward, as every pattern can be characterized by a set of possi-
bly conflicting properties: for instance, as previously mentioned, the number of
matches and the success rate in matched files. Other features may be of relevance
for further applications: patterns with low entropy will be more prone to false pos-
itives; long patterns (that is, patterns with long constant parts) generally are less
subject to false positives but have lower generalisation abilities. These aspects can
be evaluated using a multi-criteria approach that can be used for model refining
or even during the model construction step, to ensure that the resulting classifier






A.1 Steganosaurus - Atom Detection
#!/bin/bash
for file in /home/ts424/Desktop/SeekSets/*
do
mp4file --dump "${file}" > /tmp/mp4dumpfile
sed ’6,7!d’ /tmp/mp4dumpfile >/tmp/tmp1
for line in $(< /tmp/tmp1); do
echo $line | sed ’s/.*(\(.*\))/\1/’>>/tmp/tmp2
done
if egrep -q "free|mdat" /tmp/tmp2; then
source /home/ts424/Desktop/Seek/Steganosaurus/SaurusSig.sh
else
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A.2 Steganosaurus - Signature Detection
#!/bin/bash
xxd -p "${file}" > /tmp/tmp1
tail -c 40 < /tmp/tmp1 | tr -d ’\n’ > /tmp/tmp2
if grep -q -c "0000004c61766635342e35392e313036" /tmp/tmp2; then
echo -e \ "${file}" "Signature & Atom Test - Steganosaurus content
detected" >> /home/user/Results/SteganosaurusResults;
else
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A.3 OurSecret - Signature Detection
#!/bin/bash
xxd -p "${file}" > /tmp/tmp1
tr -d ’\n’ < /tmp/tmp1 > /tmp/tmp2
if grep -c -q
-"9e97ba2a008088c9a370975ba2e499b8c178720f88dddc342b4e7d317fb5e87039a8b84275687191"
/tmp/tmp2; then
echo -e \ "Signature test - OurSecret signature detected in" "${file}"
>> /home/user/Results/OurSecretResults
else
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A.4 OmniHide Pro - Signature Detection
#!/bin/bash
xxd -p "${file}" > /tmp/tmp1
tr -d ’\n’ < /tmp/tmp1 > /tmp/tmp2
tac /tmp/tmp2 > /tmp/tmp3
if grep -q -E -m1 \(20\)\{140,\} /tmp/tmp3; then
echo -e \ "Signature test - OmniHide signature found" "${file}" >>
/home/user/Results/OmniHidePResults
else
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A.5 BDV DataHider - Signature Detection
content...#!/bin/bash
xxd -p "${file}" > /tmp/tmp1
tr -d ’\n’ < /tmp/tmp1 > /tmp/tmp2
if grep -c -q "fbead881250ff9" /tmp/tmp2; then
echo -e \ "Signature test - BDV signature detected " "${file}" >>
/home/user/Results/BDVResults
else
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A.6 Generalised EOF Scanner
#!/bin/bash
catch="invalid atom size, extends outside parent atom"
mp4file --dump "${file}" > /tmp/tmp1
test=$(grep -o "invalid atom size, extends outside parent atom"
/tmp/tmp1)
echo $test >/tmp/tmp2
if [[ $test == $catch ]]
then
echo -e \ "${file}" "EOF Test - EOF injection detected! We recommend
running signature tests" >>/home/user/Results/EOFResults;
else
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A.7 OpenPuff - Flag Detection
#!/bin/bash
IFS=$’\n’
for line in $(< /tmp/tmp1); do
echo $line | sed ’s/.*(\(.*\))/\1/’ >>/tmp/tmp2
done
for line in $(< /tmp/tmp2); do





for line in $(< /tmp/tmp3); do
result=$(echo $line)




echo -n "" >/tmp/tmp2





if [[ $pvar -gt $nvar ]]; then
echo -e \ "${file}" "Flag test - Modified flags, OpenPuff Steganography
detected " $pvar $nvar >> /home/user/Results/OpenPuffResults
else
APPENDIX A. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SCRIPTS 169





APPENDIX A. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT SCRIPTS 170





for filename in glob.glob(’*.pdf’):
with open(filename, "rb") as f:
stream=f.read()
f10 = re.findall( b’\x65\x6E\x64\x73\x74\x72\x65\x61\x6D\x0D’, stream)
#Counting "endstream+CR"
occurf10=len(f10)
f11 = re.findall( b’\x65\x6E\x64\x73\x74\x72\x65\x61\x6D\x0A’, stream)
#Counting "endstream+LF"
occurf11=len(f11)
f20 = re.findall( b’\x65\x6e\x64\x6F\x62\x6A\x0D’, stream) #Counting
"endobj+CR"
occurf20=len(f20)
f21 = re.findall( b’\x65\x6e\x64\x6F\x62\x6A\x0A’, stream) #Counting
"endobj+LF"
occurf21=len(f21)
f30 = re.findall( b’\x20\x6F\x62\x6A\x0D’, stream) #Counting " obj+CR"
occurf30=len(f30)




print "This PDF file has contents hidden with OpenPuff"
maxhiddensize=0.2204*occurf11+0.2117*occurf21+0.2115*occurf31-194.6563
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print "Our estimate of the maximum size of the embedded data is",
maxhiddensize, "bytes"
else:
print "This PDF file does not have contents hidden with OpenPuff"
if ((occurf10*occurf20)==0):
print "It looks like a scanned or a compressed file"
Appendix B
Overview and Description of the
Framework
Work throughout this thesis has shown that, quite often, the steganography process
introduces predictable changes in stego-objects when using practical stego-systems.
In this work, modifications are identified using a method that is independent of the
exact tool or media format. The results obtained are related to the particular tool
used, though sometimes several tools can be affected by the same vulnerability, due
to the use of common libraries. These changes extend beyond the unavoidable im-
pact upon the signal itself, which is the subject of classical statistical steganalysis.
These implementation issues are generally unintentional modifications that can
be, however, very useful to distinguish between cover objects and stego-objects.
Implementation issues of this type can provide an analyst with a number of
options for developing an effective steganalysis framework. Signatures which can
be seen as consistent fingerprints from the stego-system are a classic candidate
for these attacks. Signatures can be unique to the stego-system and appear solely
in the stego-object. In an ideal scenario, the signature will consist of strings of
enough length and entropy so that perfect accuracy (in terms of zero false positives
and negatives) can be achieved [25], although of course this is not always the case.
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B.0.1 Concepts and definitions regarding attribute extrac-
tion
In this section a specific example is used to describe some of the terms employed
later when describing the procedure itself and all of its steps.
The objective is then the construction of a classifier able to separate cover ob-
jects from stego-objects. As in any machine learning technique, objects have to be
described in terms of features, also called attributes. For instance, the existence
of a given signature in an object would map to an attribute that has two possi-
ble values, True (if the signature is present) or False (otherwise). A supervised
classification system is able to learn the correlation between the existence of those
features and each of the object classes, if provided with adequate training data.
This training data would incorporate the class of each of the objects (labelled
data). The information the classifier learns can be called a “model”. The final
objective is twofold: to build a model that represents the information available
for training, but also that successfully predicts the correct class for any previously
unseen object, such as those found in a real-world scenario. This is usually called
“generalisation”.
Without any assumption on where potential signatures will be located in the ob-
ject, attribute generation has to be modelled as a search for modifications pro-
duced by the steganographic process. This search can be performed by comparing
a cover-object with its corresponding stego-object. Then, the system has to de-
termine if the change is consistent throughout a significant part of the available
labelled data. A classifier can only use these “consistent features”, because they
are the ones that represent information not particular to single pairs of cover and
stego-objects. For the same reason, those attributes are likely to be the most use-
ful to construct a model able to generalize, that is, a model able to successfully
distinguish between stego- and cover-objects in the most generalizable way.
In this work, a simple grammar is used, shown in Table 40, to identify potential
attributes of the classification model. With it, three different pattern types can
be generated:
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<pattern> ::= <cnst> [ <var> | { <mconst> } ] [ <cnst> ]
<mcnst> ::= <var> <cnst> <var>
<var> ::= <skip> [ <val> ] | <val> [ <skip> ]
<cnst> ::= <hex> { <hex> }
<skip> ::= "*" { "*" }
<val> ::= "?" { "?" }
<hex> ::= [af 09]
Table 40: Grammar used for the pattern generation, in EBNF notation.
• Fixed patterns. Those are strings that can be found in cover objects but
missing in stego-objects or, more frequently, the other way around. They
generally correspond to some piece of information injected or deleted by the
steganographic process. Those patterns become attributes, labelled by the
value of the pattern itself, 0012-6e4d for instance, and take binary values,
True or False.
• Variable patterns. They are strings in which a particular sub-string is
constantly changed by the same value or values. For instance, pattern
0012????0000????6e4d6574 describes one where the variable part ???? is
systematically changed for the same value or values, but the remaining 8
bytes stay constant (0012, 0000, 6e4d6574).
Variable patterns become attributes labelled with the constant part. For in-
stance, if 0012abcd000012346e4d6574 and 001212340000abcd6e4d6574 are
both found, a new attribute called 0012????0000????6e4d6574 is included,
where the only values permitted are: abcd-1234, 1234-abcd and Void.
• Extended patterns. Those patterns correspond with situations where dif-
ferences between the cover and stego-objects include a fixed part, a variable
part that changes always to the same value or values, and a variable part that
takes arbitrary values. For instance, the pattern 0012????****????6e4d6574
is similar to the previous example, but without taking into account the value
of the third byte.
The search for patterns is performed by comparison of each pair of cover- and
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stego-objects, using the aforementioned grammar as reference for identifying and
generating attributes.
At the end of this process of attribute discovery, the entire object dataset is
replaced by an attribute-value table, where each row corresponds to an object,
stego or cover, each column to an attribute, and the cells are filled with the values
of each attribute for each object.
In Table 41, a learning set with 30 objects (15 stego and 15 cover) and 3
attributes is shown. For instance, column 21 corresponds to an object where the
string “6e4d6574” is not present, string “00123b2a00009218” is, and “00122dfb****e05d”
is also present, no matter the value assigned to the asterisks. This table constitutes
the training set for the naive-bayes algorithm, which is used in the next step to
distinguish between cover- and stego-objects. In the next section, a more detailed
description is introduced about how to built the training set.
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Attributes 6e4d-6574 0012-???? 0012-????
0000-???? ****-????
Objects 6e4d-6574 6e4d-6574
VideoS 1 True Void Void
VideoC 1 False Void Void
VideoS 2 True Void Void
VideoC 2 False Void Void
VideoS 3 True Void Void
VideoC 3 False Void Void
VideoS 4 True Void Void
VideoC 4 False Void Void
VideoS 5 False Void Void
VideoC 5 False Void Void
VideoS 6 False 3b2a-9218 Void
VideoC 6 False Void Void
VideoS 7 False 3b2a-9218 Void
VideoC 7 False Void Void
VideoS 8 False 3b2a-9218 Void
VideoC 8 False Void Void
VideoS 9 False 2dfb-e05d Void
VideoC 9 False Void Void
VideoS 10 False 2dfb-e05d Void
VideoC 10 False Void Void
VideoS 11 False 3b2a-9218 2dfb-e05d
VideoC 11 False Void Void
VideoS 12 False 3b2a-9218 3b2a-9218
VideoC 12 False Void Void
VideoS 13 False 3b2a-9218 2dfb-e05d
VideoC 13 False Void Void
VideoS 14 False 2dfb-e05d 3b2a-9218
VideoC 14 False Void Void
VideoS 15 False 2dfb-e05d 3b2a-9218
VideoC 15 False Void Void
Table 41: Example of a learning table.
B.0.2 Model construction from extracted features
The overall process proposed in this work proceeds in five steps:
1. Extract patterns from a set of paired objects (cover and stego), each one
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labelled with the class it belongs to (as depicted in Figure 48).
2. Generalize patterns extracted in the previous step, and add the resulting
extended patterns to the repository.
3. Build a raw model from all patterns by searching on the whole training set
(Figure 49).
4. Refine model using predefined rules.
























Figure 49: Block diagram of the process, Step 3
Note that training requires having paired objects, that is, both a cover-object
and the corresponding stego-object, where a steganographic scheme has embedded
a message of unknown length. This set of objects is what can be referred to as
training set.
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In the experimental procedure, a test set is also used, choosing randomly a
fraction from the training set. The use of a separate test set is a common practice
for parameter tuning and to stop over fitting [59]. The experiments were evaluated
using k-fold cross-validation on the third group of objects, the validation set, so
the split among train, test, and validation sets is performed 10 times.
In the following sections, detail is given for each of the aforementioned steps in
the process.
B.0.3 Pattern extraction and pattern generalization
B.0.3.1 Step 1: Pattern extraction
This phase processes files from the training set to extract patterns that can be
used to construct a model. These selective patterns have to be searched using a
predefined criteria so they represent the modifications that a stego-system imprints
onto the files that represent both cover-objects (called cover-files) and stego-objects
(called stego-files) through its embedding scheme.
In these experiments, a search was initially conducted for two types of patterns,
based on previous knowledge of two typical steganography techniques, namely Flag
Replacement and End-of-File code injection.
• Patterns for Flag Replacement are extracted comparing a cover-file with
its corresponding stego-file. The search finds consistent sequences of bytes
located in parallel between both files.
In Table 42, the extraction process is described for one of these patterns.
In this example, an object pair is explored and it is shown that, at a given
position, 11 bytes can be identified that had the same value in both files,
then, 3 bytes are shown that were different in both files, followed by 4 bytes
that had again the same value in both.
• Patterns for EOF Injection are sequences of bytes that are found anywhere
(but frequently at the end) in a stego-file, but not in the corresponding cover-
file. In this case, only constant patterns are returned, that is, patterns with
no variable part.
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Table 42: Example pattern for flag replacement.
An example of these patterns can be found in Table 43. The final portion
of the cover-file is repeated in the stego-file, but there are some additional
contents present in the stego-file. A section of these contents are selected
(2a50523131306d622020 in the example) and store it if that fragment is not
found at any position of the cover-file.
File Hexadecimal dump in file order
Cover: 777bbbf0 EOF
Stego: 777bbbf0 2a50523131306d622020... EOF
Pattern: 2a50523131306d622020
Table 43: Example pattern for EOF code injection.
B.0.3.2 Step 2: Pattern generalization
The result of the pattern extraction process is a pattern repository. On this repos-
itory, a generalization process can be run that introduces an additional number of
extended patterns.
This mechanism was introduced to account for the fact that some object pairs
had specific parts that were being introduced in the patterns, when considered
those pairs individually, but were never repeated in other data. For instance, the
file size or file name might be present in that section of the files, and would be
consistent in cover and stego-objects, but would never (or rarely) be repeated in
any other object. So those patters were useful, but had to be generalized to match
more than one pair of cover and stego-objects.
This process is performed as follows:
1. Group the patterns in clusters, according to similarity
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2. For each cluster formed that contains at least two patterns, create a gener-
alized pattern by replacing each position that is not identical in all patterns
with the (*) sign
The clustering method, hierarchical agglomerative clustering technique (HAC)
with single linkage [80] is used, employing the Hamming distance as a measure
of similarity between patterns. When comparing two patterns, their Hamming
distance was computed as the ratio of symbols that are different for each position in
the pattern. That is, two patterns where all positions have the same symbols have
distance 0.0; if a third of the symbols are different, then distance is approximately
0.33 and so on. The patterns that were closer in terms of Hamming distance were
clustered together, as long as their distance was not above a certain threshold
“Th”. The distance function assigned distance 1.0 to patterns of different length,
thus ensuring that the cluster mechanism never placed those patterns in the same
group.
As seen in Table 44, new patterns are obtained where some of the bytes are to be
ignored. This step is relevant if the original patterns extracted when comparing
a cover-object and its corresponding stego-object are specific only to that pair.
Extended patterns are guaranteed to match at least two pairs of objects, and







Table 44: Example of the Pattern Generalization process. The repository contains three
variable patterns, and single extended pattern is generated, abstracting all
B.0.3.3 Step 3: Model generation
Model generation consists in the application of every pattern to all object pairs
in the training set, and the computation of two distributions of values for each
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pattern, one for the cover-object and one for the stego-object. This is done by
calculating the frequencies for the values obtained for each pattern, as described
previously.
An example of model generation is presented in Table 45. The first section in
Table 45 corresponds to the pattern in Table 42. It matched 90% of the cover-
objects and also 90% of the stego-objects.
Pattern 1: 0000001200017b000000????????02000a6f
Matches Value Frequency
Cover 90% 0000 0000 0.90
(Class0) False 0.10
Stego 90% 0000 0000 0.18
(Class1) 0004 1010 0.01




Cover 0% False 1.0
(Class0) True 0.0
Stego 75% False 0.25
(Class1) True 0.75
Table 45: Model constructed from the example patterns
The value “False” is included for the cases where the pattern did not match.
For the cases that the pattern matched, the frequencies of the values are obtained
located among the training set. The result in this example was:
• For cover-objects the value was 0000 0000.
• For stego-objects, the values were 0000 0000 in 18% of cases, and different
from 0000 0000 (possibly random values) in 82% of cases. This may mean
that a generally unused “flag” position was frequently (but not always) mod-
ified by the embedding scheme.
The second pattern in Table 45, corresponds to the example pattern shown in
Table 43. As the pattern has only a constant part, only the frequently matched
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files of both classes are computed. For this example, it can be assumed that it was
never identified within cover-objects, and it was found in 75% of the stego-objects.
Conventionally, the value “False” can be assigned when a pattern does not match,
and “True” when it does.
These frequencies are then stored as CPTs for the model, and used for classi-
fication using the Maximum Likelihood rule (Eq. 9). In Appendix C, details are
given into how this would be applied to a specific case using the current example.
B.0.3.4 Step 4: Model refining
After model construction, but before classification, filtering can be applied to
eliminate patterns that are certainly not useful for classification. This pruning
process consists in applying the following rules:
• Eliminate patterns that only match files in one file pair (the file pair from
which they were obtained)
• Eliminate patterns whose distribution of values is the same for both cases
(cover and stego).
• Eliminate patterns whose distribution of values is thought to be approxi-
mately random for both cases (cover and stego).
Also, the following two policies were used to modify the CPTs in the model,
to address some practical issues in this process of model construction:
• The empirical distribution may not be complete, in the sense that some
of the values for a feature may not be found in any of the cases used for
training. This is usually called the problem of zero-observation (that is, a
possible value is never observed when training). In this case, the simplest
strategy used in literature is adopted, that is, assigning a fixed small value
to the factor corresponding to unknown values. This ensures that the joint
probability product does not become 0 due to unknown values [63].
• The CPT associated to a feature was transformed when the CPT for a feature
had a single value V0 with frequency 1.0 in one case (either cover or stego).
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In these cases, the CPT was considered binary, that is, with only two cases:
Pr(V0|Classk) and Pr(¬V0|Classk), where ¬V0 means “any value different
from V0”
These subtle changes to the general process generate what can be defined as the
Refined Model, that is the final result of training and is returned as the solution
to the steganalysis problem at hand.
B.0.3.5 Step 5: Model validation
This step simply classifies a set of objects that was reserved from the original
labelled data, and reports the results in terms of classification success rate. This
is the expected success rate for the classifier on new data that might be presented
in the future.
Appendix C
Example of Classification using a
Naive Bayes Model
Let us assume a case with the example model in Table 45 is being tested. For each
pattern in the model, two factors are obtained. One is the (estimated) likelihood
for cover-objects, and the other for the stego-objects. These products of likelihoods
are used as in Eq. 9 to obtain the class.
Using this example, Pattern 1 would first be tested. If the pattern does not
match the file, the value can be considered as “False”. If it matches, then its value
can be examined for that case, and go to the proper part of the Model in Table 45
to find the factors to be used in Eq. 9:
• If the value is 0000 0000, the following values are used:
Pr(0000 0000|Class0)=0.9
Pr(0000 0000|Class1)=0.18
• If the value is different than 0000 0000, then the following is used:
Pr(¬(0000 0000)|Class0)=0.1
Pr(¬(0000 0000)|Class1)=1− 0.18 = 0.82
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, where ¬(0000 0000) means that the value is different from 0000 0000.
Then you would proceed pattern 2, where it is determined whether the pattern
matches the file (True) or not (False).
• If the pattern matches the file, Pr(True|Class0) = 0.0 is used 1 and
Pr(True|Class1) = 1.0.
• However, if the pattern does not match the file, Pr(False|Class0) = 1.0 and
Pr(False|Class1) = 0.25 is used.
So let’s say that a file has 0000 0000 for the first pattern and the second
pattern matched this file; then one would calculate:
• For Class0,
Pr(0000 0000|Class0) =
=Pr1(0000 0000|Class0)× Pr2(True|Class0) =
=0.9× 0.0 = 0.0
Pr(Class0|0000 0000) =
=α× Pr(Class0)× Pr(0000 0000|Class0)
=α× 0.5× Pr(0000 0000|Class0)
=α× 0.5× 0.0 = 0
1Usual practice in these classifiers is to smooth values that are equal to 0, because any factor
whose value is 0.0 would make the rest of the patterns useless for classification. The simplest
method found in literature is to replace 0.0 for a small, non-zero value [63]
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• For Class1,
Pr(0000 0000|Class1) =
=Pr1(0000 0000|Class1)× Pr2(True|Class1) =
=0.18× 0.75 = 0.135
Pr(Class1|0000 0000) =
=α× Pr(Class1)× Pr(0000 0000|Class1)
=α× 0.5× Pr(0000 0000|Class1)
=α× 0.5× 0.135 > 0
Because training is being carried out with balanced classes, the values of
P (Class0) and P (Class1) are both 0.5 and the factor α is the same for both. Thus,
instead of calculating the value for the posterior probability (P (Class0|0000 0000)),
it is possible to simply compare the likelihoods (0 and 0.135) and conclude that
the file should be classified as Class1, the class that has the greater likelihood.
Appendix D
Kent Digital Media Archive
Internet access to digital media resources, although ubiquitous are often subject
to strict policies regarding user download and distribution. These resources are
usually managed by copyright infringement policies or the host servers place strict
guidelines upon these media files to limit or block user access with techniques such
as digital watermarks, anti-crawling and many more. While the benefits of this
can be self-evident, easy access to a large archive of varying media files for research
purposes is a common request amongst academics and researchers, especially for
those in the domain of cyber-security, digital forensics, and machine learning, or
content based retrieval where authors will often have to use their own datasets
or do not specify the source [131]. In this sense, files can be used for testing
a various avenues of research, such as steganography, digital content forensics,
compression, and content-based image retrieval (CBIR). This is also inclusive to
research and development through image and video application benchmarking.
This can be a challenge to carry out due to availability of datasets for testing [130],
this is especially relevant in cases where a significantly large number of datasets
are required for analysis and testing over multiple frameworks. Availability of files
for these purposes are scarce and under the circumstances that they are freely
accessible with no strings attached, download policies usually restrict or limit
access to large numbers of these files, often through Captcha technology.
Having identified a significant gap where media files are needed for large-scale
testing and benchmarking, this project has endeavoured to build an archive that
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provides an open source multimedia repository available to all for research and
academic purposes. Although use of these files will be applicable to a large number
of fields and disciplines, emphasis will be placed upon research in cyber-security,
digital forensic, and benchmarking. As such, all content and datasets created for
the archive will be created by the project authors and additional participants using
state of the art devices such as cameras, smartphones and tablets.
The foundation of this archive is built around an extensive amount of diverse
multimedia content, consisting of videos, images, and in the future, audio. This
spans a range of file formats such as MP4, AVI, M4V, MOD, and JPEG. All
content produced for the archive is freely available and easily accessible with a
current archive size of 25,000 images, and 2,000 video files.
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